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**Allodi, Tommaso** (Italy)

Affiliation: University of Udine-University of Trieste (Italy)

Session: 6, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

I completed my BA and Masters Degree at the "Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore" of Milan with a thesis on Moral Virtue in Aristotle.

I am currently a second-year Ph.D student in ethics at the University of Udine-University of Trieste (Inter-University Doctorate). The provisional title of the thesis is "The relationship between virtue and human nature within Virtue Ethics" (tutor: Prof Gabriele De Anna). I am currently working on Neo-Naturalism paying attention to different understandings of Philippa Foot's appeal to human nature.

Title: **Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism: which appeal to human nature?**

Keywords: Natural Normativity – Transcendental Anthropology – Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism – Foot – Annas

**Abstract:**

In metaethics, Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism is the view that purports to ground moral judgments on some 'facts' about the nature of human beings. This thesis is usually clarified by means of an analogy with living beings: as a 'wolf that eats but does not take part in the hunt' is a defective wolf, likewise a human beings who lacks the virtue of justice is a defective human being.

Nevertheless, one of the main charges against this kind of view is that it is hard to see how moral judgments are not reduced to the kind of statistical normalities provided by biology and, hence, it is argued that Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism is doomed to failure since it cannot avoid appealing to a morally indeterminate conception of human nature. The aim of this paper will be to consider a line of reasoning supported by Thompson and Hacker Wright, who argue that Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism is not undermined by this objection.

In the first section I will consider J. Annas' formulation and I will try to show that from her understanding of Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism which seems to be, at least in some passages, supported by Hursthouse's work, she is entirely warranted in considering Neo-Aristotelian view as committed to a neutral conception of human nature.

Indeed, if the analogy with living beings rests on the twofold thesis that the world of animals and plants is the one countenanced by sciences, and human beings are similar to other living beings insofar as they share a certain biology with them, it is hard to see how Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism can avoid this objection.

In the second part of the paper I will consider how according to Hacker Wright and Thompson the natural normativity schema is not committed to the method of sciences.

On the one hand, Thompson argues that the 'natural history' of a certain life-form entails "natural historical statements", a kind of propositions irreducible to a mere survey of the individuals falling under that life-form.

On the other hand, Hacker Wright supports this idea by arguing that Foot's appeal to human nature is transcendental rather than empirical. The mediation of the "background understanding of the life-form" is considered as a constitutive part of human agency and entails a non-observational element since it is only through the direct non-observational access to our vital operation that we understand what we are doing.

In conclusion, the line of reasoning embraced by Thompson and Hacker Wright purports to explain a different role of the analogy with living beings, which is assumed to shed light on how the mediation of the 'life-form' can transcendently frame what is good to pursue for a certain individual belonging to that life-form.

Nevertheless, although this view seems to be promising, it also asks for a better characterization about the kind of similarity, if not biological, that living beings share and the kind of objectivity, if not scientific, that Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism can provide.

**References:**

Annas, Julia. (2005) What Kind of Naturalism?, in S. Gardiner (ed.), *Virtue Ethics, Old and New*, Cornell University Press, New York.

Foot, Philippa. (2001), *Natural Goodness*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Thompson, Michael. (2008), *The Representation of Life*, in *Life and Action*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA).

Hursthouse, Rosalind. (1999) *On Virtue Ethics*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Hacker-Wright, John. (2012) Ethical Naturalism and the constitution of Agency, in "Journal of Value Inquiry".

# **Book of Abstracts**

**IX Braga Meetings on Ethics and Political Philosophy**

**University of Minho  
Braga, Portugal  
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**Almeida, Hugo** (Portugal)

Affiliation: CIUHCT - Interuniversity Center for the History of Science and Technology, Faculty of Science and Technology, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa (Portugal)

Session: 10, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

Hugo Almeida (n. 1984) is a post-doctoral researcher at CIUHCT, Faculty of Science and Technology, NOVA University of Lisbon (2017-). Alumni of the residency program of the IMÉRA Foundation, University of Aix-Marseille, France (2016-2017), and of the Saari Residence, Mynämäki, Finland (2016). Former researcher at CIEBA, Faculty of Fine Arts, University of Lisbon (2013-2016). Holds a PhD in Molecular Biology (2013), for research conducted at the Instituto Gulbenkian de Ciência, Oeiras. Publishes comics with Clube do Inferno (2012-).

Title: **Not-human, not-fly: David Cronenberg's *The Fly* and the fictional representation of the Anthropocene**

Keywords: Anthropocene; posthumanism; science fiction; film; David Cronenberg

**Abstract:**

According to Bruno Latour, the Anthropocene demands an ontological revolution that overcomes the subject and object dichotomy, still the go-to organizing schema to define hierarchies, explain processes and articulate experiences. The humanist model that posits individuals in opposition to their environments loses explanatory power if, as Latour, we readjust the concept of agency to include non-human and non-living actors, while considering them as implicated cooperators in our actions.

Nevertheless, this perspective remains a dominant principle in mainstream forms of narrative. This communication will propose that David Cronenberg's 1986 film *The Fly* presents an alternative to this situation. The main character—a scientist turning into a monster after an experimental accident with a housefly—is an actor in which the two traditionally distinct narrative functions of subject and object converge. This mutating creature is presented as a biological continuum defined by an axis of human and nonhuman forms: not simply a subject, but a self-assessing locus of converging agencies that may be understood as an ongoing process. In other words, the scientist-turning-monster not only acts, but is also acted upon. Thus, the character results from the accidental cooperation of human and nonhuman agencies, as if demonstrating, following the provocative statement of Donna Haraway, that “we have never been human”. The film confronts the audience with the moral and aesthetic consequences of a partial de-centering of perspective from the human subject, thus serving as case study for the posthumanist perspective.

*The Fly* is a particularly disruptive entry point to the posthuman, here understood in two mutually reinforcing modes. Firstly, it will be understood as a speculative category for entities that are beyond a conventional understanding of the human and its modes of engagement, but which, nonetheless, are parallel to or descendent from the human. Secondly, this analysis will also subscribe to posthumanism as a disciplinary program, which seeks a reappreciation of humans as entangled naturalcultural, multispecies realities. Following Rosi Braidotti, a posthumanist understanding presupposes a dis-identification from familiar ways of “seeing” that encourages alternative perspectives. That is to say, there is no frictionless transition to the posthuman and appropriate forms of thinking, as it entails fundamental alterations in our relationship with self and environment. In this light, the monster in *The Fly* figures as an uncompromising caricature of the Anthropocene: a disruptive, negative image of the exchanges between humans, nonhumans and technological apparatuses, from which we all come into being as monstrous and improvised coexistences.

We will consider the extent to which *The Fly* expresses these considerations, what are the moral assumptions involved in the film that retain the ideologically- and historically-circumscribed features of a “human”, and how we may learn to appreciate a creature that is not-human, but is also not-fly.

**Bacchetta, Silvia** (Italy)

Affiliation: University of Milan (Italy)

Session: 15, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Silvia Bacchetta graduated in Philosophy at the University of Eastern Piedmont (Italy). Currently she is a PhD Candidate at NASP (Network for the Advancement of Social and Political studies) at the University of Milan for the PhD program in Political Studies.

Title: **Can Contractualism Overcome the Noncompliance Issue in Climate Change International Treaties?**

Keywords: Climate Change; Political Theory; Contractualism; Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory; Noncompliance

**Abstract:**

Contractualist solutions – or, more generally, horizontal approaches – can be considered as the theoretical mirroring of real-world climate negotiations. In this sense, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement can be considered as the two most important examples of international agreements on climate change mitigation. Both treaties are an example of a horizontal strategy among various agents who, coming from different point of views and interests, find a point of agreement on a set of measures to mitigate climate change. However, despite the promising starting point, both treaties had to deal with the issue of noncompliance. Starting from this premise derived from real-world politics, my aim is to investigate why contractualist solutions seem to be unable to solve the issue of noncompliance regarding climate change mitigation policies. The starting assumption is that both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement could be re-described as contractualist agreements on climate change mitigation, in which agents agree on a set of principles (or, in this case, mitigation measures) that, if implemented, would achieve the goal of mitigation. Theoretically, the contractualist approach represents the best solution to find a point of agreement among different agents with different interest, but, when put into practice, it could generate the problem of noncompliance because of the gap between the ideal formulation and the non-ideal realization. From this perspective, I hold that the noncompliance issue could arise from the polarization between ideal and non-ideal theorising. In ideal theory, it is implied that agents will fully comply with the measures they agree on, whereas non-ideal theory deals with partial compliance. The same pattern of ideal/non-ideal theorising can be traced on both the Kyoto Protocol's and the Paris Agreement's negotiations. Indeed, despite the theoretical advantages, the devised measures were rarely implemented, and agents have often withdrawn from the treaties they previously agreed on. By re-describing the international negotiation's proceedings as a problem of ideal and non-ideal theory, it can be inferred that there is a short circuit between the theoretical (ideal) planning of mitigation treaties and their actual implementation. For this reason, I hold that the noncompliance issue could be generated exactly from the shift from ideal to non-ideal theory. In this paper, I will try to show that, for what concerns climate change international treaties, shifting from ideal to non-ideal theory is problematic and directly leads to noncompliance, because ideal theory takes for granted full compliance from the involved agents, but when we move to actual policymaking, i.e. non-ideal theory, we do not have the same level of compliance that we assumed in ideal theory. This because contractualist approaches are based on a too high level of idealization that short-circuits the passage from ideal to non-ideal theory. I will try to show how noncompliance related to climate change policymaking is connected to contractualist approaches' idealization. In conclusion, I hold that, despite its appeal, contractualism may not be helpful to overcome the issue of noncompliance regarding climate change.

**Baião, António** (Portugal)

Affiliation: CEPS (Portugal)

Session: 22, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

PhD candidate in Philosophy (speciality: Social and Political Philosophy) at the Institute of Arts and Humanities of University of Minho. In my PhD project, I intend to develop a theoretical and critical analysis of contemporary anarchist thought.

Title: **Foucault, reader of Machiavelli: *raison d'État*, governmentality and state of exception**

Keywords: *Raison d'État*; governmentality; state neutrality; state of exception

**Abstract:**

This paper intends to raise the following questions: (i) can *raison d'État* be understood as a principle of state neutrality?; (ii) is it possible to accomplish a effective relation between politics and ethics, or the state and moral principles, if the state's essence and constitution depends on its salvation and self-preservation?; (iii) if the nature of the state is outlined by the principle of necessity and through the endless possibility of its normative framework to become bankrupted, does *raison d'État* legitimates a everlasting state of exception?

In the ninth lecture at the College de France, in March 8 1978, Michel Foucault explains that the birth of the concept of *raison d'État*, after the publication of Machiavelli's *Il Principe* (1513) and Giovanni Botero's *Della Ragion de Stato* (1589), was so innovative as Kepler's and Galileo's scientific breakthroughs. This discovery implied that the art of government could be detached from divine authority, which became decisive to reassess the concept of sovereignty that would be in the origin of the modern state: thus, *raison d'État* establishes politics in a autonomous domain and becomes the first secular expression of governmentality.

Foucault's interpretive proposal is particularly interesting because it expresses itself out of the tension between those who argue that *raison d'État* is nothing more than a Machiavellian transversion and between those who do not believe that there can be room for *raison d'État* in Machiavelli's work, for he would be more concerned with the preservation of the prince's power than with the relationship between the governed and the governors (Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, p. 245). In the following week's lesson of March 15, Foucault suggests a definition of *raison d'État* that transcends this duality: *raison d'État* arise from the conjunction between the art of government and the constitutive and conservative essence of the state (Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, pp. 257-258).

For this reason, Foucault considers that *raison d'État* marks a break with the forms of government that developed in the middle ages and through the Renaissance: with *raison d'État*, political temporality becomes indeterminate and the state becomes an end in itself. Thus, *raison d'État* is anti-teleological and is situated in the domain of an open historicity (Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, p. 260). Its main purpose is to ensure the preservation of all the institutions of governmentality that guarantee the regular operation of the state. In this sense, when the state is faced with a crisis, *raison d'État* can express itself violently as *coup d'État*, which emerges as a potentia and display of its self-conservative drive.

Finally, it would be interesting to note that Foucault is criticizing a model supported on the notion of *raison d'État* that, in his account, enforces a securitized state. We will try to show how the rejection of an «increasingly securitized state» (Saul Newman, «The libertarian impulse») requires a deconstruction of the political discourse and to move beyond *raison d'État*.

**Barclay, Linda** (Australia)

Affiliation: Monash University (Australia)

Session: 18, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Philosophy, Monash University. I specialise in political philosophy, with a special interest in disability and equality. My book, *Disability with Dignity*, is forthcoming with Routledge this year

Title: **Cognitive impairment and the moral significance of social status**

Keywords: Disability, social status, equality

**Abstract:**

The philosophical discussion about human beings with severe cognitive impairments has been dominated by the question of their moral status. While motivated initially by a defence of the moral status of animals, it is now commonplace to compare the moral status or standing of individuals with very severe cognitive impairments to that of animals. There is no capacity or trait possessed by all human beings that accords all of them a higher moral status than animals. Any nominated candidate will either exclude some human beings, or include many animals. Inasmuch as we might accept some human beings do have elevated moral status, this will be because of features like rationality, autonomy, or the capacity for moral agency. Most individuals with severe cognitive impairments do not possess these traits, or possess them at the same (low) level as some animals.

As a defence of the moral status of animals, many philosophers welcome these conclusions. Those who work in the philosophy of disability generally abhor them. Eva Kittay has asked: "How can I begin to tell you what it feels like to read texts in which one's child is compared, in all seriousness and with political authority, to a dog, pig, rat, and most flatteringly a chimp; how corrosive these comparisons are, how they mock those relationships that affirm who we are and why we care?".

In this paper, I argue that there are powerful ways to defend treating individuals with severe cognitive impairments much like we would treat other people. Their lives should be protected, their quality of life taken seriously, they should enjoy most of the legal privileges of other adult human beings, and they should be treated with just the same civility, respect and benevolence. The solution is not to offer yet another attempt to identify some intrinsic capacity or feature shared by all human beings that mark them out as having high moral status. Indeed, the solution largely involves side-stepping questions of moral status altogether. Instead, we should focus on the moral significance of social status. There is a certain social status typically enjoyed by adult human beings. To withhold the conditions for this social status from some adult human beings on account of their cognitive impairments can have grave implications for their exposure to what everyone would agree is cruelty and mistreatment. The same pernicious consequences do not follow for animals, who nobody has suggested should share our social status.



**Barezhev, Konstantin** (Russia)

Affiliation: Planetary Development Institute (United Arab Emirates)

Session: 5, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Dr Konstantin Barezhev is the co-author of the Planetary Project, and Director for Research of the Planetary Development Institute, Dubai, UAE.

A native of St Petersburg, Russia, he graduated from St Petersburg State University with a Cum Laude Degree in philosophy. He worked for organisations engaged in developing parliamentarism, democracy and civil society. In 2000, he received a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the Department of Ontology and Theory of Cognition of St Petersburg State University. His thesis focused on the evolution of the concept of meaning in European metaphysics, criticism and phenomenology.

**Title: Anthropocene in Light of Planetary Ideas and the Concept of Managed Harmony**

**Keywords:** Anthropocene, Russian Cosmism, Planetary Project, Managed Harmony, Global Spiritual Synthesis

**Abstract:**

Anthropocene is hailed as an era of ultimate dominance of man over nature when the nature of man is revealed as a subject of geological history. However, commentators point out to threats the era of anthropocene has brought about since it started in the middle of the 20th century. These threats include: radioactive contamination of the atmosphere; water, soil and the outer space pollution; climate change; depletion of species; and the deterioration of man at the biological and spiritual levels.

The problem is that scientists refuse to treat anthropocene as a planetary process limiting themselves to treating it merely as a historical and geological era. The notion of planetarity is one of key elements of the philosophy of Russian cosmism, especially that of Vladimir Vernadsky, and the Planetary Project, a school of thought that naturally derives from cosmism. Planetarity implies increasing interdependence between man and nature. This interdependence is growing proportionately to growing population, economic output and resource consumption. People must understand that in order to deter the death of man as a species they must not only carry out a dramatic technological leap forward, but make a breakthrough in human values. It seems a point of singularity must be reached for mankind to drastically change its way of life both on Earth and beyond.

Turning anthropocene into a process of human development both from a historical and an ontological perspective would entail human involvement with nature, understanding its mysteries, becoming a steward of managed evolution and settling other planets in the Universe. Following Russian cosmists, the Planetary Project has formulated conditions under which this transformation could occur:

- Achieving global human integration, the planetarisation of man who has overcome existing divisions and borders;
- Building a new system of resource management based on planetary rent, which would ensure fair distribution of wealth and take into account the interests of the biosphere itself;
- Lifting barriers in the development of science especially pertaining to high technologies;
- Developing a biocentric worldview based on planetary ethics and global spiritual synthesis;
- Building a noospheric civilisation on the principles of managed harmony.

The concept of anthropocene must incorporate the category of planetarity and the concept of managed evolution. From an ethical perspective, planetarity implies integrativity as the basis of human self-awareness. Integrativity of an individual with the rest of humanity and the world is a source of responsibility as the main ethical chord of Homo Sapiens. Man bears the ultimate responsibility to represent the interests of life in the Universe. This responsibility includes care for life on Earth and protecting it from external threats. To fulfill this responsibility, man has endowed with intelligence, intuition and spirituality, the latter understood as a sense of the universal connectedness of life.

**Bengtson, Audun** (Norway)

Affiliation: KU Leuven (Belgium)

Session: 19, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a PhD student at the Institute of Philosophy at KU Leuven. I work mainly on the topic of moral responsibility, the free will problem and Wittgenstein. The aim of my PhD is to develop a Wittgensteinian compatibilist position.

Title: **Rethinking Strawson's Account of Moral Responsibility: A Wittgensteinian Interpretation of the Relation between Reactive Attitudes and Moral Responsibility**

Keywords: Moral Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, Moral Concepts, P.F. Strawson, Wittgenstein

**Abstract:**

P.F. Strawson famously claimed in 'Freedom and Resentment' (1962) that we can derive everything we mean by our concept of moral responsibility from the reactive attitudes, such as resentment, gratitude, guilt, and moral indignation. Later interpretations of this view have formulated this in terms of constitutiveness: our concept of moral responsibility is constituted by the reactive attitudes. I will refer to this as the constitutive thesis. Precisely what the constitutive thesis entails, though, remains a source of controversy.

The common interpretation of this thesis is that our practices of holding people responsible via the reactive attitudes somehow determine what it means to be morally responsible (Watson 1987, 2014). Authors have criticized this view arguing that the constitutive thesis leads to unacceptable conclusions (Fischer & Ravizza 1993, Todd 2016). They argue that a consequence of the constitutive thesis is that if we were to start to hold children and people with severe mental disabilities morally responsible, it would mean that they are responsible. But this seems to undermine the intuitively plausible idea that it is inappropriate to hold such members of our society responsible. If we started to hold them responsible, we would say that there is something wrong with our practices, and not that they are now the appropriate targets of moral responsibility attributions.

In light of this worry, other philosophers have argued for a realist thesis where the property of being responsible is a property independent of our practices of holding people responsible (Brink & Nelkin 2013). This property will determine, independently of our practices, whether an agent is the appropriate target or not of our moral responsibility attributions, thus avoiding the above conclusion. This departs from the constitutive thesis because our practices do no longer determine what it means to be morally responsible. The realist thesis is not unproblematic. On the level of interpretation, it goes against Strawson's claim that all that we mean by our concept of moral responsibility can be derived from the reactive attitudes. Secondly, the realist thesis would have to account for the metaphysical status of the property of being responsible.

In this paper I defend Strawson's constitutive thesis against the above-mentioned concerns by providing a Wittgensteinian interpretation of the relationship between the reactive attitudes and our concept of moral responsibility. Specifically, I argue that we should understand the reactive attitudes as the primitive material from which our concept of moral responsibility is an extension. This interpretation, I argue, provides the resources to show how the reactive attitudes constitute our concept of moral responsibility. It also avoids the issue of having to deal with the difficult questions related to the metaphysical or ontological status of moral responsibility properties.

There are two implications of this result. 1) Interpretively, it provides a novel reading of Strawson's paper. 2) More broadly, this account provides a partial answer as to how we can understand the relationship between moral feelings and emotions and more complex moral concepts.

**Benli, Ali Emre** (Turkey)

Affiliation: Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics, UCL (Belgium)

Session: 21, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

I am currently a Hoover fellow at the Hoover Chair of Economic and Social Ethics in UC Louvain, Belgium. I received my PhD. in Political Theory from LUISS University in Rome. Since then I took up research positions at the University of Rijeka, the Italian Research Council, Durham University and University of Graz. I have also been a visiting lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Bogazici University in Istanbul.

Title: **Cosmopolitan political agency and political membership**

Keywords: Cosmopolitanism, political agency, political membership, refugees, asylum seekers

**Abstract:**

The arrival in Europe of large numbers of asylum seekers in 2015 lead to disarray and large-scale rights violations. Yet, the same period witnessed numerous forms of activism for the rights of refugees. Across Europe, diverse political agents made sustained attempts to fill in the void left by retreating institutions. The period contestation compels cosmopolitans to take up questions of political agency. Many leading theorists recognize that cosmopolitan theory is occupied more with questions of ideals and less with the ways of achieving these ideals (Archibugi and Held 2011:436). The main focus is on designing ideal political structures that achieve cosmopolitan values, after which the question becomes one of implementation and sustaining compliance. Yet, as the circumstances of 2015 show, the discretion of states in implementing policies voids rights protection regimes whenever states believe their interests are jeopardized. How can societies be moved closer to cosmopolitan ideals in actual circumstances characterized by national interests? Which agents can claim cosmopolitan political agency? What should these agents do to enhance cosmopolitan values? In this article, I delineate aspects of a cosmopolitan political agency by a discussion of leading cosmopolitan authors and their friendly critics. Friendly critics are in important respects committed to the cosmopolitan program, yet problematize moral and institutional cosmopolitans for overlooking essential questions of political agency. I begin by discussing why refugee protection in Europe should be a concern for cosmopolitan theory. My focus is on both moral (ethical) and institutional cosmopolitans, for in terms of ideal political structures, as Daniele Archibugi puts, “ethical cosmopolitanism is virtually the twin brother of the institutional cosmopolitanism” (2008:124). After that, I take up James Ingram’s radical cosmopolitanism, where he argues that the implementation of cosmopolitan ideals by avant-garde agents reproduces power disparities and leads to domination (2013). Then, I look at Lea Ypi’s statist cosmopolitanism where she emphasizes the importance of associative political relations to maintain political effectiveness and motivational sustainability (2012). A critical analysis of both concerns in the context of the acts by refugees lead me to a multi-faceted understanding of cosmopolitan political agency that focuses not only on the characteristics of the actor, but also on the features of the act and its context. I conclude by emphasizing that such an understanding is important to interpret numerous acts that took place, and yet to be carried out, in the context of contemporary mass movement of peoples.

Archibugi, Daniele (2008). *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens: Towards a Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Archibugi, Daniele and David Held (2011). “Cosmopolitan Democracy: Paths and Agents.” *Ethics and International Affairs* 25: 433-461.

Ingram, James D. (2013). *Radical Cosmopolitics: The Ethics and Politics of Democratic Universalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ypi, Lea (2012). *Global Justice and Avant-Garde Political Agency*. New York: Oxford University Press.

**Berkey, Brian** (United States)

Affiliation: University of Pennsylvania (United States)

Session: 25, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Brian Berkey is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics in the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, and an associated faculty member in the Department of Philosophy at Penn. His research is in moral and political philosophy.

Title: **The Philosophical Core of Effective Altruism**

Keywords: effective altruism; social movements; overlapping consensus

**Abstract:**

In his recent book on the effective altruism movement, Peter Singer approvingly cites a definition according to which effective altruism is “a philosophy and social movement which applies evidence and reason to working out the most effective ways to improve the world” (2015: 4-5). Effective altruism’s identity as both a philosophy and a social movement places effective altruists in a position in which they must consider the question of which philosophical commitments are essential, such that one must embrace them in order to count as an effective altruist, at least in part in the light of the goal of building a robust social movement capable of advancing its aims. On the one hand, the goal of building a social movement provides a strong reason for effective altruists to embrace a set of core commitments that is as ecumenical as possible, so that no one is excluded who might otherwise identify with the movement and contribute to advancing its central aims. On the other hand, there are a number of risks involved in adopting a broadly ecumenical approach to social movement building. Such an approach can, for example, limit a movement’s ability to challenge conventional wisdom by publically defending controversial claims, and can make certain forms of cooperation among members of a movement more difficult to sustain than they would otherwise be, since disagreements about the core values that the movement should embody and aim to promote will run deeper than they otherwise would.

It seems to me that to the extent that effective altruists can be ecumenical in articulating their movement’s core commitments without taking on (too much of) the risks, there is good reason for them to do so. In this paper, I develop a view about how effective altruists should characterize the movement’s core commitments, in light of the challenges presented by the goal of social movement building. My discussion highlights some important limits to effective altruism’s ability to be ecumenical deriving from the need to maintain a distinctive identity that is tied to central moral commitments that have, from the outset, animated the movement, as well as the need to avoid commitment to inconsistent or otherwise implausible claims or combinations of claims. Despite these limits, however, I argue that there are significant ways in which effective altruism’s core commitments both can and should be understood in ways that are substantially more ecumenical than some critical characterizations of the movement suggest they can be. I will draw on John Rawls’s idea of an “overlapping consensus” on core principles of justice in a liberal democratic society in order to suggest that effective altruism can be understood in terms of a set of core philosophical commitments that leaves room within the movement for a range of views on matters that are, at least from the perspective of the core commitments, subject to reasonable disagreement.

**Bezgodov, Aleksandr** (Russia)

Affiliation: Planetary Development Institute (United Arab Emirates)

Session: 5, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Prof. Aleksandr Bezgodov is the mastermind of the Planetary Project, a non-profit research organization, which is an associate member of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, and the founder and General Director of the Planetary Development Institute based in Dubai, UAE.

A Russian national, Prof. Bezgodov holds a PhD in Political Science and a Doctor of Economics degree, both from St Petersburg State University, Russia. His senior doctoral thesis focused on market mechanisms of implementing the concept of sustainable development.

**Title: Anthropocene in Light of Planetary Ideas and the Concept of Managed Harmony**

**Keywords:** Anthropocene, Russian Cosmism, Planetary Project, Managed Harmony, Global Spiritual Synthesis

**Abstract:**

Anthropocene is hailed as an era of ultimate dominance of man over nature when the nature of man is revealed as a subject of geological history. However, commentators point out to threats the era of anthropocene has brought about since it started in the middle of the 20th century. These threats include: radioactive contamination of the atmosphere; water, soil and the outer space pollution; climate change; depletion of species; and the deterioration of man at the biological and spiritual levels.

The problem is that scientists refuse to treat anthropocene as a planetary process limiting themselves to treating it merely as a historical and geological era. The notion of planetarity is one of key elements of the philosophy of Russian cosmism, especially that of Vladimir Vernadsky, and the Planetary Project, a school of thought that naturally derives from cosmism. Planetarity implies increasing interdependence between man and nature. This interdependence is growing proportionately to growing population, economic output and resource consumption. People must understand that in order to deter the death of man as a species they must not only carry out a dramatic technological leap forward, but make a breakthrough in human values. It seems a point of singularity must be reached for mankind to drastically change its way of life both on Earth and beyond.

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**Birks, David** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: University of Oxford (United Kingdom)

Session: 16, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a Departmental Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Oxford.

Title: **Love and Paternalism**

Keywords: Love, Paternalism, Sex

**Abstract:**

**LOVE & PATERNALISM**

Paternalism is often thought to be wrong. For example, many philosophers hold that it is impermissible to administer paternalistic medical treatment to a person who has made an informed and competent decision to refuse it, even if the treatment would confer a significant benefit to that person. This view is supported by what we can call the Anti-Paternalism Principle (APP). APP has been defended by many philosophers, including Richard Arneson, Michael Cholbi, and Joel Feinberg, among others.

Typically, however, much of the literature on the wrongness of paternalism has not been concerned with who is behaving paternalistically towards whom. Paternalism is often administered on behalf of the state, which is the focus of much of the discussion on paternalism. But an underexplored issue concerns the wrongness of paternalistic behaviour performed by private individuals towards other individuals, such as a stranger towards a stranger, a parent towards her adult children, a friend towards another friend, or, as will be the focus of this paper, a person towards someone who is in love with her.

To illuminate this issue, let's first consider the following case:

Love Paternalism - Suppose that B is in love with A. While A greatly enjoys B's company and would like to spend time with B, A does not love B, and will never love B. A repeatedly tells B this, but B continues to want to spend time with A in hope that she will change her mind. A believes that B's feelings are not good for B, and in order for B to move on with his life, A ignores all communication from B.

A's behaviour toward B is a clear case of paternalistic behaviour (according to plausible definitions of paternalism, such as Quong and Shiffrin's). Suppose we hold that A's behaviour towards B is all things considered wrong in virtue of the fact it is paternalistic. This would be consistent with APP; we ought not to behave paternalistically towards fully informed, competent adults, regardless of the benefits we can confer on them by doing so. But this conclusion seems counterintuitive, and in the paper I present several reasons to doubt it.

One is the extent of the harm to B if A does not behave paternalistically towards him. It is plausible to think that B will be miserable for a lengthy period of time if he remains in contact with A. This misery might affect B's employment, and his friendships. Moreover, B may be unable to have relationships with others because of his feelings for A. By behaving paternalistically, A can make B's life go significantly better, and APP prohibits doing so. So, this is grounds to reject APP, or at least to revise APP so that it does not result in counterintuitive conclusions in Love Paternalism. The paper considers a number of possible solutions for APP to circumvent these problems, but I find none to be satisfactory.

**Blackshaw, Bruce** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: University of Oxford (United Kingdom)

Session: 16, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Calum Miller is a medical doctor who is currently undertaking research in beginning of life ethics, Biblical studies and philosophy of science/religion.

Title: **Beyond Infanticide: How Psychological Accounts of Persons Can Justify Harming Infants**

Keywords: infanticide, abortion, psychological accounts, personhood, pre-personal acts

**Abstract:**

Advocates of the moral permissibility of abortion often base their views on a conception of rights or interests which apply only to a specific subset of human beings – usually termed ‘persons’ – where one is a person only if one satisfies certain psychological, cognitive, or other requirements. Although this is not the only way of generating the conclusion that abortion is permissible – others appeal to maternal bodily autonomy or similar considerations independent of the value or rights of the foetus – it is one of the more common and persuasive. Since foetuses lack the relevant psychological apparatus or features (either in kind or degree), they lack certain rights or interests that adult humans ordinarily have, including the right to life. It is often held, by extension, that these considerations likewise justify early infanticide in some or all circumstances, since there is no relevant disparity between the capacities or abilities of, for example, late-stage foetuses and infants. On this account, therefore, infants also lack the serious right to life which we typically predicate of adult humans.

Let us call human beings who have not yet met the criteria for personhood pre-personal humans. More precisely for our purposes, a pre-personal human is any human who has not yet attained the capacities or other features sufficient for inclusion within the community of full rights-bearers. We also define pre-personal acts: acts performed on or with a pre-personal human.

We argue that on these psychological accounts, it is difficult to explicate the reasons why certain other pre-personal acts are wrong: live experimentation, organ farming, sexual exploitation and discrimination. But in the case of infanticide, our inability to explain why infanticide would be wrong on psychological accounts is frequently taken as an indication that infanticide is not, in fact, wrong. We argue that, likewise, the inability of defenders of the psychological account to explain why these other pre-personal acts was wrong should force them towards condonation of these acts. We explore some of the main accounts of the wrongness of each of these actions, arguing that the best accounts of their wrongness fail to apply similarly if rights are a function of cognitive capacities.

We do not, of course, thereby conclude that such actions are permissible. On the contrary, we argue that they establish a persuasive *reductio* against psychological accounts of rights, and should motivate an account of rights based on something other than immediately exercisable cognitive capacities.

**Boss, George** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: University of Bristol (United Kingdom)

Session: 18, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Thanks for filling out REGISTRATION FORM for the III Braga Colloquium in the History of Moral and Political Philosophy  
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Affiliation \*

University of Bristol

Country of your affiliation Institution \*

George's work focuses on the political philosophy of human needs, value change and modernisation, and Marxism, under the supervision of Professor Terrell Carver and Dr Jonathan Floyd. Currently he is studying the competing conceptions of human needs, and their role in the work of Marx. George's background involves an undergraduate degree from Oxford (PPE) and a Masters degree from Birkbeck, University of London (MRes Politics).

Title: **Capabilities, values and human needs**

Keywords: Capabilities; human needs; values; justice; development

**Abstract:**

Questions about needs are fundamental to the ethical evaluation of our social arrangements. Societies that frustrate our needs are, in some fundamental sense, morally wrong. But what makes our needs important, and what, exactly, are they? One influential response to these questions comes from the 'capabilities approach', and it is this response - and its adequacy - that will be the central concern of this paper. The capabilities approach, in distinguishing itself from alternative bases for ethical evaluation, is committed to a tripartite conception of human persons. The artificial separation between three elements - personal autonomy, values, and functionings ('beings' and 'doings') - means the approach cannot adequately capture the concept of need. Firstly, the division between our autonomous choice and our real lived experience (our functionings) results in a commodified account of needs, in tension with the inescapability of needs. Secondly, 'capability' is understood as the freedom to choose a particular set of functionings, but the approach is ambiguous, and even contradictory, in what it conceives as the possible constraints on that choice. This problem follows



from the separations involved in the approach's understanding of persons, which make it difficult to construct a sufficiently robust notion of the 'achievability' of functionings. Thirdly, in an attempt to develop objective accounts of wellbeing the capabilities approach artificially separates our agency from our values and from our experiences of living. This results in a frozen, narrow lists of basic needs that lacks dynamism, sufficient respect for difference, and an appreciation of power. Thus the capabilities approach, despite its significant and positive impact, cannot provide an adequate account of needs.

**Bouvot, Kathrin** (Austria)

Affiliation: University of Vienna (Austria)

Session: 14, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

PhD Student at the University of Vienna, publications about Friedrich Nietzsche and political and social philosophy, research and teaching stay at the Department of Philosophy at the University of Trnava in Slovakia, presentations at several Conferences and Colloquiums

**Title: The struggling between remembering and forgetting: about the finding for dealing with the history that could be beneficial for life**

**Keywords:** dealing with the history, remembering, forgetting, Friedrich Nietzsche, peace ethics, politics

**Abstract:**

The struggling between remembering and forgetting: about the finding for dealing with the history that could be beneficial for life

The question in which extent the life and a philosophy that asserts the claim to be beneficial for life requires the history without being suffocated by the same or how should the human deal with the past that it can be beneficial for life, is a focal problem in Friedrich Nietzsche's Second Untimely Meditation with the title "On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life". Nietzsche wants to point out that historical knowledge as itself is worthless if there is not established an obvious connection between the historical knowledge and the life in the present including all the problems associated with life: "[...] thus only through the power of employing the past for the purposes of life and of again introducing into history that which has been done and is gone - did man become man: but with an excess of history man again ceases to exist, and without that envelope of the unhistorical he would never have begun or dared to begin." (Nietzsche, F. Second Untimely Meditation, p.64) From Nietzsche's standpoint the past loses in consequence of an excessive reference to it its most important function that should be the strengthening of life and of creative power. Based on Nietzsche's Second Untimely Meditation, I would like to discuss the struggling or the relationship of tension between remembering and forgetting. The main focus is on the question whether or in what way the history blockades the evolution of the creativity and, furthermore, how could be defined a dealing with the history that satisfies the requirement to be beneficial for life. In addition to it, I will focus upon the problems which can emerge in connection with a superfluity of memories or with an omnipotent memory whereby I will also dare a digression to the peace ethics, to politics and to literature. Based on Nietzsche's position that implies that forgetting is something essential for life and that an excessive accumulation of historical facts leads to passivity because such an accumulation causes that between the countless historical facts cannot be established a relation not anymore, I want to illuminate whether it would be an advantage for the creation of philosophical works, if it would be kept a greater distance towards the history. In this context it is to discuss whether a too intensive examination of the history of philosophy can provoke a state in which the philosophy is incapable to create something new or whether it can cause the phenomenon that philosophy degenerates into a discipline that is only able to echo itself and, as a result of this, falls into disrepute of being the quintessence of the senselessness as such, as it is claimed for instance by Lorenz Bruno Puntel who has formulated the critique that the German philosophy would only devote oneself to the history of philosophy. (Cf. Lorenz Bruno Puntel, Zur Situation der deutschen Philosophie der Gegenwart, In: Information Philosophie, Jg. 22, Heft 1, Februar 1994, 20.).

**Brea García, Sergio** (Spain)

Affiliation: Ph. Dr. Candidate (University of Oviedo) (Spain)

Session: 22, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

Sergio Brea García, undergraduate degree in Philosophy from the University of Oviedo (2010-2014). Ph. Dr. candidate (2016-present) in the Humanistic Research Program of the University of Oviedo (Thesis title: La (a)tracción del centro. Un estudio comparativo de las síntesis y los discursos socioliberal y falangista en España. Supervisor: Prof. Francisco Javier Gil Martín.)

**Title: On the “fascist equation” and the causes of its historical variability. An approach from Political Philosophy**

**Keywords:** World War I, Nationalism, Socialism, Fascism, Nazism

**Abstract:**

One of the classic discussions in the field of fascist studies is the discussion about the common or disparate nature of Italian Fascism and German Nazism. It is about knowing if they are epiphenomena of a generic fascism or, on the contrary, they are a different kind of movements. The cases are known: as defenders of the first opinion, Ernst Nolte, Stanley G. Payne or Emilio Gentile, for example, and as defenders of the second, Hannah Arendt, A. James Gregor or Zeev Sternhell, among others. However, it does not seem to have been satisfactorily explored the possibility that both approaches make sense in equal parts, that is, that Fascism and Nazism are ideologies/regimes deeply linked and, at the same time, profoundly disparate.

That is the intention of our proposal. Accepting the validity of the so-called “fascist equation”, according to which the fascist ideology would be the result of the sum of nationalism and socialism, our goal will be threefold. First, we will describe the World War I and, above all, the post-war period as the historical context that made possible that combination between nationalism and socialism. It was at that moment when, for the first time in History, the conditions that made the merger of both currents, hitherto far apart and even directly opposed to another one, were made possible. Second, we will analyse the specific cases of Italian Fascism, on the one hand, and German Nazism, on the other. In the first, nationalism and socialism came to converge and harmonize following different paths; in the second, socialism emerged “naturally”, “organically” from the other, that is, through the evolution of nationalism, which in the German version contained from the beginning an anti-Semitic element that in the 19th century acquired a strongly racist character, which made it possible the development of an intrinsically nationalist socialism, product -at least in part- of the need of the dispersed German people to become first a Nation and then a State. Third, connecting with the aforementioned discussion within fascist studies, we will offer some conclusions regarding the links and differences that connect or separate both ideologies/regimes. We will argue that, although all fascism is the result of a sum of nationalism and socialism, each nationalism contributes, as such, something unique and exclusive to the mixture, thus giving rise to the different fascist variants, from the Italian and the German to the Spanish, English or Hungarian, among many others.

We intend to clarify both the discussion and the nature of generic fascism and, in particular, its two most relevant epiphenomena historically, politically and ideologically, which are the Italian and German.

**Buechel, Benedikt** (Germany)

Affiliation: University of Edinburgh (United Kingdom)

Session: 12, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a PhD candidate in Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh. Before, I took an MA in International Studies at Seoul National University, and a BA in Philosophy and Business Studies at the University of Mannheim. My research links political theories of territory and migration.

Title: **Why attachment to land cannot morally justify territorial rights**

Keywords: territory, rights, justice, state, attachment

**Abstract:**

International law defines territory as land that is under the jurisdiction of a state. Since the Peace of Westphalia, almost all land with the exception of “Bir Tawil” (uninhabited land between Egypt and Sudan), “Gornja Siga” (uninhabited land between Croatia and Serbia), and the Antarctica has been divided between nation-states. Given the growing world population that is expected to hit 10 billion in 2055 and the simultaneous depletion of land and natural resources, a number of political theorists have begun to rethink territorial rights (See Buchanan 2004, Meisels 2009, Miller 2012, Moore 2015, Nine 2008, Kolers 2009, Simmons 2001, Steiner 1996, Stilz 2009, Pevnick 2011, Ypi 2014). Their political theories of territory vary depending on how each of them answers three questions. First, what good is land? Second, who should be the primary holder of territorial rights? Third, what criterion can morally justify exclusive authority over a particular land?

Given these questions, three dominant groups of theories for the justification of territorial rights have developed in the literature: attachment theories, egalitarian theories, and property rights theories. The first and second group stand in direct opposition. While egalitarians think of land as a public good that has universal value to all of humanity, attachment theorists argue that this universalism misses something important, namely that a given land also has a particular value for the people who live on it and which cannot be expressed in terms of distributive justice. This particular value is based on a formative relationship between the two. Attachment theories assume that people’s way of life is highly influenced by the land’s natural (climate and vegetation) and cultural characteristics (proximity to friends and family, job opportunities, and infrastructure) and vice versa. This seems most evident when thinking about indigenous groups.

Can someone’s attachment to a particular land, however, morally justify an unalienable right to exclusive authority over this land? If yes, why does it outweigh the universal value of land? If no, under which circumstances is it permissible to infringe the right? In this paper, I try to answer these questions. It has two sections. In the first section, I will examine three types of attachment theories: Meisels’ and Miller’s liberal nationalist account, Kolers ethnographic account, and Moore’s self-determination account. In the second section, I will give three reasons for why all three types of attachment theories fail to morally justify an unalienable right to exclusive authority over a particular land. First, attachment theories do not give enough moral weight to stronger consideration of justice: forced migration shows that attachment to land is only important to people whose basic needs are satisfied and different territories have different universal value. Second, the attachment criterion can only justify the historical status quo but not first acquisition. Attachment to land is mostly backward-looking and needs time to develop. Third, attachment theories have problems resolving overlapping claims to land if both disputing parties appeal to the value of attachment.

**Burelli, Carlo** (Italy)

Affiliation: Center for Advanced Studies (SEE) (Croatia)

Session: 2, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Carlo Burelli is a fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies Southeast Europe, University of Rijeka (CAS SEE UNIRI), where he works on a realistic theory of order, as the first virtue of political institutions. Previously, he had a two-year Post-Doc Fellowship in the ERC Project REScEU where he investigated political conflicts and realistic forms of solidarity. He has written on Political Realism, Solidarity and the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes.

Title: **Democratic Federalism. An Oxymoron?**

Keywords: Federalism, Inter-governmentalism, Democracy, Political Equality, Political Influence

**Abstract:**

The aim of this paper is to probe the normative foundations of federalism with respect to the democratic principle of political equality among citizens. There have been different concerns raised against federalism, at least as much as its defenses. While many criticize federalism on issue of stability or distributive justice (Føllesdal 2001), this paper intends to investigate whether it fits democratic standards, namely political equality. As Alfred Stepan argues (Stepan 1999), federal institutions, especially in their US version, tend to be demosconstraining, at least in two different ways. First, the division of competences along which they are organized is generally constitutionalized, leaving to the judiciary the task to adjudicate conflicts between the centralized authority and subunit governments. This draws political control away from democratic citizens. Second, the more policy issues are left to territorial chambers, such as the US Senate, the more smaller subunits happen to be overrepresented with respect to larger ones. The paper argues that the principle of political equality is different depending on whether we apply it to individuals or territories, and that federal institution tend to look for an intermediate balance of these two dimensions. The more subunits are weighted as equal, the less individuals are weighted as equals (assuming different populations among states). If this effectively counts as a breach of political equality among democratic citizens, federalism appears to undermine a key democratic value. One could resist this conclusion by redefining the demos which ought to be subject of democratic decisions (Dahl 1983); by arguing in favor of subnational identities (Kymlicka 1995, Miller 1995); and more generally by taking federalism as the only effective way to accommodate multinational states and their heterogeneous territorial minorities (Mill 1958). However, the democratic presumption for individual equality puts a weighty burden of proof on such theories and we argue that all these alternatives are indeed unstable and end up falling within the two extremes with respect to which federalist ought to represent a middle ground, namely centralized governments and inter-governmentalism.

The paper is organized as follows. In the first part it adopts a definition of the federal principle as self-rule plus shared rule and a vertical separation power, and of federal institutions as implying autonomy, integrity and participation of provinces in the government. Secondly, the paper inquires the normative ground of federalism, reviewing reasons to prefer it to centralized democracies (liberty, diversity, efficiency and subsidiarity), and other reasons to favour it to inter-governmentalism (secured peace, non-ideal democracy, self-government and non-domination). Third, the paper defends a conception of democratic equality requiring equal amount of political influence for all citizens (Brighouse 1996, Kolodny 2014) and argues that equally weighted votes are fundamental in this respect. Finally, the paper surveys three solutions that have been proposed in the literature and concludes that there is indeed a tension between the federal principle and democratic equality, which requires a necessary trade-off between the reasons for federalism and those supporting democracy.

**Burger, Sebastian** (Germany)

Affiliation: TU Kaiserslautern (Germany)

Session: 25, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Initially studying tourism management in Bad Honnef, London and Sydney, Sebastian became increasingly interested in philosophical questions. His bachelor thesis analyzed the feasibility of implementing existentialist approaches when managing service personnel. Afterwards, he studied philosophy and business administration in Mannheim where he began taking several classes on business ethics. In his master thesis, he looked at the requirements of leadership ethics in a civilized market society. After graduating he accepted a position as a director of studies for socio-economic and socio-political youth education. At the same time, he began his Ph.D. at the Technical University in Kaiserslautern.

Title: **Compensation duties for globally operating enterprises**

Keywords: Political philosophy, climate ethics, business ethics, beneficiary pays principle

**Abstract:**

With the continuous globalization, globally operating enterprises gain significance and power. At the same time, corporate ethical wrongdoings (in this paper: human rights violations) often take place far away from the headquarter somewhere in its complex supply chains or value networks. This leads to responsibility being unclear and accountability not being taken. What duties do enterprises have towards the victims, if they did not have a direct impact on the wrongdoings? How can one argue for some sort of remedial duties in the context of business ethics? If there is an agent who is causally responsible for the wrong-doing, does that excuse all other agents involved?

Research in business ethics has long overlooked these questions and usually concentrated firstly on ensuring ethical behavior in the future or preventing unethical actions. Secondly, it focuses on direct (causal) unethical wrongdoings such as bribe payments or product safety.

Not only political philosophy, but also climate ethics have dealt with similar problems. Rather famously, Thomas Pogge, advocate of the so-called institutional thesis, talks about global poverty and economic entanglement. He argues that unfair institutions and (trade) rules are to be blamed for an unfair world, not necessarily the individual citizens. One aspect is the resource privilege of authoritarian predators who can sell natural resources of 'their' country even though they haven't been democratically elected. One could argue that the buyers' (i.e. Western states') enrichment is unjust, because they bought it from someone who was not legitimized to sell the resource.

Anwander & Bleisch (2007) analyze individual responsibility for unfair conditions. As both contributory negligence and facilitation are concepts that are undercomplex for the context of world poverty, they analyze the principle of unjust enrichment. They conclude that the beneficiary has to fulfill compensatory duties.

Climate ethicists have discussed the question of who has to pay for the costs connected to climate change. To sidestep the problem of unclear or historic accountability for the actions that have caused and still are causing environmental pollution, many ethicists started to focus on the beneficiary: "Beneficiary responsibility jettisons the requirement of causation but still maintains a connection to the action through the requirement that those responsible must have benefited from the action" (Moellendorf 2012: 136). Along these lines, Moss (2015: 3) explains that "if an agent benefits from an injustice that also causes harm to another agent or agents, the agent who has benefited has a duty to compensate those harmed to the value of the benefit gained".

These examples show that suggestions from political philosophy and climate ethics should be seized and appropriately adapted for business ethics, because the latter discipline has to deal with a similar question, i.e. "How should the burdens of human rights violations in the business context be distributed amongst different agents?". Using the 'beneficiary pays' principle has important advantages. Firstly, it sidesteps the cause-effect-dogma usually used in business research that undermines the complex system contexts. Secondly, it answers the intuition of corporate involvement in human rights violations abroad.

**Camille, Pascal** (France)

Affiliation: University of Louvain (Chaire Hoover) (Belgium)

Session: 27, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

My research focuses on the links between citizenship and residence. At the moment I am particularly interested in the relationship between the right to vote and residence. I have started a series of papers intitlled "The Right to Vote: Why Does Residence Matter ?". This paper is part of this series.

Title: **Right to Vote: Does Residence Matter for Reasons Related to Membership?**

Keywords: Right to vote, Residence, Migrants, Non-Citizens, Legal Membership, Social Membership, National Membership, Political Membership

**Abstract:**

In liberal democracies, voting right regulations deny the right to vote to people who are not citizens of the country where they live. This affects millions of migrants ranging from temporary workers to asylum seekers to undocumented migrants. Few exceptions to this rule exist, in most countries one need to be a citizen of the country in order to have the right to vote. One reason for justifying this practice is the idea that the right to vote should be reserved to members of society only. If the right to vote is for members only and if only citizens are members then only citizens should have the right to vote.

This paper questions the significance of membership in relation to residence in the case of the right to vote. The argument developed is threefold. First, I show that the idea that only citizens are members relies on the assumption that permanent residency or sedentarity is necessary to be a member of society. Citizens are considered the only members of society not so much because they have the formal status of citizenship but because, as citizens they constitute a part of the population who is permanently present in the country. The aim of the first part of this paper is to understand how permanent residency is believed to provide an indication of membership in society. Two views are inquired. The national membership view holds that members of society are people who share certain community-oriented identities. Only permanent residents are members of society because one need to identify on a long-term basis to the future of the community. The social membership view holds that members of society are people who have created social connections. Only permanent residents are members of society because only by the passage of time can people form these attachments.

Second, I criticize these two views as arbitrarily excluding non-citizen residents from the right to vote. Both views seem to conflate two ways of thinking of membership. National identity and social integration are desirable for any member of society but they should not constitute criteria for accessing membership. There is a difference between what a good member of society should look like and the criteria for assessing access to membership. Criteria for accessing membership should relate to the actual content of membership not the ideal content of it.

Third, I show that the actual content of membership is of two kinds, political and legal. Political membership refers to the political relationship that links individuals together in a state when they participate to the collective decision-making process that sets laws in the state. Political membership is only possible if the individuals find themselves under the jurisdiction of a state first that is if they are legal members of the state. Indeed, participation to the law-making process is reserved to people who are also subjected to these laws. This means that in order to get the right to vote one only need to be a legal member of the state. The aim of the last part of this paper is then to understand how residence is actually related to legal membership. I show that the reason why residence matters is not so much in virtue of the habitual dwelling place in the country that it supposes but because of the territorial presence of the individual that it guarantees.

**Cava, Xavi** (Spain)

Affiliation: Universitat de Barcelona (Spain)

Session: 12, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Xavi Cava is PhD candidate in the Faculty of Philosophy of the Universitat de Barcelona (Spain) and is member of the research group 'Crisi de la raó pràctica' at the same university. He is also a staff member of the journals Oxímora and Astrolabio. His research interests include consumption and epistemology.

Title: **The transience of consumption. Some supporting points.**

Keywords: Consumption, money, commodities, capitalism, livelihood, market

**Abstract:**

We use to think about consumption as a non-historical category, a particular kind of activity that has accompanied civilization from its very beginning. But has mankind always consumed? In this paper, I will consider some issues to support that this is not the case. My assumption is that consumption is a subject-object relationship mediated by everyday commodities, therefore linked with the expansion of modern capitalism. Before industrialization people didn't consume; their relationship with the objects they used was of another kind. Among other things, it was mainly the mediation of money which changed this relationship and compelled people to turn into consumers.

In support of this thought, I will give some philological, historical and sociological arguments. first I will consider the origin of the terms 'consumption' and 'to consume' and their changing of meaning throughout history up until now. I will show that their economic meaning appeared as of the end of the 18th century, at the same time as the first industrial capitalism. Then, I will address the coincidence of an emerging retailing monetary economy with an early form of consumption in Classical Athens, and later around the Roman legions. The Agora in Athens and some Roman military settlements across the Empire hosted the first known money-based markets to supply everyday necessities. This 'proto-consumption' came to an end with the decline of both Athens and Rome and reappeared only towards the 18th century. Finally, I will reflect on the way wages changed the livelihood of the first generations of industrial workers, making them be dependent on money. Most of them come from a peasant culture, and the change from a subsistence economy to a market-based economy was a shock that forced them to change their worldview and their lifestyle: they became consumers. I will conclude that these points are sufficient to take into account the hypothesis of the transience of consumption.



**Celik, Sinan Kadir** (Turkey)

Affiliation: Assist. Prof. Dr. (Turkey)  
Session: 6, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

Dr. Celik is currently faculty member of at Ataturk University, Department of Philosophy. He recently completed his post-doc study at and is a member of CASEP (Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics), London Metropolitan University. He studies and give lectures on ancient Greek and ancient Chinese philosophy in broad sense, but his last works mainly focus on Aristotelian practical philosophy, especially Aristotelian character treatment.

Title: **What does being an “Aristotelian” Really Mean?**

Keywords: Aristotle, Aristotelianism, ethics, political philosophy.

**Abstract:**

It would be no exaggeration to say that in the contemporary literature of moral and political philosophy, one's mind can easily be confused when he comes to realize the abundance of ways available for conducting a research on the current problems of ethics and/or politics. There are so many currents, which could be divided into their rival sub-currents that it seems almost impossible to draw the entire genealogical tree illustrating all of the divisions in a detailed and an indisputable manner. While the literature especially as regards the normative claims about the nature of and the relations between human beings has propagated more and more, intensive efforts have been shown to differentiate all these diverse approaches from each other. These attempts have eventually created their own literature of meta-ethics. One of the ways often taken in distinguishing scholars and their views regarding ethics and/or political philosophy from each other is to highlight the name of a philosopher who is pursued by them in principle. That is why existing viewpoints in political philosophy are usually denominated as “Aristotelian,” “Spinozist,” “Kantian,” “Humean,” “Hobbesian,” “Hegelian,” etc. Moreover, most of the scholars typically add prefixes like “neo” or “post” in front of these terms and employs notions like “Neo-Aristotelianism,” “Neo-Kantianism,” “Neo-Humeanism,” and so on. This leads to a widespread usage of dichotomies in the literature of meta-ethics, such as “Kantian/Aristotelian,” Kantian/Hegelian,” “Kantian/Humean,” etc. Though their meaning and the validity of their utilization have become a subject of an ongoing debate, all these distinctions have notoriously been employed for categorizing various sorts of inquiries on current problems of ethics and political philosophy. Among them, the most commonly used one is the “Aristotelian/Kantian” distinction, which roughly divides the present literature of moral and political philosophy into two predominant camps. Therefore, some scholars call themselves Aristotelians or are denominated by others as Aristotelians. But, in the relevant literature, it is not in fact so clear that who is actually Aristotelian, or neo-Aristotelian, to what extent and for what reasons? What does (neo-) Aristotelian really mean? In the forthcoming paper, I will try to answer this question by specifying the essential methodological characteristics of Aristotelian ethical or political exploration.

**Child, Richard** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: University of Manchester (United Kingdom)

Session: 21, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

In 2012 I took up my current post as lecturer in political theory at the University of Manchester.

Title: **National Identity and Human Nature**

Keywords: Nationalism; Cosmopolitanism; Community; Egalitarianism; Institutions

**Abstract:**

This paper argues that the best hope we have of arresting two worrying trends in contemporary politics – the slide towards populism, on the one hand, and increasing economic inequality, on the other hand – is to embrace the theory and practice of nationalism. Promoting nationalism and national identity might seem like a counterintuitive way to try to solve these contemporary problems. But in fact this approach is grounded in some compelling theory concerning the limits of human moral psychology, the community-based grounds of tolerance and reciprocity, and the institutional pre-requisites of egalitarian political relations between individuals.

My central idea has two parts: First, that the successful practice of egalitarian politics requires not only a cognitive commitment to egalitarian principle but also an affective commitment to the members of the relevant political community; Second, that in our current circumstances the most effective way to achieve this combination of cognitive and affective commitment on a large scale is to focus on reforming and refining existing national identities, even if this means slowing down and potentially reversing the process of institutional globalisation. Rousseau and John Stuart Mill are the obvious historical precursors to this kind of view but my argument will also draw on more contemporary work, especially the recent ideas on the nature and value of national community put forward by Bernard Yack in his book, 'Nationalism and the Moral Psychology of Community'.

My argument begins negatively, by critiquing a commonly held view I call the 'institutions-first' approach to economic and political cosmopolitanism. According to this view, the most effective way to realise cosmopolitan utopia is to build the requisite global institutions first and then wait for the background motivations of communal-reciprocity and mutual concern to organically evolve and develop. The problem with the institutions-first approach is that it is premised on a faulty theory of human nature, one which assumes that human beings are the kinds of creatures who will naturally form a shared group identity with whomever they are connected to economically. This standard assumption of the 'homo economicus' theory of human nature is, I will argue, implausible. Instead, the process of forming group identities – the process of thinking in terms of 'we' rather than 'I' that is required for a stable egalitarian politics – is much more complex, and needs to be carried out with a much greater sensitivity to historical context.

The positive part of my argument involves defending the idea that communities as a whole (rather than the more educated and socially mobile sections of those populations) will only be fully ready to open up to the world economically and politically when they feel economically and politically secure 'at home'. I explain why this is the case, what it means to talk about feeling 'economically and politically secure', and I also explain what 'home' is for the large groups of anxious people who occupy precarious positions in today's global economy. I conclude by discussing a number of powerful objections to this undeniably high-risk political strategy.

**Cibik, Matej** (Slovakia)

Affiliation: University of Pardubice (Czech Republic)

Session: 17, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

I am currently a post-doc researcher at Centre for Ethics, University of Pardubice. I have studied at Charles University in Prague (PhD) and Central European University (M.A.). Apart from the issues of global justice, I focus on the role of expectations in ethics and contemporary liberal political thought, especially .

Title: **Are Global Distributive Obligations different for States and for Individuals?**

Keywords: global justice, distributive justice, obligations, individuals, states

**Abstract:**

Perhaps the most important line of dispute between internationalists and cosmopolitans over the last 20 years has been the relevance of “special relationships” for the question of global justice. Philosophers like Thomas Hurka, David Miller and Robert Goodin claim that special relationships between co-nationals can have similar structure to relationships between family and friends, which can have limiting effect on the distributive obligations owed to human beings at large. On the other hand, philosophers like Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz argue that such special relationships affecting distributive duties either do not obtain at the national level, or, positively, are owed to all human beings living in globalized, interconnected world. What both these positions presuppose, however, is a smooth transition between “the moral” and “the political”. The obligations of state to its citizens follow the same pattern of partiality as local, familial relationships, which either can or cannot justify special treatment of citizens.

My paper argues that such smooth transition between principles for individuals and principles for states is not possible, as both realms call for different approaches. In other words, the extent and stringency of global distributive obligations varies with the nature of actors in question. Collective agents like states should follow different principles than individuals.

One reason for the differing principles for states and for individuals is a special connection to space and time for individuals that the institutional actors lack. When we expect help, time is a limiting factor for individuals. For example, if it takes only 5 minutes to save a drowning child in a shallow pond, we ought to do it. However, if it takes 9 months (like in Judith Jarvis Thompson’s genius violinist example) we can justifiably refuse. Institutional actors like states do not experience temporality in the same way, so time constraints cannot be a reason to refuse help. This difference then results in different normative principles for the two kinds of actors, which breaks the (often-presupposed) parity.

On the other hand, institutional actors like states also have some limits that individuals lack. Most importantly, states (as well as museums, NGO’s, etc.) have constitutive ends that they cannot cease to fulfil. Just as a museum cannot sell all its paintings and give it to malaria prevention without defying its main purpose of existence, a state cannot systematically disregard the needs of its citizens, even if they are less pressing than the needs of other human beings elsewhere. This constitutive end of a state (which individual human beings lack) has important consequences on the global distributive principles applicable to states – and it shows that they will be different from distributive principles applicable to individuals. Thus, when talking about global distributive justice, it is important to distinguish between the principles for individuals and the principles for states.

### Colen, Jose (Portugal)

Affiliation: Ceps Universidade do Minho (Portugal)

Session: 26, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

#### Short Bio:

Jose Colen has an MBA by IESE (Barcelona) and a PhD in Political Science from IEP (Lisbon) and he is Associate Researcher of Minho University and recurrent guest Professor of IEP (Portuguese Catholic University). He was researcher of CESPRA of the École des Hautes études en Sciences Sociales (Paris) and Visiting Scholar at Notre Dame University (2014), University of Vienna (2015) and Navarra (2016). His most recent books include: Voting, governments and markets (2010); Guide to the Introduction of the Philosophy of History (2011); Facts and Values: A conversation (2012), Platão Absconditus (2013), The Early Moderns (2014) and The Companion to Raymond Aron (2015).

Title: **Popper's democracies**

Keywords: Karl Popper, majority rule democracy, political leaders

#### Abstract:

Karl Popper can be counted among the twentieth century's greatest proponents and defenders of democracy. But the term 'democracy' has several different meanings, and he might not be regarded as a great proponent, let alone a great defender, of democracy in the way in which most people understand and use the term today. Popper did not regard democracy as an end in itself or good for its own sake. Instead he defended democracy as a means to preserve freedom and open society. Moreover, Popper was neither a proponent of popular sovereignty nor a defender of majority rule. He actually regarded these ideas—popular sovereignty and majority rule—as distortions of what democracy is or is supposed to be. In this paper we intend to explain how Popper's concept of democracy differs from how most contemporary defenders of democracy understand what it is or is supposed to be.

**Collins, Stephanie** (New Zealand)

Affiliation: Australian Catholic University (Australia)

Session: 7, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

Stephanie Collins is a Research Fellow at the Australian Catholic University, and was previously Lecturer in Political Theory at the University of Manchester. Her first book, *The Core of Care Ethics*, was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2015. She is currently working on her second book, tentatively titled *Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Members*. Her work has been published in *Journal of Philosophy*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, and *Philosophical Quarterly*, amongst others.

Title: **Obligation and Blameworthiness in Non-agent Groups**

Keywords: Collective responsibility; Structural injustice; Practical deliberation; Obligation; Blameworthiness

**Abstract:**

It is natural to think that groups can have obligations and be blameworthy: perhaps the European Union has an obligation to defend human rights; perhaps humanity is blameworthy for global warming. In this paper, I focus on groups that are not agents—that is, groups that lack established decision-making procedures. Such groups include ‘humanity’, ‘carbon emitters’, ‘misogynists’, and ‘white people.’ I argue that non-agent groups cannot have obligations, but that they can be blameworthy. This unlikely pair of conclusions arises because of the distinct functions that obligations and blameworthiness play in our moral and political practices. The argument proceeds in two parts.

The first part focuses on obligations. I provide a series of examples to demonstrate that obligations function as inputs into the practical deliberation of the entity that bears the obligation. I argue that non-agent groups cannot deliberate, because deliberation involves using beliefs and motivations to decide what to do. When a non-agent group produces some outcome, there is no deliberative process that is separate from the conjunction of members’ separate deliberative processes. So non-agent groups cannot bear obligations. I then rebut two arguments from the literature in favour of non-agent groups’ obligations. The first argues that non-agent groups have a ‘mediate ability’ to deliberate; the second argues that non-agent groups have obligations that are apt for input into the practical deliberation of the group’s members. Neither, I argue, shows that non-agents groups can themselves bear obligations.

Given this, what are we to say about such ills as global warming, poverty, sexism, and racism? A natural thought is that if the groups that produce such ills cannot have obligations, then they cannot be blameworthy for them either. In the second part of the paper, I argue against this: groups such as ‘humanity’, ‘carbon emitters’, ‘misogynists’, and ‘white people’ can be blameworthy for the ills they cause—even though they never had an obligation not to cause those ills.

This is because blameworthiness—unlike obligation—functions as a reflection of the esteem or disesteem with which others should hold an entity that has produced some outcome. Whether blame is fitting in a (type of or token) case is determined by reflective equilibrium between (1) considered convictions about similar cases; (2) the consequences of blaming in that type of case; and (3) the fairness of blaming in that type of case. I use the recent #metoo campaign to demonstrate that these three conditions sometimes make a non-agent group apt for blame. I propose three conditions that are jointly sufficient for a non-agent group’s being blameworthy: (1) the members of a non-agent group each hold a particular attitude (perhaps implicitly); (2) their actions based on that attitude combine to create or uphold webs of norms and expectations that reinforce the attitude and the actions performed on its basis; (3) a harm results from the combined actions, where we cannot say precisely which members did precisely which wrongful actions to produce precisely which aspects of the harm.

**De Iuliis, Carla** (Italy)

Affiliation: Veterinary Health Institute (Italy)

Session: 7, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

My name is Carla De Iuliis graduated in Law at the University of Bologna. I'm a public administrative manager in a Veterinary Health Institute since 1996 and I'm attending a Ph.D. (GIASDI) at the University of Teramo about European Cohesion Policy.

My name is Nicola Ferri and I'm a Public Manager in a Veterinary Health Institute since 1990. My scientific interests are currently focused on aquaculture and animal welfare.

Title: **Ethics And Public Administration: A Keystone Of Good Governance**

Keywords: ethic, public administration, governance, transparency

**Abstract:**

"In the Public Administration "ethics" is necessary to strengthen public trust; ethics is the keystone of good governance" (OECD, September 2000).

But what are the mandatory interventions to strengthen ethics in the Public Administration?

P.A. can be understood as a public institution "tool" to achieve the aims of general public interest and, therefore, a "good administration" is that which tends to concretize the guidelines defined by the representative bodies of a population.

In a historical age where it is acknowledged that society needs rules, it should be considered that, unlike natural or physical ones, the social rules are defined by people.

Therefore, specifically as per the system of the PP.AA., what society needs are strong values originating rightful rules to be followed by respectful behaviors.

In order to have a service-oriented P.A. it would be appraised that those occupying higher positions of responsibility do not think about themselves as more powerful or holding more privileges compared with the community: they are just undertaking greater duties.

A strong ethical tension is a necessary condition for restoring hope in the future: if in society and towards the P.A. there is no ability to overcome attitudes of habituation and acceptance of situations in which citizens are considered modern subjects of formal laws and/or uncontrolled discretionary powers and not as persons to be respected with their own rights and in their fundamental needs, projects for the future involving the young and the less young cannot be accomplished.

The recovery of the ethical sense is also based on authority, credibility, transparency and the search for truth by those who occupy positions of power, responsibility and service. Ethical behavior requires going beyond professionalism in order to reject "idealistic" proposals or policies or the result of compromises that are unattainable. Ethical behavior requires to develop knowledge, technical skills, and also to communicate appropriately, even by accepting unpopular choices.

Carla De Iuliis & Nicola Ferri

**Demuijnck, Geert** (Belgium)

Affiliation: EDHEC Business School (France)

Session: 29, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Geert Demuijnck is professor of business ethics and political philosophy at EDHEC Business School (Lille, France) and at the Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium). His research focuses on ethical questions related to business and the economy. He is a member of the advisory board of KBC Bank (Belgium) and of the ethics committee of Auchan (France). He is currently the president of the European Business Ethics Network (EBEN). He is member of the editorial board of several journals in the field of ethics, among which The Journal of Business Ethics.

Title: **The “Big Data Industry”, Discrimination and Social Inequalities**

Keywords: Discrimination, Big Data

**Abstract:**

In this article we essentially put forward that while the problem of discriminatory effects caused by the big data industry could be addressed by a careful identification of individual responsibilities in the big data “supply chain”, big data’s more global tendency to deepen social inequalities requires a different type of response that addresses shared responsibilities of the entire big data industry. In other words, we argue that discriminatory effects can be reduced through preventive measures and careful control of the processing of the data. However, mitigating the increase in social inequalities that big data processing is likely to provoke would require that taken-for-granted patterns of actions, and “ways of doing things” in the big data industry be revisited.

We predicate our argument on the premise that business enterprises indeed have a social responsibility to combat discrimination, for reasons related to the limited cost (and no loss in terms of competitiveness), and the inefficiency of the legal constraints. The original contribution of our paper is to demonstrate the saliently distinct nature of this challenge, which call for different orders of response. We would also provide a proposal on how to map responsibilities of business enterprises that are involved in the data process and use data-driven applications.

It has been amply demonstrated that massive data collection, advanced analytics and subsequent uses of data-driven applications actually or potentially generate discriminatory effects (see e.g. Barocas and Selbst 2016; Sweeney 2013). We also note how internet platforms offering data-driven services and access to large data bases potentially cater to discriminatory behavior of platform users. For example, it was possible for landlords, who used a Facebook’s ad service, to un-tick boxes listing ethnic affinities with the result that an apartment was only offered for lease to people of a certain ethnic affinity (Angwin and Parris 2016). Similar cases implicate popular providers such as AirBnB (cf. Edelman and Luca 2014; Edelman et al. 2017), Uber and Lyft (Ge et al. 2016), or the French Blablacar (Farajallah et al. 2016). In these cases, it is not the big data process itself that produces discriminatory effects, but it rather offers a pathway for discriminatory behavior of certain users.

We argue that both types of cases, catering to discriminatory preferences, and algorithmic discrimination can reasonably be addressed by the big data industry:

We put forward that advanced data analytics’ method of clustering and then classifying individuals into groups for statistical treatment could – when subsequently exploited by commercial applications–not only create accumulated advantage for certain people, but inversely, accumulated disadvantage for individuals who, somewhere in the data process, are placed in groups that induce less advantageous transactional opportunities (for example with regard to work, business, or social opportunities). We will refer to this problem as big data’s Matthew Effect.

**Destri, Chiara** (Italy)

Affiliation: European University Institute (Italy)

Session: 2, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a Max Weber fellow at the European University Institute and I work in democratic theory. I hold a PhD in Political studies from the University of Milan and I have been visiting scholar at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales and at the University of Arizona.

Title: **Democratic Federalism. An Oxymoron?**

Keywords: Federalism, Inter-governmentalism, Democracy, Political Equality, Political Influence

**Abstract:**

The aim of this paper is to probe the normative foundations of federalism with respect to the democratic principle of political equality among citizens. There have been different concerns raised against federalism, at least as much as its defenses. While many criticize federalism on issue of stability or distributive justice (Føllesdal 2001), this paper intends to investigate whether it fits democratic standards, namely political equality. As Alfred Stepan argues (Stepan 1999), federal institutions, especially in their US version, tend to be demosconstraining, at least in two different ways. First, the division of competences along which they are organized is generally constitutionalized, leaving to the judiciary the task to adjudicate conflicts between the centralized authority and subunit governments. This draws political control away from democratic citizens. Second, the more policy issues are left to territorial chambers, such as the US Senate, the more smaller subunits happen to be overrepresented with respect to larger ones. The paper argues that the principle of political equality is different depending on whether we apply it to individuals or territories, and that federal institution tend to look for an intermediate balance of these two dimensions. The more subunits are weighted as equal, the less individuals are weighted as equals (assuming different populations among states). If this effectively counts as a breach of political equality among democratic citizens, federalism appears to undermine a key democratic value. One could resist this conclusion by redefining the demos which ought to be subject of democratic decisions (Dahl 1983); by arguing in favor of subnational identities (Kymlicka 1995, Miller 1995); and more generally by taking federalism as the only effective way to accommodate multinational states and their heterogeneous territorial minorities (Mill 1958). However, the democratic presumption for individual equality puts a weighty burden of proof on such theories and we argue that all these alternatives are indeed unstable and end up falling within the two extremes with respect to which federalist ought to represent a middle ground, namely centralized governments and inter-governmentalism.

The paper is organized as follows. In the first part it adopts a definition of the federal principle as self-rule plus shared rule and a vertical separation power, and of federal institutions as implying autonomy, integrity and participation of provinces in the government. Secondly, the paper inquires the normative ground of federalism, reviewing reasons to prefer it to centralized democracies (liberty, diversity, efficiency and subsidiarity), and other reasons to favour it to inter-governmentalism (secured peace, non-ideal democracy, self-government and non-domination). Third, the paper defends a conception of democratic equality requiring equal amount of political influence for all citizens (Brighouse 1996, Kolodny 2014) and argues that equally weighted votes are fundamental in this respect. Finally, the paper surveys three solutions that have been proposed in the literature and concludes that there is indeed a tension between the federal principle and democratic equality, which requires a necessary trade-off between the reasons for federalism and those supporting democracy.



**Dhaware, Milind** (India)

Affiliation: Jawaharlal Nehru University (India)

Session: 14, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Milind Suresh Dhaware is a Ph.D. research student in the Centre for Comparative Politics and Political Theory, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. His research interest is in moral political philosophy and political thought especially Indian political thought and politics. He has done his B.A, M.A, M.Phil in Political Science. His present Ph.D. work is on 'Ethical Imperatives in Politics: The Role of Ethics in B.R. Ambedkar's Political Thought'. He is awardees of many national fellowships including ICSSR's Doctoral Fellowship in India. Also, he is awardee of A4U and Erasmus+ International Mobility Grant.

Title: **Universality of Ethicality in Politics: B.R. Ambedkar's Quest for Justice**

Keywords: Ethics, Morality, Politics, Justice, Ambedkar, Buddhism

**Abstract:**

The aim of this paper is to quest the politics with ethical imperatives which shall have universal moral concerns and ideal standard of human conduct in achieving harmonious social intercourse. B.R. Ambedkar is known as chief architect of 'Indian Constitution' and champion for social justice in India explicitly said that equality is the ethics of modern world. In this context my research paper argues that B.R. Ambedkar deems the value of freedom, equality, fraternity, rationality and justice as the modern ethics for constituting up a modern ideal society. This study regards ethical politics in term of 'public good' and establishing justice primarily based on the ethical values pronounced by Ambedkar under the influence of western modern values and Buddha's dhamma.

The objective of this paper is to have recourse the dichotomy of politics from ethics which is actuated by expediency and very often selfish motives. This course of politics has inflicted 'injustice' for others in the form of poverty, inequality, racial discrimination, misery, abuse of basic human rights and incapability to indulge freedom. The value of tolerance, acceptance of others, equality and fraternity has been ruined in this kind of politics which has been become one of the cause of 'injustice'. The relation between politics and ethics has been a fundamental problem of all ages and has attracted the attention of thinkers in the past and present. The Machiavellian discourse of 'politics' differing from ethics was in continuation with utilitarian theorist focused on the end of politics than its means. Ultimately the individual selfish motives and divorce of ethics from politics rendered injustice in society. Apart from Machiavellian discourse since early time philosophers, thinkers, and scholars let it be western or Indian society or in ancient or modern time, they spoke about the ethics or virtue in politics. The ethical dimension of politics in contemporary time has reintroduced the debate of 'justice', 'equality', 'collective good' and 'universal rights'. Ambedkar's engagement with 'Dhamma-Buddhist philosophy' experience of humiliation along with his community castes in India spelled out his commitment to ethics and morality in public life. The concept of 'Dhamma' helped him to integrate morality and ethics with his commitment to rationality and scientific spirit in politics. The proposed paper proceeds with the question that how does Ambedkar's notion of ethics based on Buddhism, make it compatible with modern democratic values and contribute to achieve a just socio-political order? The paper locates Ambedkarian imperatives on ethics in politics in the context of wider theoretical debate on the concept of ethics in politics.

This research work uses the analytical approach based on the method of text analysis and interpretation. The paper consists of two substantial parts. One part is dwelling up on ethics in politics in contemporary context, this is theoretical part. Second part is about locating Dr. B. R. Ambedkar's political thought in the wider context of ethical debate in politics.

**Domenicucci, Jacopo** (Italy)

Affiliation: Cambridge (United Kingdom)

Session: 26, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Jacopo Domenicucci, normalien (ENS Ulm, AL 2012) and agrégé de philosophie, studies trust since 2014 and digital trust since 2015. On trust, he published “Trust as a two-place relation”, co-authored with Richard Holton, in Faulkner and Simpson (ed.) *The Philosophy of Trust* (Oxford University Press 2017) and “Trust, Agency and Discrimination” (*Rivista di Estetica*, 03/2017) and edited *Trusting Institutions* (Rosenberg and Sellier). On digital trust and related issues, he published “A memory centred approach”, forthcoming in Romele and Terrone (dir.) *Recording Media*, Palgrave. The volume he co-edited with Milad Doueiri on this topic, *La confiance à l'ère numérique*, is under press for the Editions Berger-Levrault and Editions Rue d'Ulm.

Title: **Approaches to social Coordination and Trust**

Keywords: coordination, trust, functionalism, social science, cooperation

**Abstract:**

Approaches to social Coordination and Trust

What is the place of trust in the understanding of human coordination, collective action, shared agency, and sociality? There is patent interdisciplinary disagreement and confusion about the various ways in which notions of trust can be understood and operationalized in the social and experimental sciences. This is the more interesting that this disagreement does not merely rest on transdisciplinary misunderstanding, as it is orthogonal to disciplinary habits. It is not just that economists and sociologists, for example, have each their own notion of trust. The disagreement is actually stable across disciplines and seems to point at some deeper feature in human coordination than terminological trifles. Or so does this paper argue, in trying to bring some clarification to the notions of trust that “we need” and that can play a role in understanding human coordination.

To do that, I draw two distinctions between approaches to human coordination that may help philosophers see more clearly what and how to pick from social science discussions of trust, and help social scientists be clear on what they do when they call on “trust”. The aim is not to advocate for the superiority of one of the branches in each couple of perspectives. It is to make it clear that each approach adumbrates a specific level of social interaction, where different notions of trust may or may not be meaningful. Overall, as it will appear, each level of investigation is both necessary and insufficient for an elucidation of trust –though, it appears, not each level is endowed with a notion of trust by itself. The first distinction draws a line between a functional and a substantial approach to human coordination. I argue that while the first is also necessary for the study of human coordination, only the second makes room for a notion of trust. The second distinction, mapping the territory within the substantial approach to social coordination, is between structural and thick understandings of trust.

In the first section, I say a word about each perspective and the way it is standardly presented in the literature(s). The second section tackles the distinction between functional and substantial approaches to human coordination, while the third that between structural and thick approaches to trust. The second section argues that functional approaches to human coordination cannot actually have a meaningful notion of trust, and should not use the term “trust” in a lay sense to describe the state of a well-functioning cooperative system. To support this, I draw on well-known evidence about the non-linear relations between cooperation and trust. Trust, I argue, rather has its place at the substantial level, which does not deal with the coordinative output but with the mechanisms behind its implementation. The third section distinguishes the structural perspective, which focuses on the logic of agent conduct in trust, and the thick one, focusing on the phenomenology of the subjects of trust. While both perspectives have a notion of trust, they fill it in according to different theoretical desiderata that I shall make explicit. And this should bring some light to the widespread but mysterious idea of a current crisis of trust.

**Düvel, Eike** (Germany)

Affiliation: Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz (Austria)

Session: 24, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

PhD-candidate in the interdisciplinary doctoral program “climate change” and the University of Graz. Working on risk imposition in intergenerational contexts in a broadly contractualist framework, focusing on how to combine deontological reasoning and numerical probability.

MA in philosophy from the University of Göttingen and BA in philosophy&economics from the University of Bayreuth.

Published papers on human rights and the precautionary principle. Work in progress papers deal with stranded assets and sustainable transformation and ex-ante contractualism and risk imposition.

Organized several conferences on risk, human dignity, constructivism, etc. Editor and co-founder of the climatefootnotes blog.

Title: **What does it mean to have a right against climate change related risks?**

Keywords: risk ethics, uncertainty, aggregation, political philosophy, contractualism

**Abstract:**

Human rights approaches in intergenerational justice promise to yield robust duties to current generations to combat climate change. These duties are robust, because the corresponding rights are, at least prima facie, understood as absolute rights: they cannot easily be outweighed or discounted. In a way then, rights-based accounts are too successful. Even benign actions carry the risk of violating future person’s rights and thus we need some way to justify the imposition of risks of rights violations to future persons.

It is their anti-consequentialist commitment that makes many right-based theories struggle with the justification of risk imposition. I argue that scanlonian contractualism is a way to conceive of rights which enables us to justify certain kinds of impositions of risks of rights violations while staying true to most of the anti-consequentialist commitments of right-based theories.

Contractualists argue that the correct moral principles are those which could not be reasonably rejected by those affected by the corresponding actions. Regarding risk imposition, the main idea is that virtually all actions carry the risk of rights violations and would be impermissible if these risks were to be avoided. A principle which allows for risk impositions and thus solves this problem of paralysis could not be reasonably rejected, thus risk impositions are permissible insofar as they solve the problem of paralysis.

In this paper I will present 1) how contractualists conceive of rights 2) how risk impositions be justified given that people have rights, and 3) what the actual practical consequences of this view in intergenerational justice are, especially with respect to climate change.

**Fairhurst, Jordi** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: Universidad de las Islas Baleares (UIB) (Spain)

Session: 6, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

Jordi Fairhurst is a PhD student at the Universidad de las Islas Baleares (UIB) with a FPU grant from the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte del Gobierno de España. His thesis focuses on ethics in Wittgenstein's works, specially the ethical thought developed in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. His research interests also encompass philosophy of language, ethics, epistemology and philosophy of science.

Title: **Ethics, will and the metaphysical subject in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus***

Keywords: Wittgenstein, Ethics, Will, Subject.

**Abstract:**

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we will analyze the issues that stem from the Transcendental Reading of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (hereafter, *Tractatus*) and their thesis that Wittgenstein endorses, under the notion of 'metaphysical subject', the existence of a willing subject as a transcendental condition of ethics and representation. It is possible to object that the contents of the Notebooks introduced by the Transcendental Reading distort the contents of the *Tractatus*. Moreover, it is uncertain whether Wittgenstein endorses in the Notebooks the idea that the willing subject is a transcendental condition of ethics and representation. The Transcendental reading mainly resorts to the entry 5.8.16 to sustain their characterization of transcendental willing subject. However, this entry does not demonstrate that Wittgenstein endorses the idea of the willing subject as a transcendental condition of ethics and representation. Finally, the *Tractatus* does not present any indication in favor of the understanding of the metaphysical subject as a transcendental condition of ethics and representation. Wittgenstein does not employ the notion of 'transcendental' alongside the metaphysical subject in the *Tractatus* and there is no explicit or implicit admission of endorsing this understanding.

Second, we will set forth an alternative reading of the *Tractatus* that overcomes the issues that stem from the Transcendental Reading. It is a widely held view that the propositions concerning ethics in the *Tractatus* presuppose the existence of an ethical subject. The *Tractatus* provides us with two main alternatives regarding which subject should be recognized as such. On the one hand, we can merely resort to the 'happy man' introduced in TLP 6.43; thus, avoiding any substantial understanding of an ethical subject in the *Tractatus*. On the other hand, we can resort to the metaphysical subject introduced in TLP 5.632–5.64. Nonetheless, there are discrepancies regarding how we must conceive the metaphysical subject as an ethical subject. We argue in favor of conceiving the metaphysical subject as an ethical subject, without resorting to the contents of the Notebooks and avoiding the commitments sustained by the Transcendental Reading. Additionally, we will argue in favor of a willing subject in the *Tractatus*. There is a lack of commentators arguing in favor of the existence of a willing subject in the *Tractatus* without resorting to the Notebooks or subscribing to the Transcendental Reading. Hence, we will present an alternative reading that conceives that metaphysical subject as a willing subject: a subject that possesses will in an ethical sense and alters the limits of the world, making the world wax and wane as a whole, attaining happiness or unhappiness

**Ferri, Nicola** (Italy)

Affiliation: Veterinary Health Institute (Italy)

Session: 7, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

My name is Carla De Iuliis graduated in Law at the University of Bologna. I'm a public administrative manager in a Veterinary Health Institute since 1996 and I'm attending a Ph.D. (GIASDI) at the University of Teramo about European Cohesion Policy.

My name is Nicola Ferri and I'm a Public Manager in a Veterinary Health Institute since 1990. My scientific interests are currently focused on aquaculture and animal welfare.

Title: **Ethics And Public Administration: A Keystone Of Good Governance**

Keywords: ethic, public administration, governance, transparency

**Abstract:**

"In the Public Administration "ethics" is necessary to strengthen public trust; ethics is the keystone of good governance" (OECD, September 2000).

But what are the mandatory interventions to strengthen ethics in the Public Administration?

P.A. can be understood as a public institution "tool" to achieve the aims of general public interest and, therefore, a "good administration" is that which tends to concretize the guidelines defined by the representative bodies of a population.

In a historical age where it is acknowledged that society needs rules, it should be considered that, unlike natural or physical ones, the social rules are defined by people.

Therefore, specifically as per the system of the PP.AA., what society needs are strong values originating rightful rules to be followed by respectful behaviors.

In order to have a service-oriented P.A. it would be appraised that those occupying higher positions of responsibility do not think about themselves as more powerful or holding more privileges compared with the community: they are just undertaking greater duties.

A strong ethical tension is a necessary condition for restoring hope in the future: if in society and towards the P.A. there is no ability to overcome attitudes of habituation and acceptance of situations in which citizens are considered modern subjects of formal laws and/or uncontrolled discretionary powers and not as persons to be respected with their own rights and in their fundamental needs, projects for the future involving the young and the less young cannot be accomplished.

The recovery of the ethical sense is also based on authority, credibility, transparency and the search for truth by those who occupy positions of power, responsibility and service. Ethical behavior requires going beyond professionalism in order to reject "idealistic" proposals or policies or the result of compromises that are unattainable. Ethical behavior requires to develop knowledge, technical skills, and also to communicate appropriately, even by accepting unpopular choices.

Carla De Iuliis & Nicola Ferri

**Fumagalli, Corrado** (Italy)

Affiliation: LUISS - Political Science (Italy)

Session: 1, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Corrado Fumagalli is a postdoctoral fellow in political philosophy at the Political Science Department of LUISS University.

Title: **On pluralistic political theories**

Keywords: Comparative political theory, pluralism, inclusion,

**Abstract:**

Liberal and democratic normative political theory has extensively acknowledged the observation that pluralism is a fact of modern societies. However, by dealing with pluralism on the assumption that there is no normative arrangement that can accommodate all worldviews simultaneously, liberal democratic political theorists with an interest in pluralism maintain that exclusion from the construction of collectively-binding principles of coexistence is somehow an undesirable externality of normative arrangements of any kind. In this paper, by drawing upon disputes about the normativity of comparative political theory, I challenge the belief that exclusion is somehow an unavoidable externality, and I identify the necessary conditions of a truly pluralistic political theory. So far, there have been disagreements on the normative status of comparative political theory. One solution, as Warren and Williams argue, is to capture the positive argument of comparative political theory in deliberative terms. For me, this perspective has two limits when applied to the theory of pluralism. First, it is explicitly pre-committed to democratic values and norms. Second, reciprocity may be unproblematic among people familiar with each other; however, it seems less persuasive among parties with linguistic barriers who disagree with one another on fundamental matters. Another solution, as Godrej and Jenco argue, is to identify the distinctive articulation and evolution of alien philosophies through a hands-on engagement with texts, habits and debates. For me, such an indigenisation of hermeneutical techniques still hinges upon an unsophisticated articulation of the concept of recognition. As I argue in the paper, the claim for recognizing the qualities of alien philosophies is biased in favour of “the recognizer” – i.e. the comparative political theorist. In the second part of the paper, I argue that a transversal reading of the debate identifies a more general normativity, which is inherent in (almost) all arguments in comparative political theory. That is, the argument is not only that of an indigenization of learning and hermeneutical techniques, or of a dialogue between different cultures, but that there are other voices and these otherwise-neglected voices deserve space. From this, I identify three necessary conditions of a truly pluralistic political theory: a truly pluralistic political theory must acknowledge that there might be neglected voices; a truly pluralistic political theory must maintain the point of view of the otherwise-neglected voices; the normativity of a truly pluralistic political theory is a normativity that otherwise-neglected voices can affirm from their own point of views.

**Gallino, Francesco** (Italy)

Affiliation: CESPRA - EHESS (France)

Session: 3, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

PhD in History of Political Thought, Department of Culture, Politics and Society  
University of Turin, Italy.

After graduating in philosophy, I won a 3-years doctoral scholarship at the University of Turin, spending one year at the Laboratoire Sophiapol in Paris and presenting my researches in France, Portugal and the United States. I defended my PhD thesis in May 2018 (awarded *summa cum Laude*) and obtained a 1-year research grant from Fondazione Luigi Einaudi (Italy). I am currently Teaching Assistant at the University of Turin and Visiting postdoc at CESPRA-EHESS (Paris). My work focuses on political obedience.

Title: **Habits of obedience. Political anthropology and materialistic gnosiology in Tocqueville and Lucas works on prison discipline**

Keywords: habit, gnosiology, prison, Tocqueville, Foucault

**Abstract:**

The debate on prison discipline reforms took hold in the late XVIII century in Europe and the United States, and became more and more participated in the following decades. Essays concerning controversial points – solitary confinement, individual Vs collective work, religious education– were regularly published in both French and English. Among the authors intervening in the discussion were some of the finest intellectuals of early XIX century: Edward Livingston, Pierre Étienne Louis Dumont (a close collaborator of Jeremy Bentham), the Duke of La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, Gustave de Beaumont and Francis Lieber. In his *Discipline and punish*, Michel Foucault famously showed the disciplinary, political and epistemic implications of these writings; nevertheless, his approach has led critics to underestimate their theoretical meaning. What might seem a technical debate (concerning times, rules, architectures) turns out to be, at a deeper analysis, a philosophical discussion dealing with the plasticity of human nature. A discussion which was deeply influenced by XVI and XVII century French works on «coutume» and «habitude» as well as by XVIII century British and French materialistic gnosiology (Locke, Hume, H  lvetius) and pedagogy (Rousseau).

In order to explore the philosophical sense of this debate, it is particularly rewarding to focus on the discussion between Alexis de Tocqueville and Charles Lucas. During their querelle (respectively started with Lucas' 1830 *Du Syst  me P  nitentiaire en Europe et aux   tats-Unis* and Tocqueville's *Du Syst  me P  nitentiaire aux   tats-Unis et de son application en France*) both developed an implicit but innovative political anthropology. Through a distinction between «pure» and «relative» prisoner's moral reform, Tocqueville – influenced by American prison director Elam Lynds – suggested a «proto-behaviourist way» (M. Perrot 1984) to durably condition convicts' will through the combination of psychical isolation and compulsory work. By employing only a small number of guards for control, this method would lead prisoners to feel like they were choosing to obey to the harsh prison discipline: this feeling would gradually disable the convicts' capacity to act and think autonomously. On the other side, Lucas' studies on the effects of moral teaching shed light on the despotic aim of Tocqueville's project, gradually pushing him towards more traditional positions.

Lucas was right in labelling Tocqueville's model as nefarious. Nevertheless, Tocqueville's project might be regarded as socially innovative. Unlike most of his contemporaries, Tocqueville acknowledged the unavoidable harmfulness of prisons. Therefore, while developing a penitentiary system addressed to «unrecoverable» criminals, he refused Bentham's and Lucas' dream to extend the same principles to poor or unemployed people. He also recommended for young convicts a separate disciplinary method, based on free dialogue and on the empowerment of their democratic capabilities. Tocqueville didn't share the dream of transforming prisons in a sort of «social school for dangerous classes»: on the contrary he argued for a free political pedagogy based on spontaneous participation and collective initiative. An «anthropology of intersubjectivity» (Antoine 2003) which was the exact opposite of the «anthropology of domestication» he proposed in the *Syst  me*.

**Garcia Portela, Laura** (Spain)

Affiliation: University of Graz (Austria)

Session: 24, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

Laura García-Portela is a PhD candidate and 'La Caixa' Fellow at the University of Graz. She is a member of the Doctoral Program in Philosophy and an associate member of the Doctoral Program in Climate Change. She has been a visiting scholar at the University of Keele (UK) and the University of Washington (US). During her career, she has taught undergraduate modules in Logic, Ethics, Philosophical Methodology, and Problems of Metaphysics (UV). She has collaborated in collective works and has published journals on green democracy, intergenerational justice and global studies.

Title: **Moral responsibility as answerability for historical emissions: overcoming the excusable ignorance objection.**

Keywords: burden-sharing, moral responsibility, excusable ignorance, loss and damage

**Abstract:**

One of the most popular debates in climate ethics has become the so-called burden-sharing debate. It is well known that climate change poses important harm and threats to people's lives and that this fact calls us for action. However, preventing and dealing with the adverse effects of climate change is not burden-free. Tackling climate change demands mitigation and adaptation efforts. Lately, compensatory burdens have gained a foothold in international negotiations under the heading of 'loss and damage'. These burdens intend to address climate change related harm that results from inadequate or insufficient mitigation and adaptation policies. Among these compensatory burdens for climatic loss and damage, we can find 'measures of satisfaction', such as acknowledgements, recognition or public apologies. The burden-sharing debate addresses the question of how all these burdens should be distributed among the relevant agents.

The burden sharing debate involves moral principles such as the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP), the Ability to Pay Principle (APP) or the Beneficiary Pays Principle (BPP). The PPP, which states that those who have caused the problem should bear the burdens of addressing, is usually regarded in the literature as a high intuitive principle. However, it faces important theoretical objections. Here I will focus on the PPP and the excusable ignorance objection, which claims that if an agent is excusably ignorant of the consequences of her actions, she should not be held liable for the costs associated with the consequences of her actions. On this basis, given that before the publication of the first IPCC report in 1990 climate change was not considered a threat to humanity, it is argued that the PPP cannot be applied to pre-1990 emissions (historical emissions).

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the use of the concept of moral responsibility that is in place in the debates about burden-sharing principles for climate justice, specifically with regards to the application of the PPP. My aim will be to explore how the concept of moral responsibility has been used in the debate and the consequences it has had on the applicability of the principles. In particular, I will show that the excusable ignorance objection involves a particularly narrow understanding of the concept of moral responsibility (a volitionalist account of moral responsibility). I will further argue that that a wider understanding of moral responsibility as answerability (as part of a non-volitionalist account) can be applied to the case of historical emissions and that would pave the way to support the PPP. This will have two effects, at a conceptual level and at a practical level. At a conceptual level, it will show that there is at least conceptual space for defeating the excusable ignorance objection at any application level. At a practical level, as I will show, this understanding of moral responsibility would support at least the application of the PPP for those 'measures of satisfactions' involved in the so-called 'loss and damage' policies.



**Glaeser, Micha** (Germany)

Affiliation: University of Zurich (Switzerland)

Session: 1, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a postdoctoral fellow in political philosophy at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. I hold an undergraduate degree in Philosophy and Economics from the University of Bayreuth, Germany, and a doctorate in philosophy from Harvard University, where I completed a dissertation entitled "Counsel and Command: An Address-Dependent Account of Authority" under the supervision of Christine Korsgaard, Thomas Scanlon, and Selim Berker. My research concerns the variety of ways in which normative phenomena in morality, politics, and law exhibit a relational structure.

Title: **Command and Natural Equality**

Keywords: Command; request; equality; Rawls; Kant

**Abstract:**

In *De Cive* Thomas Hobbes defines command as "an instruction in which the reason for following it is drawn from the will of the instructor." Hobbes contrasts command with counsel, which is "an instruction...in which the reason for following it is drawn from the matter itself." My own argument departs from a different contrast, that between command and request. Like command and unlike counsel, request seems to derive its normative force from the act of address itself, rather than merely transmitting normative force whose existence explanatorily "predates" the act of address. Yet there is clearly a difference in the normative force originating in command and that generated by request, with command amounting to the normatively more stringent and imposing of the two. The fact that we often resent being told what to do even though we are perfectly comfortable being asked to do the very same thing speaks to this fact. My proposal is to understand the normative gap between command and request by appeal to a difference in the kind of relation between addressor and addressee presupposed by the act of address in question. In commanding another the commander presupposes to possess a certain kind of normative power over the latter, while the same presupposition isn't in place with request. The fact that we often reject being commanded--"You don't get to tell me anything!"--might therefore be interpreted as a rejection of the implicit proposal that the addressor has the relevant kind of normative power over us.

Our resistance to others' telling us what to do in turn is indicative of the special justificatory burden inherent in command. To command someone is to assume a certain relational superiority over them, one which offends our self-conception as naturally free and equal beings. My suggestion is that the possibility of justified command--i.e. command that isn't inconsistent with our natural equality--depends on the "artificial" background of some appropriate system of public institutions. Such a system is capable of justifying command because it creates a practical standpoint shareable between commander and commandee through which it is possible for the latter to regard the command as in the relevant sense authored by herself. The fact that structures of command and obedience are naturally at home in institutional settings--say, the military or corporate hierarchies--might be taken in favor of my proposal. However, I not only have real life but also philosophical tradition on my side. Both Rawls's claim that it is possible for the members of a just basic structure to "recognize their obligations as self-imposed" and Kant's argument that freedom understood as "independence from being constrained by another's choice" is only possible in a "rightful condition"--i.e. a system of public laws--amount to different expressions of the same point, or so I argue.

**Gois Moreira, Pedro** (Portugal)

Affiliation: Catholic University of Portugal (Portugal)

Session: 14, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Pedro Góis Moreira is a PhD candidate at the Institute for Political Studies of the Catholic University of Portugal and holder of a FCT grant (Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology). He was, for the year 2016-2017, Research Scholar at the University of Dallas, Texas. He published on Thomas More's Utopia in *The Early Moderns* (Vienna, 2014) and participated in the translation and revision of *La pensée de Raymond Aron* (Aster, 2017). He is currently co-editing *Revisiting Richard Rorty* (Cambridge Scholars, 2018, forthcoming), a work based on a conference in memory of Richard Rorty that he co-organized. He is interested in radicalism and moderation in political thought.

Title: **On a non-Relational Conception of 'Political Radicalism'**

Keywords: Political Theory, Radicalism, Moderation, Populism

**Abstract:**

An operative notion of 'political radicalism' has never been more necessary to describe the times in which we live. Unfortunately, this concept is plagued with traps and confusions. One of them is the reduction of radicalism to a relational definition where it is understood as the deviation from some normative state.

In a first part, we will address some of the recent literature on radicalism (McLaughlin, 2012) and describe the problems of such a relational approach. Our conclusion is that 'radicalism' either ends up saying too little or too much: it either does not say enough and renders the use of the term purely local; or, it forces entire groups of authors, works, and arguments within the label 'radical.'

In the second part, we will operationalize a notion of political radicalism that avoids these pitfalls.

On the one hand, we shift the center of attention from the text to the reader: instead of focusing on 'what' makes a text 'radical' or who 'is' radical, we turn our attention to the kind of effects the use of radicalism affords. We see political radicalism as the use of a background metanarrative in order for an author to make his case to an audience. By invoking this metanarrative, the author is then able to give a sense of 'us and them' to the reader, which in turn enables him to perform several 'operations': 'align' the argument he is trying to make with the 'us' side; or 'exclude' any adversary and element lingering in the middle toward the 'them.'

In other words, we see political radicalism as analogous to a literary genre: just like a writer can use tropes reminiscent of, e.g., the fairy tale in order to induce the readers in a state of expectation on what is going to happen next, so does the author invoking radicalism to make his case. This 'smooth reading' enables the author using radicalism to generate effects that reinforce his case.

By using political radicalism in this way, we are able to avoid the pitfall of saying that a heterogeneous class of authors is 'radical,' all the while we reap the main benefit of the concept of radicalism itself: the ability to compare widely different authors and works.

**Golubev, Vadim** (Russia)

Affiliation: Planetary Development Institute (United Arab Emirates)

Session: 5, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

A Russian national, Dr Vadim Golubev holds a PhD in Linguistics from St Petersburg State University, St Petersburg, Russia, and currently leads the Department of English for the Faculty of Journalism at St Petersburg State University. Since 2015, he has been part of the Planetary Project, a global studies research and public awareness program, carried out by the Planetary Development Institute (PDI), based in Dubai, UAE. Dr Vadim Golubev works for the PDI as the Head of Information Monitoring Department. His research interests include argumentation in the media, global studies, planetary ethics and translation studies.

Title: **Anthropocene in Light of Planetary Ideas and the Concept of Managed Harmony**

Keywords: Anthropocene, Russian Cosmism, Planetary Project, Managed Harmony, Global Spiritual Synthesis

**Abstract:**

Anthropocene is hailed as an era of ultimate dominance of man over nature when the nature of man is revealed as a subject of geological history. However, commentators point out to threats the era of anthropocene has brought about since it started in the middle of the 20th century. These threats include: radioactive contamination of the atmosphere; water, soil and the outer space pollution; climate change; depletion of species; and the deterioration of man at the biological and spiritual levels.

The problem is that scientists refuse to treat anthropocene as a planetary process limiting themselves to treating it merely as a historical and geological era. The notion of planetarity is one of key elements of the philosophy of Russian cosmism, especially that of Vladimir Vernadsky, and the Planetary Project, a school of thought that naturally derives from cosmism. Planetarity implies increasing interdependence between man and nature. This interdependence is growing proportionately to growing population, economic output and resource consumption. People must understand that in order to deter the death of man as a species they must not only carry out a dramatic technological leap forward, but make a breakthrough in human values. It seems a point of singularity must be reached for mankind to drastically change its way of life both on Earth and beyond.

Turning anthropocene into a process of human development both from a historical and an ontological perspective would entail human involvement with nature, understanding its mysteries, becoming a steward of managed evolution and settling other planets in the Universe. Following Russian cosmists, the Planetary Project has formulated conditions under which this transformation could occur:

- Achieving global human integration, the planetarisation of man who has overcome existing divisions and borders;
- Building a new system of resource management based on planetary rent, which would ensure fair distribution of wealth and take into account the interests of the biosphere itself;
- Lifting barriers in the development of science especially pertaining to high technologies;
- Developing a biocentric worldview based on planetary ethics and global spiritual synthesis;
- Building a noospheric civilisation on the principles of managed harmony.

The concept of anthropocene must incorporate the category of planetarity and the concept of managed evolution. From an ethical perspective, planetarity implies integrativity as the basis of human self-awareness. Integrativity of an individual with the rest of humanity and the world is a source of responsibility as the main ethical chord of Homo Sapiens. Man bears the ultimate responsibility to represent the interests of life in the Universe. This responsibility includes care for life on Earth and protecting it from external threats. To fulfill this responsibility, man has endowed with intelligence, intuition and spirituality, the latter understood as a sense of the universal connectedness of life.

**Guillery, Daniel** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: University College London (United Kingdom)

Session: 13, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a PhD student at University College London working in political philosophy. My research is centred in two areas, which I try to bring together: state legitimacy or the morality of state enforcement, and the concept of feasibility and its role in moral and political philosophy. Before starting my PhD, I did a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford, and an MPhil in philosophy at UCL.

Title: **Legitimacy, obligation and justification**

Keywords: Legitimacy; political obligation; state enforcement; feasibility

**Abstract:**

It is generally thought that states that meet certain conditions possess a general and exclusive moral permission to enforce compliance with their directives. I will call this (stipulatively) 'legitimacy'. States are also sometimes taken to have the power to create obligations or reasons for action by issuing directives. Call this 'obligating power'. Scepticism about the latter property (the view that there are no general political obligations) has become quite widespread (thanks to the work of writers such as A. John Simmons and Robert Paul Wolff). However, it seems to be quite often assumed (and sometimes argued) that what I am calling legitimacy is on safer ground. That is, it is often thought that, even if states lack obligating power, at least some existing states possess a general moral permission to enforce. In this paper I give some reasons to doubt that state legitimacy is on safer ground than obligating power.

In particular, I address a line of thought that, I think, often underlies both the implicit assumption that state legitimacy is on safe ground and many of the most plausible explicit arguments for state legitimacy. This is the thought that a state's legitimacy follows from a property that at least some states possess reasonably uncontroversially (and from which obligating power does not follow). The property in question is the property of being justified, or the state's existence being in some sense a good thing. Such a line of thought, I argue, does not straightforwardly succeed in establishing legitimacy, but it may do so if we add certain strong premises about the lack of feasible alternatives. This is enough, I think, to show that the existence of legitimate states should not simply be taken for granted, since it is not obvious that the feasibility premises needed to make the argument work are true. Some thought needs to be given to exactly what feasibility premises are needed and whether or not these are in fact true.

I proceed by considering the most obvious interpretations of what might be meant by the claim that a state is justified (its existence is a good thing), and argue that none of the properties identified are such that we are warranted in assuming both that some states possess the property and that legitimacy follows from the property. We can get to claims about what a state can permissibly do from claims about that state's being morally good by either narrowing the comparison class too much or making unreasonably strong claims about how comparatively good the state is. This can be avoided with the aid of premises about feasibility or likelihood of alternatives to the state in question, but it should not simply be assumed without argument that the necessary feasibility premises are true.

**Halliday, Daniel** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: University of Melbourne (Australia)

Session: 12, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Daniel Halliday teaches political philosophy at Melbourne University. He works mainly on topics about economic justice, especially questions about markets and taxation. His book "The Inheritance of Wealth: Justice, Equality and the Right to Bequeath" was published in 2018 by Oxford University Press.

Title: **Indeterminacy of Contract and Labour Market Justice**

Keywords: Justice; Employment; Contracts; Inequality

**Abstract:**

Employment contracts are unlike most other contracts in being 'indeterminate'. When you sign a contract with (say) an electricity company, it is precisely clear what both parties have to do - one party keeps directing current to the plug sockets, and the other party pays according to how much of this current they take out by switching on their appliances. But the nature of work is rather different. Employers almost never know, in advance, precisely what they will want their workers to do. Therefore, almost all of us sign work contracts that have 'gaps' in them. Decisions then get made, on the fly, by bosses who are able to command workers to do specific things.

This indeterminacy is not bad or unjust by itself. Instead, much hangs on the actual conditions of labour markets. For highly skilled work where productivity is enhanced by employee freedom (like the academic profession), indeterminacy of contract is a great thing. But for most workers it is not so great, particularly in light of some current trends: Industry consolidation means larger firms with more hierarchy, and technology is allowing bosses to monitor their staff in ways that exacerbate the power inequality enabled by indeterminacy.

The problem is now arguably worse than it used to be. And yet the philosophy has not yet caught up: Indeterminacy of contract tends to be overlooked in the development of accounts of labour market in justice, which tend to be preoccupied with low wages and exploitation. These preoccupations often lead to proposals about regulating employment ex ante, e.g. calls for minimum wage laws, subsidized education, and other efforts aimed at correcting the worker/employer inequality of power in ways prior to the signing of a contract.

While the traditional proposals retain some force, my main point will be that the increasing causal significance of indeterminacy of contract should encourage more thought about ex post regulation of labour markets. More specifically, I will argue that more should be done to enable workers to take their employers to court when they've suffered injustice, and that the state needs to find new ways to police employment. Some of the greater injustices of recent reform lie in states moving in the opposite direction where such regulation is concerned.

In other words, the pursuit of labour market justice, insofar as it is about regulating employment contracts, should be more about good policing than good legislating. Such proposals have a practical advantage: Unlike much ex ante regulation, they take seriously the need for indeterminacy given the enduring fact of ignorance about which tasks bosses will need their workers to perform. And they also have a theoretical advantage: When it comes to contracts and justice, really the emphasis should be on enforcement guided by an interpretation of what the parties have really agreed to, rather than an attempt to decide, in advance, which agreements should be possible.

**Herrero-Olivera, Laura** (Spain)

Affiliation: Universidad Complutense-Madrid (Spain)

Session: 17, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

I'm part-time teacher at the Complutense University in Madrid, my PhD deals on kantian practical reason working. I teach Theory of Knowledge and my work as assistant to the Spanish Bioethical Committee has lead me to problems of the influence of science and economy in politics and social life in general.

Title: **Jürgen Habermas & Saskia Sassen On Globalization**

Keywords: Globalization, Habermas, Sassen, technology, exclusion

**Abstract:**

I would like to present the relationship between Habermas' text 'Technology and Science as Ideology' and Saskia Sassen proposals around globalization in some of her key works, for example 'Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages'. My objective is to study the main concepts in both authors to show their similarity and differences from the point of view that a better understanding and creative thinking is attained in a dialectical lecture of texts.

I would pay special attention to Habermas' concept of 'scientified politics' which has a tendency to abolish the distinction between work and interaction. In this exposition will be also very appealing to introduce the differences pose by Hannah Arendt on labor, work and action. But as in Arendt, Habermas analyses goes further to explore the influence this has in subjectivity, because the relation establish between subject and world changes the way in which the first build itself.

A transfer of these ideas to their factual implications is exposed in Saskia Sassen's work. She explores the way in which this specific way of work (reduced to technology) has transformed our cities from a place where people lived to a place where people mainly work. This is the bridge between the interpretations I present of both authors but Sassen also introduces the issue of exclusion suffer in certain social groups.

To summarize I would try to tackle following in my presentation:

- Features of work and interaction in Habermas' work and the abolition of their differences.
- Are these features present in Sassen's interpretation of globalization? (Differences and Similarities)
- Ways of violence out the system of work: exclusion.
- Is it still possible to think interaction as a solution to rebuild our cities?

**Hibbert, Neil** (Canada)

Affiliation: University of Saskatchewan (Canada)

Session: 13, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Associate Professor, Department of Political Studies

Title: **Legitimacy and Justice in Liberal Realism**

Keywords: Legitimacy, Justice, Realism, Political Authority

**Abstract:**

Political theory is marked by different views on the relationship between political legitimacy and morality. In general, however, political theorists link legitimate authority to morally justified governance, and introduce some degree of external evaluative standards of justice in assessing claims to legitimacy. Realist political theory, in contrast, rejects this approach to theorizing the normative dimension of political legitimacy, and presents a counter-position that holds that legitimating political norms are freestanding and not rooted in external and antecedent moral requirements. In recent years, significant work has emerged in this realist vein, leading to a strong countervailing position to more conventional modes of liberal theorizing. Perhaps the most influential contemporary formulation of an explicitly realist approach to political legitimacy is that presented by Bernard Williams. Williams holds that unlike 'moralist' political theory, political legitimacy is separate from a conception of justice that exists outside a specific political practice. Despite the separation of legitimacy from antecedent and external requirements of morality, Williams holds the further view that legitimate politics is normatively distinct from successful domination by virtue of offering some kind of internal justification to political subjects that they accept. Realism thus attempts to occupy a normative space between 'liberal moralism' and amoral 'real politik'. The general argument of this paper is that such space is not available to realists.

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the realist critique of what it identifies as problematic moralism in liberal political theory and to present a critique of the realist account of political legitimacy. The first section presents the realist critique of two ways in which external and antecedent principles of justice work in liberal theories of political legitimacy. The second section shows how the alternative realist conception of legitimacy tries to create distinct conceptual space for a normative conception of legitimacy between liberal moralism, on the one hand and amoral, real politik, conceptions that reduce legitimacy to effective rule, on the other. The third section develops three arguments against the availability of this space for realists. The first is that justification of political authority itself is normative and occurs prior to the existence of a particular political context, which Williams argues provides the origin and normativity of specific legitimations. The second is that distinguishing between genuine and 'false' acceptance of a political authority's self-justification draws on a general idea of reciprocity as the basis of legitimate authority. The third builds on this concern, and shows that the realist view of legitimacy cannot account for the 'recognitional' elements of legitimacy assessments. As a result, it fails to provide guidance for how political societies should structure their interactions with others, which is one of the basic social functions establishing standards of legitimacy serves.

### **Huk, Marta Zuzanna** (Poland)

Affiliation: Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland)

Session: 26, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

#### **Short Bio:**

Marta Z. Huk is a Ph.D. candidate in the Chair of Public Philosophy and Philosophy of Law in Institute of Philosophy at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan (Poland). She graduated cum laude in philosophy (2014). Currently, her main research area remains deliberative political philosophy and philosophy of law.

Title: **Seeking the Ideal Model of Deliberative Democracy**

Keywords: deliberative democracy, self-interest, decision-making processes, deliberative negotiation, deliberative justification

#### **Abstract:**

In my presentation, I would like to answer the question concerning the role and functions of self-interest on the basis of ideal model of deliberative democracy. I will attempt to demonstrate, that in present reflection concerning the regulative standard, to which actual deliberation ought to aspire, it is not necessary to exclude self-interest and rely on common interest instead. This notion, perceived by me as a key to fully understand premises of deliberative model of democracy, is strictly combined with defining and placing such categories as power, as well as coercive power, negotiation or voting on the grounds of deliberative democratic decisions. The main concern remains how does self-interest influence mechanisms of decision-making processes. Being able to recognize all of the above issues will, as a consequence, show two separate functions of self-interest in deliberative decision-making processes. It can and should either provide them with information or justification of certain practices. In other words, my central task will be to demonstrate, that fair cooperation and mutual justification are possible to achieve in deliberation built upon self-interest. However, it's crucial features must meet standards of equality, mutual respect or reciprocity. Yet, the most important thing to address at this point is how the the ideal model – a regulative standard of deliberative democracy can be applicable to the real and unpredictable deliberation?



**Jørgensen, Simon Laumann** (Denmark)

Affiliation: Aalborg University (Denmark)

Session: 2, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Simon Laumann Jørgensen is Associate Professor in political theory at the Department of Political Science, Aalborg University, Denmark. He has studied philosophy in Aarhus, Tübingen, New York and Frankfurt. He has published on democratic citizenship policies, contemporary political philosophy and critical theory in journals such as *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, *Scandinavian Political Studies*, *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research* and in books by publishers such as Cambridge University Press, Brill, Aarhus University Press, Informations forlag and Djøf Publishing.

Title: **The democratic contradictions**

Keywords: Democracy, immigrants, future citizens, children, trade

**Abstract:**

Democracy is a contested term over which people continue to debate. Views concerning the preconditions of democracy relate to controversial political issues concerning what the state should bring about. In light of this, a democracy will likely entail different conceptions of democracy among its constituency and representatives. Based on ideal types, the overall democratic system can be reconstructed to indicate which conception of democracy prevails at a given time. None of this is rather controversial. But what if a given democracy actually trades on several contradicting conceptions of democracy in order to legitimize its practices? I believe this is often the case and can be revealed by reconstructing the ways different 'boundaries of democracy' are guarded. In this paper I bring together four boundaries of democracy to reveal the operation of contradicting conceptions of democracy: children, immigrants, future citizens and citizens of trading partner countries.

A simple way of mapping the contradictions that interest me entails a distinction between 1) minimalist and optimistic versus 2) maximalist and pessimistic conceptions of democracy. According to the minimalist and optimistic conception, democracy can function under rather minimal preconditions. This view is optimistic concerning human courage, rationality and creativity, and argues that citizens do not need full civil and political rights or extensive forms of welfare state empowerment measures to take active part in a minimally functioning democracy. According to the maximalist and pessimistic view, however, democracy can only function if a long list of preconditions is fulfilled. The list will entail robust and fully institutionalized civil, political and social rights empowering all citizens to participate as peers in social and political life.

The paper brings out the contradiction between defending maximalist and pessimist conceptions when it comes to children and immigrants and minimalist, and optimistic conceptions when it comes to future citizens and citizens of trading partner countries. Children and immigrants need to develop extensive competences of autonomy for their voice to count, while not much concern is given the preconditions for the effective voice of future citizens or citizens of trading partner countries such as Saudi Arabia.

It may be objected that these are not real contradictions and that bringing them together entails a category mistake. In the case of future citizens, however, it is hard to defend the view that the right to democracy is only for the present generations and not for the coming (and into the future). In the case of trading partner countries, Leif Wenar has convincingly argued that buying the natural resources such as oil from a country entails authorising the regime as representing the people since the natural resources belong to the people. In the case of selling surveillance equipment, it would be hard to defend the sale without seeing the buyers as legitimate representatives of the people. In both cases, however, the possible conceptions of democratic autonomy entailed must be of a minimalist and optimistic nature. I hope that bringing out these contradictions would pressure democracies to confront the legitimacy of their present actions.

**Karalius, Gintas** (Lithuania)

Affiliation: Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University (Lithuania)

Session: 2, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Academic position: Assistant lecturer at the Department of Political Theory, Institute of International Relations and Political Science (IIRPS), Vilnius University, Lithuania.

Education: BA in Political science at the Vilnius University (IIRPS) in 2011. MA Cum Laude degree in Comparative politics in 2013. Political science certificate at the Institute of Political Science of Lyon, France (Institut d'études politiques de Lyon) from 2009 to 2010.

Currently PhD student (from 2014) at Vilnius University (IIRPS). PhD thesis: Transformations of the idea of honour in XIXth century continental political philosophy.

Research Area: Political Philosophy

Title: **Representing the people: failed promise of modern democracy?**

Keywords: representation, democracy, the people, monarchy, populism

**Abstract:**

Since the beginning of the XIX century it has become common to complain about poor legitimacy of democratically elected officials. Today such complaints are loudly expressed by anti-establishment movements, but are more and more shared by traditional political parties. It seems paradoxical that the so called 'populists' and the traditional political elites both claim to speak in the name of 'the people', while denouncing the current quality of representation of the very same people. A XVIII-XIX century debate between 'republican' and 'monarchist' concepts of political representation offer one possible explanation, why we still struggle to trust our elected representatives.

Jean Jacques Rousseau's famous thought that 'the voice of the people is the true voice of God' has become a keystone normative standard of parliamentary democracies. Legitimacy of modern democratic rule rests upon an elaborate idea that 'the good society' is necessarily a democratic society, where every individual is free and equal in an integral collective entity – 'the people'; while a good political regime is the one that effectively represents 'the people'. The sustainability of such an idea was criticized as delusional by monarchist philosophers. Joseph De Maistre claimed that, without a king under whose authority to function, parliaments inevitably become illegitimate institutions. Political representation can only function when there exists a recipient, to whom the will of the people could be addressed. Democratically elected officials only convey the wishes and woes of their voters. They are not the recipients of the will of the people, only its stewards. Elected officials can only become proper representatives under a higher authority (such as, a king) to whom the will of the people is addressed. The people cannot respect such a parliament that derives its authority from the very same people.

Two practical threats emerge from the paradoxical idea of democratic representation: 1. Tyranny of the masses; 2. New forms of enlightened absolutism. The former concept resonates with what we today call populism - political passions of the public against supposedly illegitimate elites in order to establish genuine representation of the people's will. The latter concept corresponds to a paternalistic government by technocratic elites, who claim to poses superior knowledge and authority to represent the interests of the people.

Modern democracy struggles with an intrinsic contradiction between its idea of popular sovereignty and its implementation through political representation. Thus, it uses a monarchic structure to politically fulfill an egalitarian idea of the rule of the people. The result is that democracies become stuck with an impossible task to try and represent something that is too abstract to be represented. Democrats can never be satisfied with their governance because elected representatives become unable to represent anything the very day they get elected. Populist and technocratic threats to democracy that are still relevant in today's Europe are the result of democracy's failed promise to represent the people.

**Klem Thomsen, Frej** (Denmark)

Affiliation: Roskilde University (Denmark)

Session: 11, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Frej Klem Thomsen is post doctoral researcher in ethics, with particular interests in criminal justice ethics, bioethics and neuroethics.

Title: **The Badness of Surveillance**

Keywords: Surveillance; Harm; Privacy

**Abstract:**

Surveillance is a topic that has attracted increasing scholarly attention over the past decade. In spite of this, we still lack a clear understanding of the concept of surveillance as well as a coherent account of what makes surveillance morally bad, when it is bad. This article attempts to provide both.

The article first develops a concise definition of surveillance, exploring the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, arguing that we should employ a purely descriptive concept, resisting the temptation to moralise surveillance, or to restrict it to contexts of privacy.

It next explores a privacy-based account of the badness of surveillance – the idea that surveillance is morally bad, when it is, because it reduces privacy. I review several prominent theories of privacy and distinguish three revised conceptions of privacy, focused on access, accessibility, and control respectively.

Sections four and five present two constraints that the privacy-based account of the badness of surveillance must operate under based on two prominent challenges to a right to privacy. Jointly, I argue, these challenges entail that the privacy-based account of the badness of surveillance must take a particular, restricted shape, which limits the type of argument available to the proponent of that account.

In section six I summarise the privacy-based account as it has been developed throughout the article, as the notion that surveillance is bad, when it is, because there is a pro tanto reason against reducing persons' privacy just because doing so reduces their privacy. I briefly clarify how each of the three conceptions of privacy might work within this framework before critically assessing the account.

In the final section, I introduce an alternative and more plausible account of what makes surveillance morally bad (when it is bad) – that surveillance can cause harm, and is morally bad when and to the extent that it causes such harm. I briefly develop the account by exploring the myriad ways in which surveillance can cause harm, before I discuss a number of potential objections, including apparent counterexamples involving intuitively wrongful but harmless surveillance, and the idea that the account's appeal will be limited to thinkers with particular types of moral background theories.

**Klenk, Michael** (Germany)

Affiliation: Utrecht University (Netherlands)

Session: 19, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

BA in Business Management (Stuttgart), MA in Philosophy (London), BSC in Psychology (Hagen, Germany), now PhD Candidate in Philosophy (Utrecht, Netherlands).

Title: **Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Metaethics Fail if they Depend on Disagreement**

Keywords: Moral objectivism, moral epistemology, evolutionary debunking arguments, moral disagreement

**Abstract:**

The burgeoning debate about the metaethical implications of Darwinism about morality focuses on which epistemic principle(s) allegedly support debunking arguments against moral objectivism (e.g., Lutz 2017; Vavova 2015; Sinclair forthcoming). Moral objectivism is the view that (at least some) moral truths are metaphysically necessary as well as constitutively and causally independent of human attitudes or beliefs (e.g., Enoch 2011; Shafer-Landau 2003). Though objectivists must, of course, explain how objectivist moral beliefs can be justified in the first place, a central question is whether objectivist moral beliefs can be undermined, assuming that they are at least *prima facie* justified.

Several philosophers have recently argued that Darwinism about morality is metaethically significant because it implies a hypothetical disagreement: had our evolutionary history been different, our actual moral beliefs would conflict with the moral beliefs of our counterfactual selves (Mogensen 2016, 2017; White 2010; Bogardus 2017). For example, Mogensen writes that any metaethical implications that follow from Darwinism about morality “will be due to the epistemic significance of moral disagreement” (Mogensen 2016: 591). The disagreement in question is hypothetical or counterfactual disagreement: had our evolutionary history been different, our actual moral beliefs would conflict with the moral beliefs of our counterfactual selves.

This paper aims at showing that evolutionary considerations do not imply epistemically relevant moral disagreement. My argument focuses on the concept of epistemic peer-hood, a rather underexplored issue in recent epistemology and uncharted territory in relation to evolutionary debunking arguments in metaethics. My strategy is to show that evolutionary explanations of morality do not reveal epistemically significant disagreement about morality. In arguing for this claim, I combine considerations about the criteria for moral peers with considerations about the implications of evolutionary explanations of morality. I show that, in counterfactually nearby scenarios, evolutionary considerations imply tremendous moral agreement. In counterfactually remote scenarios, evolutionary considerations do not entail relevant disagreement with our epistemic peers, on neither a narrow nor on a broad conception of peer-hood. In conclusion, evolutionary considerations do not reveal epistemically troubling kinds of disagreement. Anti-objectivists need to look elsewhere to fuel their sceptical argument. In addition to this claim, the paper shows what we can and cannot learn about counterfactual moral disagreement from evolutionary considerations.

These findings should be of interest to both moral objectivists and their critics. Section 2 clarifies the context and the metaethical significance of the debunking disagreement thesis. Section 3 reconstructs the argument for the debunking disagreement thesis in greater detail. Section 4 argues that the debunking disagreement thesis is false.

**Kniess, Johannes** (Germany)

Affiliation: Princeton University (United States)

Session: 28, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Johannes Kniess is a postdoctoral research associate in values and public policy at Princeton University.

Title: **Bentham on Animal Welfare**

Keywords: Bentham, Singer, animal rights, animal welfare, utilitarianism

**Abstract:**

Jeremy Bentham is often thought to have set the groundwork for the modern “animal liberation” movement, but in fact he wrote little on the subject. A full examination of his work reveals a much less radical position than that commonly attributed to him. Bentham was the first Western philosopher to grant animals equal moral consideration, and he was a staunch defender of animal welfare laws. But he also approved of killing and using animals, as long as pointless cruelty could be avoided. The nuances of his position are best brought out by comparing it to that of Peter Singer, who draws considerably more radical practical conclusions. This is not primarily explained by competing formulations of utilitarianism, however, but by different empirical background assumptions about the lives of animals.

**Lawford-Smith, Holly** (New Zealand)

Affiliation: University of Melbourne (Australia)

Session: 27, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

I'm a Senior Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Melbourne. I work mainly at the intersection of social ontology and moral philosophy. I'm particularly interested in the application of these two areas to climate ethics.

Title: **Is the offshore processing & resettlement of refugees morally permissible?**

Keywords: Ethics of immigration, refugees, moral outsourcing, exploitation, political philosophy

**Abstract:**

Australia is notorious for its treatment of asylum-seekers arriving by boat: they are sent offshore, to either Papua New Guinea or Nauru, to have their claims processed and from there to be resettled or returned. In this paper, I ask whether the offshore processing and resettlement of refugees is permissible, whether in ideal or non-ideal conditions. I take the underlying philosophical issue to be one about moral outsourcing: do countries have non-transferable obligations to process and resettle refugees who arrive on their territory? If not, under what conditions can these obligations be transferred? I will argue that there's nothing wrong in principle with offshore processing and resettlement, unless there's something wrong in principle with a non-multicultural society.

**Leipold, Bruno Leipold** (Germany)

Affiliation: Goethe University Frankfurt (Germany)

Session: 9, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a Post-doctoral Fellow in Political Theory at the Justitia Amplificata Centre for Advanced Studies at the Goethe University Frankfurt and the Free University of Berlin.

My research interests include the work of Karl Marx, theories of popular democracy, the republican political tradition and nineteenth-century social and political thought.

Before coming to Frankfurt, I completed my PhD at the University of Oxford. In September 2018 I will begin a Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellowship at the European University Institute in Florence.

Title: **Chains and Invisible Threads: Liberty and Domination in Marx's Account of Wage-Slavery**

Keywords: Marx; Republicanism; Wage-Labour; Domination; Freedom

**Abstract:**

In Capital vol. I (1867), Karl Marx writes that while the 'Roman slave was held in chains; the wage-labourer is bound to his owner by invisible threads.' This is one of countless examples where Marx uses ideas and language that we associate with the republican tradition. This has been noted by several scholars of republicanism, including Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, but has received very little sustained examination. This paper addresses that gap by exploring how Marx deployed and transformed central republican ideas in his critique of wage-labour.

The paper is divided into four sections. First, I discuss two nineteenth century republican critiques of wage-labour, that of Robert de Lamennais and William James Linton, in order to highlight how Marx's account built on and extended existing republican critiques.

Second, I look at how Marx thought how the worker was structurally dominated as a result of the distribution of the means of production. He argued that while workers differed from slaves and serfs by having the freedom to sell their labour-power, the fact that they owned no means of production meant that they were forced to sell their labour-power to a capitalist. That meant that they though were not tied to an individual master (like serfs and slaves), they were tied to the mastery of the capitalist class. Marx argues that this makes the unfreedom and domination of the workers less transparent than previous relationships of domination.

Third, I explore how Marx thought that the worker was dominated during the bargaining over the terms of the wage-contract. Marx argued that because the worker was more dependent on the capitalist than the capitalist on the worker, the capitalist could use their arbitrary power to extract greater economic benefits. I focus particularly on Marx's account over the length of the working day, and how Marx shows that the greater the domination of the capitalist the greater their ability to extend the length of the working-day and hence extend their exploitation of the worker.

Fourth, I then discuss Marx's account of the worker's domination inside the workplace. Marx repeatedly compares the arbitrary power of the capitalist inside the factory to the arbitrary power of a despot over their subjects. Marx argues that because workers are subjected to this kind of arbitrary power, they are unfree inside the factory. He further argues that because the worker is dependent on the good will of the capitalist they have to demean and ingratiate themselves, to ensure their continued employment. Marx thus transfers many of the classic concerns of republicanism from their political origins to the economic sphere.

In conclusion, Marx thus believed that because of this structural domination in the means of production, domination during the setting of the wage-contract, and then domination inside of the workplace, wage-labour in fact amounted to wage-slavery.

**Lepore, Emanuele** (Italy)

Affiliation: Ca' Foscari University of Venice, CISE: Interuniversity Center for Studies in Ethics (Italy)  
Session: 9, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

Emanuele Lepore graduated in Venice in 2016, with a thesis about the relation between theoretical and practical thought in Jules Lequier and Tomas Aquinas, under the direction of Professor Paolo Pagani. He is attending his master's degree in Venice, focusing his research on Ethics and Political Theory: precisely he is inquiring into the Principle of Justice, both in ethical and political sense. He is member of the venetian group of the Interuniversity Center for Studies in Ethics (CISE).

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Title: **Why should we join Capitalism?**

Keywords: capitalism; ethics; political theory; critical theory; arendt; adorno; boltansky; chiapello; human being

**Abstract:**

According to Hannah Arendt's Political thought, the birthday of every totalitarianism is the murder of the person by denying its singularity. In 'The Origin Of Totalitarianism' she argued that this murder is the finale of a three steps process: 1) body; 2)ethics; 3)individuality. Throughout a coherent development line of thought, crossbreeding Adorno's idea of 'Befriggsbildung' and its critical élan, we can deduce an account of our times as totalitarianism. Properly speaking, by Arendt's and Adorno's introductions we can argue that Capitalism is the most efficacious and difficult to undermine practical translation of 'totalitarianism'. We are to explain the argumentative itinerary. Our argumentation, in this paper, can be bent in three main passages: 1)Showing the introductions: a) Arendt's account of totalitarianism as murder of the singularity; b) Adorno's 'Negative Dialectics'; 2) The political turn in nowadays: Capitalism as obliteration of the singularity: a) merchandise's replacement of person; 3) Why should we join Capitalism? a) Boltansky's and Chiapello's account of 'Ideology' as a speech able to justify the involvement in this process.



**Li, Tingwen** (China)

Affiliation: Xiamen University (Phd Student); University of Cambridge (Visiting Researcher) (China)

Session: 4, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

I'm a Phd student in the field of aesthetics and phenomenology at Xiamen University in China and a Visiting Researcher at University of Cambridge, and my research interests are Art and Phenomenology, Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Science, Liberalism and British Conservatism. I have published 14 papers on national and international academic journals and made several presentations at some International conferences, and they are mainly about my recent investigation of contemporary phenomenological aesthetics in the English world and the concern of Liberalism and British Conservatism. Also, some of the publications are out of my one-year-study of Aestheticism in Japan.

Title: **On the Tradition of “Don’t be Cruel” --An Account of Richard Rorty’s Minimalist Liberalism**

Keywords: Richard Rorty; Minimalist Liberalism; Don’t be Cruel; the Liberalism of Fear; Tradition

**Abstract:**

In his *Debating Democracy’s Discontent*, Richard Rorty made a defense for and so to self-declare as a Minimalist Liberal in Sandel’s sense that has no ontological commitment to any assertion of Human Nature or any other philosophical foundation. One of the benefits is that, as Rorty claimed, it liberates the expandable “us” from a suspicious philosophical definition of Liberalism proclaimed by classic liberals that separates people belonging to the same tradition and discredits Liberalism itself, and all we have to do now is to identify with and learn more from that specific tradition, by which Rorty referred to the Liberalism of fear that manifested the “minimal” discipline of Liberalism — “don’t be cruel.” As far as the criticism has gone, the problematic is concisely articulated by three main questions: 1) what is cruelty and what is “don’t be cruel”? 2) why should cruelty be against? 3) how could we combat cruelty in practice? As for the first question, while Richard Shusterman provided an account of the characterization of cruelty by distinguishing its means of body and language, Richard Bernstein correctly pointed out the difficulties in the definition and demarcation of cruelty for Rorty has ruled out both the approach of nominalization of predicate and the representational understanding of Human Nature in terms of body and mind. In order to involve Rorty in a more promising conversation, we might have to move from the first question. Regarding the second one, many philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas and Judith Butler propose some formulations that are not based on any reference of self/subject/agent, and they also gave out reasons for our responsibility for others. However, we would also find those reasons trivial or even controversial when we pay closer attention to their arguments and the implications, which relate us to the third question. Considering the third issue, as Michael Oakeshott argued, and Rorty agreed, that we should learn more from a tradition and its practice rather than from any sort of rationalism, which means that we need a specific education for Minimalist Liberalism and its only discipline. But what kind of tradition and what kind of education we would need are two subsequent questions. As for tradition, if we resort to Judith Shklar’s Liberalism of fear, we would find its merits along with the flaws and predicaments it brings, and among them is the problem of the expected audience who are supposed to be educated just as Bernard Williams suggested. When it comes to the question of education, although Rorty had separated the public from the private that entails two different fashions of education for citizens and individuals so to prevent the detrimental interference, we are still exposed to, as Michael Tanner and Mary Midgley both underlined, a potential risk of people’s disgust of sentimental literature that serves for the public education.

### **Mabota, António dos Santos** (Mozambique)

Affiliation: Pedagogical University, Mozambique (Mozambique)

Session: 27, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

#### **Short Bio:**

Assistant professor at the Pedagogical University - Mozambique, PhD Candidate in Political and Social Philosophy at the University of Minho, Portugal. Researcher in the areas of Ethics and Development Policy and Indigenous Knowledge System

Title: **Immigration, Human Rights and Ethical Dilemmas**

Keywords: Refugees; Human rights; Moral Argumentation and Ethical Dilemmas

#### **Abstract:**

Argumentation, not being exclusive, is an appropriate way of thinking about the good as the object of the philosophical discipline of ethics. Valid modes of argumentation include *modus ponens*, *modus tollens*, and dilemma. Considering the issue of immigrants as an ethical problem arise several dilemma situations. Among the arguments put forward in these situations appear to favor, cosmopolitan and humanitarian issues, and against, the questions of national sovereignty and security. Taking Human Rights as a moral paradigm and the case of refugees as immigrants, it is necessary to seek a way out of this dilemma which can be situated between the politically correct and the ethically better, based on alternative modes of valid argumentation, avoiding fallacies.

**Marian, Marco** (Italy)

Affiliation: researcher (Portugal)

Session: 10, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

PhD in Philosophy at the University of Santiago de Compostela, researcher at the University of Minho at the Centre for Ethics, Politics and Society (CEPS).

My research is focused on issues related to the Philosophy of Technology and the new problems that the technique is bringing in terms of its relationship with reality and the human being. Author of the book "From a critical theory of society to a digital critical theory" Aracne Editrice, Italy.

Title: **Technical system and automatic society as conditions of Anthropocene**

Keywords: Mechanical society, efficiency, system, computer, technique

**Abstract:**

Human beings are suffering not only from an economic crisis due to the enrichment of a little number of persons, but also an existential crisis due to the invasion of technology in their life. This crisis is linked to the process by which human subjectivity is lost in the mechanisms of scientific objectivity and technology. Everything originated through the transformations that have affected individual and contemporary society since the twentieth century. The ideal of "new" and the automatic replacement of all that is old, all new forms of life, massive cities, arts, work, culture and information age, are themes that, with the modernity, are changing its perspective from the past. The Critical Theory of Society done by Frankfurt School, and in particular I am referring to the think of M. Horkheimer, Th. W. Adorno, W. Benjamin and H. Marcuse, reflects the causes of the critical situation that human beings are living in the future. Existence was replaced for a new artificial world that had its bases in the "instrumental reason" described by Max Horkheimer and W. Theodor Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment. Apparently there is no way to escape from the power and totalitarianism of technique that represents the first tremendous element of contemporary society. With the thought of the french philosopher Jaques Ellul we cannot say that technology is under the control of human intentions. Humans are living in a technological system and are adapted to it for reasons that are not visible at first sight. This technological system represents the base of the human condition in the era of the Anthropocene. The Anthropos has definitively entered in this new era becoming a victim of a change in his life. This change could be produced by the autonomy of technique.

Technique's reason is adapting itself to human's needs therefore there is no more a forced submission on the individuals by the side of technological and industrial system but it is this system that personalized itself according to human's necessities. Contemporary society is living an inauthentic and artificial life; it's was becoming a show and overpassed it. Individuals are converted in audience of their life's show and protagonist of its own death in life.

Cybernetic is yet the only instrument for living and exploring the world through informations and media at the service of progress. A human being is seen as a calculator and like an instrument for the informatics operations. Technological progress believes in artificial life and in genetic transformation. All sides of human's life are invaded for the automation.

Jean Baudrillard says that digital world will be the only platform to live on, replacing space and time, turning them into something unreal and manipulated through computing engineering. Bernard Stiegler affirms the proletarianization of human being due to the effect of the technology in its life. For the letter, unlike this contemporary philosophy thought, it is possible to rethink technology and find a new form to live with it. The technological element can be think as a pharmacon, something that can procure salvation on one side and on the other, death.

**Martínez Contreras, Javier** (Spain)

Affiliation: Universidad de Deusto (Spain)

Session: 8, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

Javier Martínez Contreras (Ourense, 1969) es doctor en Filosofía (Universidad de Deusto) y licenciado en Filosofía (Universidad de Deusto) y Licenciado en Ciencias Religiosas (Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca). Profesor de Historia de la Filosofía y Ética en la Universidad de Deusto. Miembro del Centro de Ética Aplicada de la misma universidad, y miembro del equipo de investigación Ética Aplicada a la Realidad Social. Realizó estudios complementarios en la Universidad de Tubinga, y fue Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter del Institut M.-D. Chenu (Berlín). Es coordinador del Grado en Humanidades y del Grupo de Profesores de Ética Cívica y Profesional en la UD.

Title: **Social Accountability and Gender: an ethical approach**

Keywords: Social Accountabilty, Gender, Ethics, Democracy

**Abstract:**

Social Accountability (SA) has attracted increasing interest in the last decade. Most of the research on SA focuses on developing countries and the direct engagement of poor people. These studies assume that democratic regimes in developing countries are frequently weak and unresponsive to the needs of wide segments of the population. Accordingly, studies try to grasp how, and under what conditions, programs aimed at fostering accountability from below incorporate poor people's interests into policy-making and policy implementation.

We suggest that the concept of SA is also useful to imagine new ways for democratizing democracy in developed countries, thus SA implies a relationship between citizens or/and civil society with public institutions. We look for deepen the relational perspective of SA introduced by Joshi and Houtzager (2012) and Houtzager et al. (2016) considering it from an ethical perspective that is informed also by gender perspective. Accountability relationships are power relationships and, as such, are susceptible of being ethically analyzed. More when usual exercises of power create clear discriminations, as gender perspective demonstrates continuously webbing a net of structural injustice.

We conceptualize SA as a web of relationships between account-giving public actors (elected representatives and public servants) and account-demanding social actors (citizens and civil society groups) in which the latter develop the capacity to effectively exact rigorous and understandable explanations from the former regarding their conduct, official procedures and policies. In such relationships, citizens and civil society groups have the power to sanction authorities that deviate from agreed or socially acceptable ethical standards. If SA can be considered so, then it deserves a reflection about ethical principles like responsibility and justice, that might guide SA in order to foster inclusion, transparency and democratic legitimacy. This ethical consideration is especially relevant for SA, because in most cases only a small part of the society has the opportunity, interest, or capacity to interact with the state. Moreover, in very exceptional circumstances the interaction between the state and civil society deals with decisions that affect only those who are directly engaged. If SA is also about building more responsive, inclusive, and legitimate public institutions, the participants in the interactions need to assume responsibility for the needs and interests of those who cannot participate, and this is a political responsibility.

According to this remarks, we develop an ethical frame for SA following the ideas or responsibility of Hannah Arendt and Iris Marion Young, linking it with the notion of structural injustice. We illustrate this structural injustice considering the perspective of gender as an ethical problem embedded in every social structure as well as in every social interaction. As Goetz said, for women, being at the margins of political life has translated into being invisible to accountability institutions (2005). To sum up, we analyze ethically how a relational perspective of SA can stimulate gender equality and, therefore, the democratization of democracy.

**Mellor, Rowan** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: University College London (United Kingdom)

Session: 9, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a second year PhD student studying at University College London. My research focuses on the philosophical problems surrounding structural injustice and large-scale coordination.

Title: **Must the Proletariat Sell Their Labour?**

Keywords: G. A. Cohen, freedom, collective unfreedom, capitalism, wage labour

**Abstract:**

This paper is a response to G. A. Cohen's *The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom* (1983). Cohen sets out to answer the following question: are the workers in a capitalist society forced to sell their labour power? His answer is 'yes and no': 'no' in an individual sense, but 'yes' in a collective sense. This paper argues that Cohen's proposal is unsatisfactory. Cohen aims to respond to what I call the Argument from Social Mobility, which runs as follows. The proletariat are not forced to sell their labour because capitalism offers them a reasonable alternative. If they worked hard enough, they could exercise upward social mobility and raise themselves to the level of the petty bourgeois. Cohen responds by distinguishing two forms of unfreedom: individual and collective. Individual unfreedom is a matter of what an individual can and cannot do. Collective unfreedom is defined as follows: "...a group suffers collective unfreedom with respect to a type of action A if and only if performance of A by all members of the group is impossible" (1983, p. 16). Cohen then asserts that there are always more proletarians in a capitalist society than there are exits from the proletariat. Consequently it is not possible for all of the workers to ascend their class. However it remains possible for any one worker to do so. Therefore, whilst there is collective proletarian unfreedom for class ascension, each worker is individually free to leave. Cohen thereby concedes that the Argument from Social Mobility succeeds in demonstrating that no individual proletarian is forced to sell their labour: since the possibility of class ascension offers each of them a reasonable alternative. Nevertheless he holds that the workers are forced to sell their labour power in a collective sense.

At the heart of Cohen's position is the thought that, whilst each worker has a reasonable alternative to wage labour, the proletariat lack any such alternative collectively. I argue that this claim is problematic. The primary problem with it is this. The claim that, collectively, the proletariat lack a reasonable alternative to wage labour might be understood as follows: every alternative to the action-combination in which all of the workers sell their labour is either impossible or unreasonable. That, however, is inconsistent with the claim that, in an individual sense, class ascension offers each worker a reasonable alternative to wage labour. That is true only if, for every worker *w*, there is a possible and reasonable action-combination in which *w* ascends their class. Cohen, I argue, thinks that such action-combinations are possible: namely, those combinations in which some workers leave whilst others stay behind. All that needs to be added is that they are reasonable. But that cannot be done if it is insisted that, collectively, the proletariat lack a reasonable alternative to wage labour; on the present reading, that claim requires that such action-combinations are unreasonable. Possible responses are explored and rebutted. Either they have unattractive consequences, or they cannot be attributed to Cohen.

**Menshikov, Andrey** (Russia)

Affiliation: Ural Federal University (Russia)

Session: 29, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

I graduated in Philosophy at Ural State University and in Medieval Studies at Central European University (2002). I defended my PhD in the History of Philosophy at Ural State University in 2006. Between 2002 and 2016, I participated in Soros Foundation's projects on Toleration and Multiculturalism, first as a student, later as an instructor. I was NCEEER fellow at Boston University (2004) and INTAS fellow at Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study (2006-2008). Since 2009, I am a docent at the Department of Philosophy, Ural Federal University, since 2015, I am an academic coordinator of MA program in Political Philosophy.

Title: **Freedom of Conscience and Protection of Religious Feelings: Human Rights in the Context of Post-secular Modernity**

Keywords: Religious Feelings; Defamation of Religion; Freedom of Conscience; Freedom of Speech; Religious Interpretation of Human Rights

**Abstract:**

In the presentation, I will discuss the legal reform that is aimed at protecting religious feelings of the believers in Russia. Legal innovations are described and placed in the context of recent legal developments in Russian and international law. Examples of the use of the notion of religious feelings in legal practice and in court experts' discourse are presented and analyzed. I focus on two cases of prosecution for insulting religious feelings that occurred in Ekaterinburg in 2017 and 2018. I emphasize that the protection of religious feelings significantly differs from anti-blasphemy legislation. It does not contain any notion of the sacred that can be defiled or profaned. It is formulated specifically and exclusively as a protection of individual's human rights. I, therefore, conclude that in Russian legal discourse on the protection of religious feelings the language of human rights is used to suppress human rights. As I demonstrate further, even for the court experts acting in good faith the notion of religious feelings presents insurmountable difficulty in grasping, interpreting and applying it in a trial. This notion can only be the means of limiting freedom of speech and stifling dissent. Finally, I surmise that the introduction of this notion of religious feelings is symptomatic of the post-secular conflicts in Russia, where the church seeks to exercise political power whereas state leadership "talks morality", but this alliance promotes its conservative authoritarian agenda through the invocation of human rights.

I, then, consider the arguments of proponents and opponents of protecting religious feelings. The proponents' claims range from the perfectly legitimate appeals to impermissibility of defamation, hate speech and negative stereotyping of individuals or communities on the grounds of their race, gender, religion, etc., on the one hand, to diverse attempts to offer alternative interpretation of and religious underpinnings for the notion of human rights.

I argue that to respond to this challenge of using the discourse of human rights to suppress human rights a certain hierarchy of human rights may be needed and then discuss three approaches to such hierarchization: comprehensive deontological approach; comprehensive consequentialist approach; lexical priority approach.

**Miguel, Ricardo** (Portugal)

Affiliation: LanCog, Centro de Filosofia, Faculdade de Letras, Universidade de Lisboa (Portugal)

Session: 28, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Ricardo is currently studying for a Ph.D. at the University of Lisbon (FCT studentship SFRH/BD/107907/2015) with a thesis on the moral status of animals and the problem of replaceability.

Title: **Vegan labelling may contain traces of non-veganism**

Keywords: allergens, animal ethics, food ethics, veganism, The Vegan Society

**Abstract:**

Some years ago being sure that you were buying vegan food (at least other than fresh produce) was a lot harder than it is now that we have vegan labelling (e.g. the Vegan Trademark). One had to check the ingredients list and, most likely, further investigate the origin of less known ingredients such as food additives, like colours and preservatives. The most careful vegans were also paying attention to the possibility of cross-contamination with animal-derived ingredients. Is this burdensome process unnecessary now that we have vegan labelling? I think it is not. The worry is related with the following tension: on the one hand, when a product may contain animal-derived allergens, intuitively, this makes it non-vegan and, moreover, it also seems contrary to the standard definition of 'vegan' proposed by The Vegan Society (VS); however, on the other hand, nowadays it is easy to find a vegan label, including VS's Vegan Trademark, in products which may contain animal-derived allergens (e.g. most "vegan" chocolates may contain milk). Can this be morally justified? I assess four lines of argument: (i) some vegan companies/products would not exist but for the shared production lines with non-vegan products which, in turn, possibly involve cross-contamination and, hence, the allergens label; (ii) the allergens labelling is a mere disclaimer to avoid legal issues but the possibility of cross-contamination is too weak for moral significance; (iii) only intended ingredients are relevant and cross-contamination is unintentional; (iv) cross-contamination is morally significant but the harm it implies is outbalanced by the benefit to a vegan company. I argue that these justifications are unconvincing or incompatible with the standard understanding of veganism. (i) is only plausible if the products are necessary for a certain minimum level of human welfare, but this is not the case of many products (e.g. chocolates). As to justifications (ii) and (iii), even if we grant that cross-contamination is not morally significant, they ignore the most important factor of boycotting: cutting the financial support of non-vegan companies. Finally, justification (iv) is more promising, but only available for ethical theories where veganism is a weighted, rather than a full, boycott to animal products. Its problem, however, is that the underlying reasoning could also justify eating meat (the benefits would just have to be proportionately bigger). Therefore, and given the scarce information and debate on the issue at hand, vegans have strong reasons to refrain from buying a product that contains both labels. In addition, since it is a recognized authority with a strong influence on vegans, VS should revise its labelling practice or offer a convincing moral justification of why vegan products may contain traces of animal ingredients.

**Miklos, Andras** (Hungary)

Affiliation: University of Rochester Simon Business School (United States)

Session: 25, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Professor Miklós teaches business ethics and corporate social responsibility at the Simon Business School, University of Rochester. His current research topics include corporate altruism, fairness in labor relations, and global justice. He is the author of the book *Institutions in Global Distributive Justice*, published by Edinburgh University Press, and his research has been published in journals such as the *Journal of Business Ethics*, *Boston Review*, *Utilitas*, and *Public Health Ethics*.

Title: **Firms and Effective Altruism**

Keywords: Effective Altruism; corporate responsibility; consequentialism; rights; accountability; corporate governance

**Abstract:**

The Effective Altruism (EA) movement prompts individuals to use their time, money, skills, and other resources to do the most good they can. This paper examines whether firms and their managers should follow the formula EA recommends for individuals - even when doing so reduces profitability. It argues that, although the impact of EA could be increased by using firms as vehicles for altruism, corporate altruism should ultimately be rejected.

EA so far has restricted its focus to private decisions about career choice and charitable giving. It could have much greater impact, however, by making recommendations to managers and board members about how to act within their corporate roles, and by advising investors on how to invest, so as to do the most good they can. Corporate altruism encompasses the pursuit of altruistic goals both through firms' normal business activities in R&D, production, and distribution, and through other means such as internal policies and education. Effective altruists should prefer corporate altruism over private charitable contributions due to the cost advantages of firms with special competencies, resources, and complementarities. Furthermore, the consequentialism of EA better fits corporate altruism than it does private decisions since economic analysis in corporate decision-making already relies on consequentialist reasoning and since firms, lacking personal lives, can use their resources to do the most good without compromising family relationships, friendships, and projects central to individuals' sense of who they are. Altruism could then be delegated to firms by shareholders inspired by EA, and managers could act on their own initiative when most shareholders are not Effective Altruists.

Although EA could have greater impact if it extended its focus from individual philanthropy to corporations, this paper argues that corporate altruism should be rejected. Firms and their managers are not justified in seeking to maximize net social benefit since there are ethically relevant differences between private choices and corporate decisions. First, owing to their greater capacity to inflict severe harm and to their special relationship with employees and shareholders, firms bear particular responsibility to respect the rights of the potential victims of their harmful activities, of employees, and of shareholders. Firms ought not to violate basic rights and harm others even if that means foregoing benefits of similar magnitude they could have provided to many more. Second, corporate altruism generates an accountability deficit private altruism typically lacks. Providing managers with a mandate to maximize firms' net social impact undermines managerial accountability and exacerbates corporate governance problems since unresolved disagreements about priority-setting make both defining managerial objectives and performance evaluation more contentious. The paper concludes by outlining some substantive and procedural constraints on a legitimate corporate decision-making process that can accommodate disagreements in priority-setting.



**Miller, Calum** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: University of Oxford (United Kingdom)

Session: 16, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Calum Miller is a medical doctor who is currently undertaking research in beginning of life ethics, Biblical studies and philosophy of science/religion.

Title: **Beyond Infanticide: How Psychological Accounts of Persons Can Justify Harming Infants**

Keywords: infanticide, abortion, psychological accounts, personhood, pre-personal acts

**Abstract:**

Advocates of the moral permissibility of abortion often base their views on a conception of rights or interests which apply only to a specific subset of human beings – usually termed ‘persons’ – where one is a person only if one satisfies certain psychological, cognitive, or other requirements. Although this is not the only way of generating the conclusion that abortion is permissible – others appeal to maternal bodily autonomy or similar considerations independent of the value or rights of the foetus – it is one of the more common and persuasive. Since foetuses lack the relevant psychological apparatus or features (either in kind or degree), they lack certain rights or interests that adult humans ordinarily have, including the right to life. It is often held, by extension, that these considerations likewise justify early infanticide in some or all circumstances, since there is no relevant disparity between the capacities or abilities of, for example, late-stage foetuses and infants. On this account, therefore, infants also lack the serious right to life which we typically predicate of adult humans.

Let us call human beings who have not yet met the criteria for personhood pre-personal humans. More precisely for our purposes, a pre-personal human is any human who has not yet attained the capacities or other features sufficient for inclusion within the community of full rights-bearers. We also define pre-personal acts: acts performed on or with a pre-personal human.

We argue that on these psychological accounts, it is difficult to explicate the reasons why certain other pre-personal acts are wrong: live experimentation, organ farming, sexual exploitation and discrimination. But in the case of infanticide, our inability to explain why infanticide would be wrong on psychological accounts is frequently taken as an indication that infanticide is not, in fact, wrong. We argue that, likewise, the inability of defenders of the psychological account to explain why these other pre-personal acts was wrong should force them towards condonation of these acts. We explore some of the main accounts of the wrongness of each of these actions, arguing that the best accounts of their wrongness fail to apply similarly if rights are a function of cognitive capacities.

We do not, of course, thereby conclude that such actions are permissible. On the contrary, we argue that they establish a persuasive *reductio* against psychological accounts of rights, and should motivate an account of rights based on something other than immediately exercisable cognitive capacities.

**Mokrosinska, Dorota** (Netherlands)

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, Leiden University (Netherlands)

Session: 11, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Dorota Mokrosinska (PhD, Amsterdam) is Assistant Professor and the Program Director of the Centre for Political Philosophy at Leiden University. She is laureate of an ERC Starting Grant awarded by the European Research Council. She is the director of the ERC StG project entitled “Democratic Secrecy: A Philosophical Study of the Role of Secrecy in Democratic Governance” (2015 to 2020). She specializes in political philosophy with particular interests in issues related to privacy, transparency and secrecy in democratic governance, political legitimacy, political obligation and democratic theory.

**Title: “Why Snowden and not Greenwald? On the Accountability of the Press for Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information”**

**Keywords:** unauthorized disclosures, classified information, the media, accountability, prosecution

**Abstract:**

“Why Snowden and not Greenwald? On the Accountability of the Press for Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information”

Unauthorized disclosures of classified information are a two-part process: civil servants disclose classified information to the press and the press makes it available to the public at large. Without the media, the leaks would pose little threat. Snowden’s disclosures would have been far less consequential without Greenwald and The Guardian.

Both leaking classified information and publishing classified information violate the law prohibiting unauthorized disclosures. Accordingly, when it comes to a legal response to this illegal action, there are two potential targets for the prosecution: the leakers and the press. In actual legal and political practice, however, it is only the leakers who are prosecuted; reporters and editors go unpunished. Snowden is facing a threat of 30 years’ imprisonment, but no charges have been raised against Greenwald and The Guardian.

If both leaking and publishing classified information violate the law prohibiting unauthorized disclosures, why prosecute only the leakers and not the press? Why Snowden and not Greenwald? Academic discussions have focused on the political accountability of civil servants for leaking classified government information. The political accountability of the media has not been addressed. This paper intends to fill that gap.

I consider two ways to make sense of this seemingly inconsistent practice. The first proposal says that while we prosecute the leakers, we should not prosecute the press because the press has a special prerogative to balance its compliance with the law against the importance of disclosing classified information. First, one may argue that the press enjoys an extraordinary privilege to publish whatever content the editor chooses, including leaks, in virtue of the freedom of the press. Alternatively, this prerogative is conferred upon the press in virtue of its role as a “fourth estate” in democratic society.

The second proposal says that if we prosecute leakers and not the press this is because leaking is more serious a wrong than publishing leaks. According to one variant of this view, leaking is worse than publishing leaks because leakers not only violate the law prohibiting unauthorized disclosure, but also their contractual obligations: Snowden consented to nondisclosure as a condition of employment at the NSA and, thus, in leaking classified NSA documents, he not only violated the law but also his contractual obligations. Greenwald was not subject to any such obligations and so did not violate them. Snowden committed two wrongs, Greenwald only one. Some legal scholars and judges suggest a different understanding of the moral difference between leaking and publishing leaks: leakers steal government information; the press merely distributes stolen information. Stealing and distributing stolen objects have a different moral import: stealing being a more serious offence than distributing stolen goods.

I reject the arguments and conclude that the current prosecution practice is inconsistent: If the prosecution targets leakers, it should also target the press. If the press goes unpunished, so should the leakers.

**Nguyen, Quan** (Germany)

Affiliation: St Andrews and Stirling Philosophy Graduate Programme (United Kingdom)

Session: 23, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

I'm a PhD student from Germany, working on what role time should play in moral thinking.

Title: **Intuitions about Past and Future Value**

Keywords: Ethics, Time-Biases, Death, Value Theory

**Abstract:**

In asking how goods and harms should be distributed across time, many moral theories accept temporal neutrality. Temporal neutrality requires us to attach no normative significance per se to the temporal location of goods and harm – in short, we shouldn't be time-biased (Brink 2010).

There are commonly two forms of time-biases, near-bias and future-bias. If an agent is near-biased, she discounts the value of an event the more distant the event is from the present. If an agent is future-biased, she discounts the value of an event if it's in the past rather than the future. While it is commonly accepted that near-bias is rationally impermissible, future-bias enjoys intuitive support. Wanting bad things to be past and good things to be future seems to be so natural that it could be treated as a brute fact about our rationality (Dorsey 2016, Parfit 1984).

Recently however, several authors tried to debunk the intuitive appeal behind future-bias to show that the intuitive support behind it is unstable by showing that future-bias does not generalise well to non-hedonic goods and harms and to scenarios involving other people than ourselves. Therefore, the intuitive appeal should not be treated as an argument in favour of the permissibility of future-bias (Brink 2010, Greene forthcoming, Parfit 1984). On the contrary, the instability of our intuition may be used as evidence to show that future-bias is not result of rational processes and should be marked impermissible due to its arbitrariness (Dougherty 2015, Sullivan forthcoming).

This paper argues against the admirable efforts of these authors. Firstly, it will be argued that future-bias's intuitive appeal is not lost because it generalises well to non-hedonic goods and harms such as disgraces, personal relationships and virtues or vices as well as to scenarios involving other people. Secondly, it will be shown that future-bias also explains our attitudes towards death and provides the best and simplest explanation as to why the Lucretian symmetry argument against the badness of death fails to convince us. Thirdly, drawing on scenarios provided by Scheffler and Schiffrin (2013) this paper argues that future-bias also generalises to collective decisions about society and humanity as a whole.

In summary, not only do the mentioned philosophers fail in debunking the intuitive appeal behind future-bias – our preference for bad things to be past and good things to be future is deeply embedded into our ways of thinking and does not suggest any arbitrariness or instability in reasoning at all. We may continue to treat the intuitive appeal behind future-bias as philosophical evidence – and should not be neutral towards the past.

**P Casanovas, Ager** (Spain)

Affiliation: UCL (University College London) (United Kingdom)

Session: 23, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

She earned her BA in Philosophy in Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (2017), with a mention in both applied and fundamental philosophy. Currently, she is based in London, where she is undertaking the MA in Philosophy at UCL, sponsored by LaCaixa Fellowship for Postgraduate studies. Her current research, supervised by Dr. Tom Stern (UCL), focuses on philosophy and theatre, and the intersections between politics, ethics and the creation of new spaces of possibility within artistic practices. She is interested in the responsibility of the artist, and on the moral theory of the Frankfurt School and Hannah Arendt.

Title: **The vicious and the akratic: an appraisal of moral conflict**

Keywords: Rosen, Aristotle, akrasia, blameworthiness, original responsibility

**Abstract:**

In his paper 'Skepticism about Moral Responsibility', Gideon Rosen argues that the only locus for original responsibility is akrasia, that is, a 'genuinely akratic act of omission'. Rosen characterizes this act as a 'knowing sin', where the agent's action is an episode of 'knowledgeable wrongdoing'. However, the question remains about what exactly is the structure of akratic acts and what are the necessary and sufficient conditions to consider that the agent knows that her action is wrong. The aim of this paper is to analyse Aristotle's account of akrasia in the Nicomachean Ethics in order to shed some light on these questions. Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of akrasia or incontinence: akrasia in respect of anger, akrasia in respect of appetites, akrasia as weakness and akrasia as impetuosity. The failure of the akratic agent seems to lie in different points of the deliberative process in each these kinds, and in virtue of this difference, it is possible to regard some kinds of akrasia as more disgraceful than others. After examining the different figures of the akratic, I will argue that Rosen's targetting of the akratic act as the source of original responsibility and, therefore, the akratic agent as the only one properly blameworthy is counter-intuitive. Instead, out of the four protagonists of the Nicomachean Ethics – the virtuous, the vicious, the akratic and the enkratic – the vicious seems to be the one who deserves to be deemed culpable. While the akratic is, at least, susceptible to be cured of his moral defects and “on his way to recovery”, the vicious is self-indulgent, which translates for the Greek *akolastos* – literally, incorrigible. The vicious commits his criminal acts with pleasure, while in all the akratic figures there is an element of pain and regret, which ought to diminish the agent's culpability instead of, as Rosen argues, aggravate it. The akratic, even when defeated, is already engaged in a process of generating strategies of self-control to change his habits, whereas the self-indulgent is not defeated because he experiences no struggle or moral conflict and pursues the merely apparent good without regret. Since the akratic listens to reason to some degree and the vicious doesn't, the latter's 'self-indulgent is worse than incontinence' (1150b30). Against Rosen's claim that moral ignorance is exculpatory unless it can be traced back to a genuine akratic act, my aim is to defend that the vicious' ignorance is more blameworthy than the akratic's knowledgeable wrongdoing or, at least, to show how considering akratic acts the only locus for original responsibility can lead to the undesirable outcome of blaming agents who are committed to changing their habits towards virtue and exculpating those who refuse to change their behaviour and are satisfied with their perversion.

### **Pala, Davide** (Italy)

Affiliation: University of Rijeka (Croatia)

Session: 7, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

#### **Short Bio:**

Davide Pala is a Post-doc Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies – South East Europe of the University of Rijeka. Previously, he was a Post-doc Fellow at "Fondazione Burzio" of Turin and a PhD Student at the University of Turin, in the Department of Cultures, Politics and Society. He was Visiting Post-doc Fellow at the University of Frankfurt and at the University of Manchester. He works in the field of normative political theory applied to international issues. In particular, his research focuses on global justice, world poverty and economic inequalities. On the matter he wrote several articles focused on institutional cosmopolitanism, capability approach, and nationalism. He is currently developing a republican idea of global political justice.

Title: **Experts, Good Citizens, Democratic Public Debates and Global Warming**

Keywords: Experts, good citizens, public debates, global warming

#### **Abstract:**

Among climate experts there is an overwhelming consensus that global warming is occurring; that this fact is alarming; and that humans are causally responsible for it. Notwithstanding, 16% of American citizens deny that global warming is occurring; 48% question its seriousness; and 50% think that human activity has no role in causing it. I will provide a normative framework to assess the attitude of those citizens that, like American citizens, in democratic public debates concerning the elaboration of public policies, mistrust experts, i.e. trustworthy epistemic authorities, in regard to beliefs that are justified and almost undisputed within the scientific community. I will argue that this attitude is bad, because citizens showing it do not possess the virtue of the epistemic trust in trustworthy epistemic authorities (ETITEA), which is demanded by the non-exhaustive ideal of the good citizens publicly debating in democratic contexts. According to this ideal, in democratic public debates citizens trust trustworthy epistemic authorities as a way to respect themselves and each other as peers in circumstances of epistemic dependence. Specifically, I will show that ETITEA is required by three ideas specifying this ideal: the idea of rational citizens; the idea of reasonable citizens; and the idea of responsible citizens.

First, ETITEA is demanded by the idea of rational citizens. Rational citizens normally want to act successfully, and know that justified beliefs lead to successful actions more than unjustified beliefs. Yet, rational citizens know that, in those domains in which they are laypersons, they do not have first-hand evidence justifying the related beliefs, and cannot acquire the expertise necessary to understand either the evidence or the claims relative to the evidence. Consequently, rational citizens dismiss the idea of epistemic independence as irrational, acknowledge their epistemic dependence, and show ETITEA, thus respecting their rational powers.

Second, ETITEA is required by the idea of reasonable citizens. Reasonable citizens respect a reciprocity constraint, therefore they restrain themselves from publicly advancing unjustified and sectarian beliefs, because they do not meet almost uncontroversial scientific standards and would not be endorsed by everyone. Furthermore, reasonable citizens accept, among the burdens of judgement, the fact of epistemic dependence on epistemic authorities as a condition that all citizens share. Both features lead reasonable citizens to show ETITEA as a way to respect each other as peers in circumstances of epistemic dependence.

Third, ETITEA is demanded by the idea of responsible citizens. Responsible citizens do not want to unduly harm others and know that public policies based on unjustified beliefs likely harm others. Also, they are aware that they cannot autonomously shape justified beliefs in those domains in which they are not experts. Thus, in public debates concerning the elaboration of public policies, responsible citizens show trust in trustworthy epistemic authorities in those domains in which they are laypersons – thereby respecting co-citizens and outsiders.

Finally, I will employ this framework to assess the attitude of those citizens mistrusting climate experts in regard to global warming, and argue that it is bad because it shows a lack of rationality, reasonableness, and responsibility.

**Peeters, Wouter** (Belgium)

Affiliation: Centre for the Study of Global Ethics (University of Birmingham) (United Kingdom)  
Session: 24, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

I obtained my PhD in Philosophy and Moral Sciences in December 2014 from Vrije Universiteit Brussels. Since 1 September 2016, I am a Lecturer in Global Ethics in the Centre for the Study of Global Ethics (Department of Philosophy - University of Birmingham). My main research interests include global justice, environmental sustainability and the ethics and politics of climate change.

Title: **How new are the 'New harms'? Climate change and conventional moral concepts**

Keywords: climate change, global justice, harm principle, capitalism

**Abstract:**

Climate change is a prime example of what Judith Lichtenberg (2010, p. 558-559) calls New Harms: 'the model of harm underlying the classic formulation of the harm principle - discrete, individual actions with observable and measurable consequences for particular individuals - no longer suffices to explain the ways our behavior impinges on the interests of other people' (Lichtenberg 2010, 558-559). Indeed, the belief that today's moral problems differ from those we are more familiar with appears to be widely accepted in the global ethics literature (see also, for example, Cripps 2013; Jamieson 1992, 2014; Parfit 1987; Widdows 2011) and by the general public.

This New Harms discourse is predicated upon two main assumptions. First, climate change and other current moral problems appear to differ categorically from 'old' harms in their essential characteristics. On the basis of this premise, the New Harms discourse leads to the conclusion that we cannot learn from past successes and failures in addressing complex moral problems. Second, conventional and widely accepted moral concepts (especially the harm principle and the prevailing, ordinary conception of individual moral responsibility) appear to be inadequate to guide people's actions in the context of today's moral problems. The conclusion here seems to be that understanding and addressing New Harms is preconditioned on a complete overhaul of our morality.

In this paper, we will argue that both of these assumptions may be flawed. First, we will assess the characteristics that supposedly render climate change and other New Harms distinct, and argue that virtually all of the likely candidates have been observed in 'old' harms as well. This means that, in contrast to the implications of the New Harms discourse, we are able to learn from past successes and failures in addressing complex moral problems. Second, we will argue that the critique of the New Harms discourse is not aimed at conventional moral concepts as such, but rather at a particular interpretation of them - associated with the rise of liberal capitalism - which shields private, individual, consumerist choices from moral assessment. We will argue that a more accurate interpretation and application of conventional moral concepts do provide us with the necessary guidance as to how to tackle today's moral problems. In this way, we will conclude that the paralysis to which the New Harms discourse arguably leads, is avoidable, and explain some of the implications of this conclusion for tackling climate change and other complex moral problems.

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**Pereira Castanheira, Nuno** (Portugal)

Affiliation: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil)

Session: 20, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Nuno Pereira Castanheira has a PhD in Political Philosophy, granted by the University of Lisbon in 2015, where he also graduated in Philosophy and specialized in Ethics and Politics. He is currently developing his post-doctorate research on Hannah Arendt, the ecological crisis and political ontology at the Philosophy Department of the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, in Brazil. He is also a member of the Centre of Philosophy of the University of Lisbon. His research interests are Political Theory, Ethics, Phenomenology, Political Ontology, Critical Theory, and Crisis, particularly the Ecological Crisis.

Title: **Revolutionizing values in the Anthropocene with Arendt and Marcuse**

Keywords: Hannah Arendt; Herbert Marcuse; Anthropocene; Values; Revolution

**Abstract:**

Human action over nature triggered a set of irreversible transformations in the Earth's ecosystems and their respective balances, transformations which seem now to be threatening life itself. In *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt states that human beings have begun acting into nature, in the sense of having started to create natural processes that would have never come to existence without human intervention. This human ability to start unprecedented natural processes whose outcome is unpredictable has shown both the fragile and uncertain character of all there is, uncovering the fundamentally contingent givenness of life itself.

The geological concept of the Anthropocene, put forward by Paul J. Crutzen, seems to validate Arendt's view by acknowledging mankind as a powerful geological force, putting into question the Modern Age's conception of anthropos of which the late-capitalism of our day seems to be the ultimate expression, with its demands for ever-increasing productivity, its concomitant exploitation of resources, and its transformation of even the limitations of the Earth's life support capabilities into mere barriers to be overcome by its limitless expansionist drive.

The result of this trend is an overall ecological crisis that has reached environmental, economic, political, ethical, and even ontological levels. For Arendt, a crisis occurs when extant values are no longer useful to deal with and understand the basic experiences of our time. Values are prejudices, that is, shared social criteria for judging everyday life whose main function is to preserve the life process and the reproduction of the species – that is, of an extant socialized way of life – through the production and consumption of goods. In addition, values also play a role in preserving the potential for emancipation of individual life, as well as the world itself, containing potentialities that transcend the economic order and enter into the political sphere. In a similar vein, Herbert Marcuse defines values as impersonal norms and aspirations that define and drive the needs of social groups and the process of their satisfaction, a process that expresses the demands of production and the patterns of consumption, but also the repressed possibilities that transcend the extant social system and its relations of production.

From these points of view, the ecological crisis seems to be not only an indictment of our current capitalistic way of life, but also a call to free the potentialities of both a conception of anthropos more in line with the human being's current ability to effect unprecedented change in nature and a new way of life founded on a revolutionizing of values able to break with the process of continuous exploitation of nature and human beings.

In the context of the Anthropocene, we will explore some of Arendt and Marcuse's contributions regarding the subject of a revolution of values capable not only of leading to radical transformations in economic and political institutions, but also – and most importantly – of opening the possibility of an essentially different way of life.

**Ramos, Iago** (Spain)

Affiliation: University of Salamanca (Spain)

Session: 3, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

My primary research interest is Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the Social Enlightenment and the public mind. My more relevant papers are "Rousseauistes, amis ou ennemis?", in *\*Annales de la Société Jean-Jacques Rousseau Tome 53\**, and "Rousseau and Smith in the Age of the Imagination," forthcoming in the *\*Adam Smith Review\**. I published in 2014 the book *\*Rousseau y el ser del hombre\**.

Title: **Rousseau's Chains of Freedom**

Keywords: acknowledgment, civil freedom, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, natural freedom, social contract

**Abstract:**

In his *\*Constitutional Project for Corsica\**, Rousseau adverts to Corsicans: "The fundamental law ruling your institution must be equality. All must be related to it, even authority which is only established for its protection; everything ought to be equal by right of birth. The State should grant distinctions only to merit, virtues and services rendered to the fatherland, and these distinctions should not be hereditary as neither do the qualities on which they settle"(OCP3:910). This premise offers a brief answer to the essential questions Rousseau poses at the very beginning of *\*On the Social Contract\**: "Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. He who believes himself the master of others fails not to be a greater slave than they. How did this change come about? I do not know. What can make it legitimate?" (DCS:L1.C1, OCP3:352, translated by John T. Scott in *\*The Major Political Writing of Rousseau\**(2012)).

How equality is the answer to the second one, "What can make [political society] legitimate?", is evident: equality grants that human beings in a relationship will not fall into a slave-master dynamic. Leaders will emerge in an egalitarian society, but not tyrants; their equals will acknowledge leaders because of their virtues to drive the community to succeed, but no one will be granted with the possession of the life and fate of the members of the political body. Thus, the chains self-imposed to the individual at the agreement of the social contract do not involve illegitimate clauses.

Nevertheless, how does equality explain the movement out of the state of nature and into nascent society is less evident if we do not account Rousseau's anthropological theory. To wit, Rousseau's anthropological views assume that the acknowledgment of a different non-human animal as an equal is essential for the non-human animal to become a human being. So, equality is at the foundations of social relationships and the acquisition of freedom. Thanks to the passage from the state of nature to the civil society, the individual own free and conscious life which, for Rousseau, as I will argue, is not granted by the natural law but by a healthy equalitarian relationship with other human beings –that politics should protect.

Thus, when, agreeing to the social contract proposed by Rousseau and the individual loses his natural freedom to gain civil liberty, he is not accepting a lousy bargain but acknowledging the ownership of a moral and free life; which is undoubtedly better than passively spend your days waiting for God's or Nature's plans.



**Regina, Schidel** (Germany)

Affiliation: Frankfurt University (Germany)

Session: 22, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

After graduating from the University of Tuebingen (in Philosophy and Tuebingen), I have been a PhD student at the University of Frankfurt and a scholar in the Leibniz Research Group "Transnational Justice" since 2015. My PhD thesis deals with the notions of dignity and justice related to persons with mental disabilities.

Title: **Hannah Arendt on Human Dignity**

Keywords: Hannah Arendt, human dignity, natality, humanity, dehumanization

**Abstract:**

Hannah Arendt's account of "the right to have rights" is often regarded as contributing an important and full-fledged perspective to the theory of human rights, but not necessarily to that of human dignity. This is most likely due to the fact that her anti-essentialist thinking stands in direct contradiction to substantialist notions of dignity. However, in this talk my aim is to demonstrate that Arendt's notion of "the right to have rights" connected with her conceptualizations of natality, the human condition and dehumanization add a new and hitherto underestimated dimension to theories of human dignity. Whereas 'classical' accounts of human dignity drawing on Kant's concept of dignity as ultimate value of the autonomous person following the moral law face various problems (e.g. that whether non-autonomous persons also have the value of dignity), the conceptual resources found in Arendt's work offer a different, relational account of human dignity that avoids such exclusions.

Isaac 1996, Helis 2008, Parekh 2008, Menke 2014, and Macready 2016 have undertaken the attempt to systematically reconstruct Arendt's thinking on dignity, but they mainly focus on the dignity of political action in an ethical sense or on a right-centered account of dignity. I want to argue that Arendt's work allows an understanding of the normativity of dignity beyond these accounts which roots in an idiosyncratic notion of our common human condition and of living in a shared world.

My argument in outline is the following: against the idea of the authority of an preexisting and transcendental dignity, Arendt draws on systematic acts of dehumanization under the totalitarian regimes in the 20th century to demonstrate that "the world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human" (Arendt 1978: 299). This historical compromising of an inherent human value should - according to Arendt - lead us to dismiss the idea of an "inborn human dignity which de facto, aside from its guarantee by fellow men, not only does not exist but is the last and possibly most arrogant myth we have invented in all our long history." (Arendt 1951: 439) I read this warning not as denying human beings' claim to respect and recognition, but on the contrary as a warning to rely on attributes or properties for ascribing humans a specific value or status, since this trait-value linking always runs the risk of being arbitrary and thus of being contingently annihilated.

Instead, our dignity has to be understood in terms of consisting in a common notion of humanity, in living in a mutually shared world and in our existential relatedness to each other as source of a reciprocal obligation to respect. Thus, I want to show that Arendt's idea of natality and of humanity are not neutral concepts, but intrinsically normative ideas which point to our existence as social beings in need of each other and always related to each other as origin of both our vulnerability and reciprocal commitment.

**Rego, Bruno** (Portugal)

Affiliation: Centro de Ética, Política e Sociedade da Universidade do Minho (Portugal)

Session: 5, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Bruno Rego has a PhD in Philosophy of Nature and the Environment (2015) and He's the author of two books in Portuguese language: *The Global Chaos of Modernity - The 21st Century According to Ulrich Beck* (Esfera do Caos, 2016) and *From an Enviro-Social Contract Toward An Anthropology of Hope - Citizenship and Sustainability in the Age of Environmental Crisis* (2016, Novas Edições Académicas - OmniScriptum GmbH & Co. KG).

Title: **Return to the City in the Age of Anthropocene – For a New Environmental and Cosmopolitan Idea of Europe**

Keywords: Europe, Environment, Cities, Cosmopolitanism, Modernity

**Abstract:**

This paper aims to explore the idea of Europe through a possible cosmopolitan politics of cities by exploring the unfinished arguments of an Ulrich Beck's essay "Cosmopolitan Communities of Risk: From United Nations to United Cities", published posthumously in his work *The Metamorphosis of the World* (2016).

The main question is: Can cities, involved in transnational political organizations destined to forge solutions to the global environmental crisis, contribute to rethink the idea of Europe through the creation of a cosmopolitan political culture in face of a Europe plunged in a sociopolitical crossroad and of a contemporary dysfunctional paradigm of nation state that no longer works institutionally in the global Second Modernity?

In the age of the Anthropocene more than a half of the world's population lives already in urban spaces. Considering environmental issues, first and foremost climate change, as the main agents of sociopolitical metamorphosis in Second Modernity, and given the institutional paralysis of nation state's political culture, Beck displaces his methodological cosmopolitanism thesis from the space of nation state to the political orbit of the city.

Unlike nation states, cities, as cosmopolitan communities of global risk and through their historical sociopolitical autonomy, are in a better position in order to forge a new model of political action to face the global environmental dilemmas of our contemporary world.

In a historical moment in which the idea of Europe and its existence are dangerously at stake, through a political and environmental philosophy of cities, we will try to claim that cities can become an axis of an alternative political paradigm, thus enlarging conceptually the idea of Europe with a cosmopolitan dimension applied to its future. We will also argue that the future cosmopolitanism of the idea of Europe, envisaged through cities, and not nation states, presupposes also a dialog with history.

Second Modernity's cosmopolitanism, non-hegemonic and culturally inclusive, refuses the one-dimensionality of both current European sociopolitical landscape and the idea of Europe. According to this argument, we will sustain that to rethink the idea of Europe through a possible cosmopolitan politics of cities in Second Modernity, we need to go beyond Beck' methodological cosmopolitanism and to enrich it with a dimension of historical and cultural cosmopolitanism.

Envisaging an effective and culturally inclusive dimension of cosmopolitanism compatible with a pluralistic Second Modernity, which without a dialogue with its past cosmopolitan roots the concept of cosmopolitanism would remain incomplete, we will claim that the intellectual background of the idea of Europe derives not only from its Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian, but it is also debtor in pre-modern times to cities such as Ptolemaic Alexandria, Sassanid Gundeshapur, Bagdad and Al Andalusian Cordoba and Toledo, veritable intellectual and cultural centers, which without the laborious process of translation of works and cultural transmission of knowledge, namely Greek science, made from the High Middle Ages on, possibly Europe would not have achieved its universal hegemony since the dawn of Modernity.

**Ribeiro Mendes, João** (Portugal)

Affiliation: Centre for Ethics, Politics and Society, University of Minho (Portugal)

Session: 15, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

João Ribeiro Mendes is tenure-track Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Minho (UM), Braga, Portugal. He teaches graduate and postgraduate courses on Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Technology, and Science, Technology and Society. He is Deputy-director of the Department of Philosophy at UM and director of the Master programme in Political Philosophy. He is research fellow and current Director of the Centre for Ethics, Politics and Society at UM. He is editor of Ethics, Politics & Society journal. He is the Principal Investigator of the research project "SFIDA-Philosophical Innovative Solutions for the Anthropocene Challenge" (2018-2020).

Title: **Overcoming The Cold Panic Without Falling Into Barbarism: An analysis of the major political challenge of the Anthropocene according to Isabelle Stengers**

Keywords: Anthropocene; Cosmopolitics; Cold panic; Isabelle Stengers

**Abstract:**

In 2009 Isabelle Stengers published the book *Au temps des catastrophes: Résister à la barbarie qui vient* (translated in 2015 with the title *In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism*). In this essay the French philosopher of science has claimed that we live in a "new age" - she calls the age of the "intrusion of Gaia" (clearly what is now referred as Anthropocene) - characterized by a profusion of natural and social disasters that are bringing us closer to a scenario of apocalypse and extinction of our (and most of all other) living species. Besides that she has also claimed in it that we face the odd dilemmatic situation of urgency to overcome a global state of "cold panic" – the paradoxical exhortation of political responsible to consumption and competition for the sake of economic growth at the same time they warn for the need to radically change that lifestyle – without falling into barbarism or reach the end of civilization.

To Stengers this is the major political challenge of the Anthropocene. Adopting a "cosmopolitics" (first proposed in her 1977 book *Cosmopolitiques*, 7: *Pour en finir avec la tolérance*) – different from Kant's cosmopolitanism that roughly asserted the need to abandon parochial allegiances and to assume a common world as ground to manage differences among humans – that is, a standpoint that presumes the inexistence of a common world (cosmos) and, eo ipso, the need to compose it, she tried to devise a path to a good or better future Anthropocene, one of "sustainable (degrowth) capitalism" (now perceived as oxymoronic) and preventive of a generalized war.

The main purpose of my presentation will be to analyse the significance, legitimacy and difficulties of Stengers' ethical-political proposal for a coordinated global action to avoid the fast coming geopolitical chaos.

**Risberg, Eirik Julius** (Norway)

Affiliation: The Falstad Centre for Human Rights (Norway)

Session: 18, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Eirik Julius Risberg is employed as a researcher at the Falstad Centre for Human Rights. His primary interests are in questions about moral responsibility and human rights.

Title: **Dignity as the Foundation of Human rights?**

Keywords: Human rights, dignity, rank, worth, foundations

**Abstract:**

Arising from the cataclysmic experience of the Second World War, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – and the whole discourse on human rights – was premised on the idea, contrary to the atrocious world-view of Nazism, that humans have an inherent dignity (Gearty 2005; Dupré 2011; Kateb 2014). The United Nations Charter (1945), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) all emphasize dignity as a key concept in human rights discourse (Kretzmer and Klein 2002; McCrudden 2008), and other legal and political treatises and covenants followed suit in the post-war years, cementing the importance of the concept of dignity for our understanding of the human rights.

However, while dignity occupies a place of prominence in most human rights documents, the exact meaning of the concept and the role it plays in these documents is patently unclear (cf. McCrudden 2008). Sometimes, as Jeremy Waldron (2015: 117) notes, “[t]he claim is often made loosely; sometimes it is barely more than a piece of decorative rhetoric”, leading some critics to argue that its use in central human rights documents are simply incoherent (Pinker 2008). While most scholars don’t go that far, the question about what role the concept plays in human rights discourse remains: Does it serve as the foundation of moral human rights, as some have argued, or does the notion play a less direct role in justifying moral and legal human rights?

This paper addresses a recent suggestion by Jeremy Waldron (2015: 134), that dignity is “a status-concept, not a value-concept”: In contrast to the prevalent Kantian conception of dignity, which ties dignity to our worth as agents, the concept should rather be understood as “universalized high social rank” (Dan-Cohen 2012: 5), something we hold because we occupy a particular status or social position. As such, however, dignity is foundational-ish rather than foundational (cf. Waldron 2012: 21) – it cannot serve as the foundation or major premise in a logical argument, although it can nevertheless serve to throw “some indispensable light” (Waldron 2015: 125) on human rights.

However, while sympathetic to this looser connection between dignity and human rights, this way of understanding the relation between dignity and human rights does not, as Waldron (2015: 131) himself concedes, allow for “any expansion of the list of rights beyond what we started with.” Without reverting to a conception of dignity as the foundation of human rights, I thus wish to explore the idea that we can combine the idea of dignity as rank with a conception of human rights as continually open for revision and expansion.

**Rowland, Richard** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: Australian Catholic University (Australia)

Session: 23, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

I'm a tenured research fellow in moral philosophy at ACU in Melbourne. I obtained my PhD in Philosophy from the University of Reading in 2014. Before coming to ACU I held positions at Oxford, Warwick, and La Trobe. My research focusses on three topics: moral disagreement, the relationship between reasons and value, and revisionary ethical theories. I've published papers on these topics in *Nous*, *Ethics*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Analysis*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*, and *Utilitas*. I have monographs forthcoming with OUP and Routledge. I have an edited collection in metaethics forthcoming with Routledge.

Title: **Ethical Theories and Controversial Intuitions**

Keywords: Normative Ethics; Intuition; Disagreement; Moral Methodology; Theory Selection in Ethics.

**Abstract:**

Ethical Theories and Controversial Intuitions

There are many differences of intuitions in ethics. Some have the intuition that retributive punishment is justified for its own sake; others don't. Some have the intuition that there are reasons to keep promises for its own sake even when no value will come of this; others don't. Some have the intuition that it would be wrong to push the heavy man in the footbridge trolley case; others don't. It is normally held to be a desideratum for a normative ethical theory that it fits with and explains our intuitions. But should ethical theories aim to fit with and explain controversial intuitions such as those discussed above? Some ethical theories, such as Ross' and Kamm's, seem to aim to fit with such controversial intuitions.

I argue that we should accept

Widely Shared. Ethical theories should aim to fit with and explain (and only to fit with and explain) positive ethical intuitions that are shared by almost all people (who are informed and have reflected on the relevant issues).

Widely Shared makes sense of the widely held idea that ethical intuitions bear a similar relationship to ethical theories to the relationship that empirical observations bear to scientific theories. Furthermore, if we think that our informed and reflective intuitions are reasonably reliable regarding the ethical truth-as we must-then we should think that those who are just as informed and have reflected on similar issues are to that extent similarly reliable. In which case we should accept Widely Shared. Widely Shared has not been articulated in the literature. I explain how Brad Hooker and Mark Timmons' somewhat similar proposals are less plausible and have different implications: Hooker and Timmons' proposals do not distinguish positive ethical intuitions from the lack of an ethical intuition and do not undermine any ethical theories.

Widely Shared undermines certain ethical theories. For instance, Ross argued on the basis of intuitions that there are non-derivative non-instrumental moral reasons to punish wrongdoers and to refrain from breaking break promises. But, as I argue, these intuitions are not shared by almost all. So, Widely Shared undermines Ross's ethical theory.

It might be objected that there are no positive ethical intuitions that almost all people share. But this is not the case. Almost everyone shares the intuition that we have some reason to promote our own and others' well-being and that it's at least sometimes wrong to kill or assault others. Even utilitarians seem to have the intuition that we have special obligations to those to whom we bear a special relationship; utilitarians just believe that this intuition is in tension with our other impartial altruistic intuitions such that we must drop one intuition or the other. Furthermore, Widely Shared does not entail that we cannot deviate from the moral views that are shared by almost all. We can deviate from these views on the basis of further arguments. Widely Shared merely claims that controversial positive intuitions are not data that ethical theories need to explain.

**Sáez de la Fuente Aldama, Izaskun** (Spain)

Affiliation: Universidad de Deusto (Spain)

Session: 8, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

Izaskun Sáez de la Fuente Aldama (Bilbao, 1970) es doctora en Ciencias Políticas y Sociología (Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea) y Licenciada en Ciencias Políticas y Sociología (Universidad de Deusto). Profesora de Opciones Críticas frente a la Vida Social y de Ética en la Universidad de Deusto y directora del Máster en Ética para la construcción social de su Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Humanas. Es miembro del Centro de Ética Aplicada de la misma universidad y miembro de su equipo de investigación Ética Aplicada a la realidad social.

Title: **Social Accountability and Gender: an ethical approach**

Keywords: Social Accountability, Gender, Ethics, Democracy

**Abstract:**

Social Accountability (SA) has attracted increasing interest in the last decade. Most of the research on SA focuses on developing countries and the direct engagement of poor people. These studies assume that democratic regimes in developing countries are frequently weak and unresponsive to the needs of wide segments of the population. Accordingly, studies try to grasp how, and under what conditions, programs aimed at fostering accountability from below incorporate poor people's interests into policy-making and policy implementation.

We suggest that the concept of SA is also useful to imagine new ways for democratizing democracy in developed countries, thus SA implies a relationship between citizens or/and civil society with public institutions. We look for deepen the relational perspective of SA introduced by Joshi and Houtzager (2012) and Houtzager et al. (2016) considering it from an ethical perspective that is informed also by gender perspective. Accountability relationships are power relationships and, as such, are susceptible of being ethically analyzed. More when usual exercises of power create clear discriminations, as gender perspective demonstrates continuously webbing a net of structural injustice.

We conceptualize SA as a web of relationships between account-giving public actors (elected representatives and public servants) and account-demanding social actors (citizens and civil society groups) in which the latter develop the capacity to effectively exact rigorous and understandable explanations from the former regarding their conduct, official procedures and policies. In such relationships, citizens and civil society groups have the power to sanction authorities that deviate from agreed or socially acceptable ethical standards. If SA can be considered so, then it deserves a reflection about ethical principles like responsibility and justice, that might guide SA in order to foster inclusion, transparency and democratic legitimacy. This ethical consideration is especially relevant for SA, because in most cases only a small part of the society has the opportunity, interest, or capacity to interact with the state. Moreover, in very exceptional circumstances the interaction between the state and civil society deals with decisions that affect only those who are directly engaged. If SA is also about building more responsive, inclusive, and legitimate public institutions, the participants in the interactions need to assume responsibility for the needs and interests of those who cannot participate, and this is a political responsibility.

According to this remarks, we develop an ethical frame for SA following the ideas or responsibility of Hannah Arendt and Iris Marion Young, linking it with the notion of structural injustice. We illustrate this structural injustice considering the perspective of gender as an ethical problem embedded in every social structure as well as in every social interaction. As Goetz said, for women, being at the margins of political life has translated into being invisible to accountability institutions (2005). To sum up, we analyze ethically how a relational perspective of SA can stimulate gender equality and, therefore, the democratization of democracy.

**Scarso, Davide** (Italy)

Affiliation: Centro Interuniversitário de História das Ciências e da Tecnologia (FCT-UNL) (Portugal)

Session: 20, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Davide Scarso is a post-doc researcher at the Centro de História das Ciências e da Tecnologia, (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal), with a project on the conceptual, institutional and political challenges of the Anthropocene debate. Between 2015 and 2016 he lectured Philosophy and Ethics at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Paraná (Curitiba, Brazil). Between 2009 and 2014, he worked as a post-doctoral researcher at the Centro de História das Ciências e da Tecnologia, (project title: "The nature/culture polarity in contemporary anthropological theories"). He obtained a Phd in Philosophy in 2008 at the Universidade Clássica (Lisbon, Portugal).

Title: **The Anthropocene and the "nature" of humanity**

Keywords: Anthropocene, Humanity, Nature, History

**Abstract:**

This paper will analyse how the Anthropocene hypothesis has given an unprecedented political relevance to the notion of "humanity", while, at the same time, putting it into question with radicality. The very word was intended as a wake-up call and as the marker of a "growing awareness" of the human influence on Earth's life cycles. This, however, does not necessarily entail humility and restraint, as the very idea of a 'man-made' nature opened the path to Geo-engineering and an "eco-modernist" proposal for a full and definitive anthropization of nature. Several authors consider that by focusing on the "Anthropos", or humanity as a whole, the "Anthropocene narrative" functions as an ideological concealment of specific historical responsibilities. The present predicament results from the socio-economical conflicts of capitalistic development, and, if any, it should be called "Capitalocene".

In this context, we believe that Bengali historian Dipesh Chakrabarty's position is particularly challenging for philosophy. Not himself an enthusiast of the term "Anthropocene", Chakrabarty believes that acknowledging the anthropogenic origin of climate change forces us to accept a deep connection among nature and human history, categories whose distinction we usually consider not only possible but indispensable. In a much-discussed 2009 article, he argued that one should not assume that the link between climate change and capitalism is direct and unambiguous, as if the demise of the latter would necessarily bring a solution for the former. While social critique is indispensable, our present predicament calls for the elaboration of new historical and political categories that have humanity, and life as such, at its core, and no more, or not just, the individual subject, class or the people. We will then follow Chakrabarty's perilous but thought-provoking suggestion, also through an exhaustive examination of critical arguments against it. This will bring us to considering how the oscillation between humanity as a "natural kind" and as an "ethical ideal", though not new, is brought today to a radical tension. We will conclude arguing that the creation of new social and political answers to the issues raised by Chakrabarty demand a radical engagement with the non-human components of the world much in the sense proposed by Bruno Latour's recent works.

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**Segalerba, Gianluigi** (Italy)

Affiliation: AKA - Arbeitskreis Kulturanalyse Universität Wien (Austria)

Session: 3, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Date and place of birth: 24. June 1967, Genoa, Italy.

11. June 1991: attainment of the MA in Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Pisa.

26. June 1998: attainment of the Ph.D. in Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Pisa.

Title: **The age of reason will be reached with pain: on Vico's interpretation of Natural Law**

Keywords: Vico, Natural Law, Theology, reason, brutality, civilization, Providence, ages of history

**Abstract:**

In my contribution I would like to present Vico's theory of natural law and Vico's criticism of the Interpretation of natural law exposed by Grotius, Selden and Pufendorf. The main thesis of my exposition will consist in showing that natural law is to be seen by Vico as a development, in which reason reaches its Expression only after a painful way of Progress. There is not a unique model of Natural Law: Natural Law at the beginning of history is the law of might is right; Natural Law as the Manifestation of reason will emerge only after a painful period of development of men. Reason is obtained by men only with pain: it is not something ready at the beginning of history. Most Ages of humanity are dominated by brutality and violence: there is no space for illusions regarding the existence of a golden Age in human history, although the direction of human history is determined by Providence.

Since Vico's Interpretation of natural law is strongly connected with Vico's Interpretation of the development of human history, the different ages of human history will be described in my exposition. A long way of education is necessary, in Vico's opinion, for reason to be dominant in human history. Reason is being developed in human history; it is not a faculty that is already completed at the beginning of history; it can be spoken of a progressive humanization of human beings in the course of human history.

Connected to Vico's belief of men becoming, and not immediately being, rational being is Vico's criticism of natural rights theories: Vico's criticism of natural rights theories is based on Vico's conviction that men were not borne, but, on the contrary, only become, and become rational only after a long process of civilization, so that natural rights founded on human reason can have a justification only after a long period of development of human history (that is, there is no reason or there is only little reason at the beginning of history, so that it cannot be spoken of natural rights founded on the presence of reason, at least not at the beginning of human history). Connected to this subject I will analyse the difference between the natural rights of philosophers and the natural rights of peoples.

I will then focus my attention on the ideal history and on particular histories of the different peoples: Vico's interpretation of human history as organized into the age of Gods, the age of heroes, and the age of men will belong to my investigation. I will thereafter show how Vico's new science aims at demonstrating the presence of eternal orders posed by the providence; the constant presence of institutions like religion, marriage and burials in the birth and in the development of the civilization is a sign of a common nature in human beings and of common orders put by the providence into human history.

Vico's conception of philosophy as a discipline that considers the men as the ought to be, and not as they are, thus being a discipline that steadily aims at the moral elevation of men, will then conclude my exposition.



**Smith, Leonie** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: University of Manchester (United Kingdom)

Session: 8, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Manchester, with primary interests in social epistemology, social metaphysics, and material injustice. My thesis brings these themes together in examining the connections between material exclusion, personhood status, social knowledge, and epistemic harm for those living on the margins of society. Prior to my PhD I earned my BA(hons) at the University of Oxford, and completed the MLitt in philosophy, with distinction, at the University of St Andrews. I am also Administrator for The Mind Association, and Editorial Assistant for the journal, *Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric*.

Title: **Epistemic Injustice and the Tools of the Oppressor**

Keywords: Epistemic injustice; epistemic paternalism; ethical nudging

**Abstract:**

"You [white people] have not had to know these things ... People of color, on the other hand, have lost so much when we've gotten it wrong..." [Oluo, 2017, on the need for black people to understand the dominant white culture of the US].

The idea that structurally prejudiced-against individuals might have epistemic advantages despite – or because of – their conditions of injustice is well-trodden ground in standpoint epistemology [e.g., Harding, 1993; Hartsock, 1999]. But in addition to insight into their own situation as 'the oppressed', the sheer necessity of survival can require that minority group members do the epistemic work to understand the attitudes, beliefs and demands of majority group culture [Medina, 2013]. Brought to light in the quote from Oluo, is the thought that those who experience oppression may be able to understand the mindset of likely perpetrators of injustice far better than those perpetrators themselves do.

The literature on epistemic injustice tends to focus on what dominant members of society might do to develop epistemic virtue either as individuals [Fricker, 2007], or through establishing institutionalised structures and practices [Anderson, 2012]. But when epistemic virtue includes understanding social expectations and the lived reality of others, then those currently surviving under epistemic injustice and living with the 'epistemic friction' of competing worldviews [Medina, 2013] may already be, in this sense, virtuous. As such, they may also be "uniquely positioned to initiate and motivate resistance efforts" [Vasanthakumar, 2016, p2] against the injustices they experience. The question this paper asks is: when it comes to the epistemic ignorance and prejudices of others, what may we actually do from a position of epistemic oppression to change that oppression, before risking perpetuating epistemic harms of our own?

To answer this, I draw on the broader literature on epistemic and social improvement. Epistemic paternalism stipulates that in some circumstances we may be justified in interfering with the inquiry of another for her own epistemic good or improvement [Ahlstrom-Vij 2013, Goldman 1991]. In contrast, the practice of ethical nudging makes the nudgee's preferred outcomes more salient amongst the nudgee's choice set to achieve a greater good at the social level [Thaler and Sunstein, 2008]. This will explicitly involve working with – rather than working to remove – an individual's existing cognitive biases. Both approaches have come under criticism with regard to their interference in individual epistemic practice and social outcomes.

But what if those of us who are victims could alternatively use our epistemic insight to co-opt the tools of epistemic paternalism and nudging from within our oppression, to create a form of 'epistemic nudging' aimed at alleviating our own mistreatment? Would these same criticisms apply? And to what extent? How far could our epistemic nudging go, before we become the epistemically un-virtuous ourselves? In this paper, I propose (a) the conditions under which we might do this, and (b) how far we might take it.

(Wordcount: 479 words, excluding abstract references)

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**Sorger, Andreas** (Austria)

Affiliation: University of St Andrews (United Kingdom)

Session: 4, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

My name is Andreas and I am an MPhil student in Philosophy at the University of St Andrews. Prior to starting my Masters here, I completed a BSc in Politics and Philosophy at LSE in London. Having grown up in multiple different countries and with parents of two distinct cultural backgrounds, the intersection between culture and political philosophy comprises my main research interest, and is an area where I hope to pursue a PhD!

Title: **To what extent is a language requirement justifiable as a liberal constraint on multiculturalism?**

Keywords: multiculturalism, liberalism, language, culture

**Abstract:**

There is a prima facie incompatibility between language requirements and multiculturalism. Language requirements demand that prospective citizens demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the dominant language of the country they are seeking citizenship from. Consequently, language requirements invoke ideas of forced assimilation, since minority cultures with their own distinct languages are in some sense subsumed under the dominant culture that exists within society. This seems at odds with multiculturalism, which holds that cultural differences should at the very least be accepted. Contra this, I argue that language requirements, if accepted as an initial constraint on multiculturalism, will be useful in promoting cultural self-governance, defined as the ability for members of a culture to define and shape their shared identity. I make the further claim that cultural self-governance is crucial in securing significant provisions for the protection of minority cultures.

I begin by offering a defence of the view that language requirements can be justifiably implemented by a state. This is based on a strong Republican view of self-government, namely that it is an intrinsic good which the state ought to protect. Given that language can be conceived instrumentally as a tool for the construction of effective self-governing polities, language requirements can be justified only if a) they are the product of a legitimate democratic process and b) they are for the purpose of promoting effective self-government. From this, I aim to justify the need for widespread reform to the ways in which language policy is implemented at a local level, in order to better achieve the aims of multiculturalism, which I present as the acceptance of diversity and the freedom from discrimination. I argue for this claim on the following grounds: first, there is an intrinsic link between language and culture such that knowing a language gives one an insight into a particular cultural identity. Second, one's culture is the 'lens through which one views the world', which in turn allows one to make meaningful choices in life. This is sufficiently important to justify the protection of cultures by the state on liberal grounds. Third, the ability for a culture to engage in cultural self-governance is predicated on the number of its members that can fluently speak the language the culture in question is associated with. Fourth, given that I have defended language requirements from an instrumental conception of language, it follows that language can form the basis of cultural self-governance and that some language policy can be devolved to the local level. This will allow citizens of minority cultures to lobby for greater provisions for their own languages, such as having street signs in both the official language and the minority language in question. Consequently, this will allow for minority languages to be used in a meaningful capacity beyond private conversation. Thus, by granting greater language protections, the state will achieve the aims of multiculturalism by facilitating cultural self-governance. I conclude by defending this view against an objection from cultural imperialism.

**Sparenborg, Lukas** (Germany)

Affiliation: Goethe Universität Frankfurt (Germany)

Session: 4, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a master student in Political Theory at the Goethe University Frankfurt am Main/ Technical University Darmstadt and a Research Assistant at the chair of International Political Theory and Philosophy (Prof. Dr. Darrel Moellendorf) at the Cluster of Excellence "Normative Orders" at the Goethe University Frankfurt. I hold a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Hamburg. In 2017, I was a visiting student at the University of Southampton (with David Owen). During my time in Frankfurt I was awarded with the Deutschlandstipendium at the TU Darmstadt and the "Stipendium Gerlacianum".

Title: **Responsibilities for Justice – On Iris Young's theory of political responsibility**

Keywords: justice, responsibility, domination, oppression, discourse

**Abstract:**

In her book *Responsibility for justice*, Iris M. Young develops a social connection model to address structural injustice. For her, structural injustice occurs "[...] when social processes put large groups of people into systematic threat or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities, at the same time that these processes enable others to dominate or have a wide range of opportunities for developing and exercising capacities available to them." (Young 2011: 52). Young uses sweatshops as an example to illustrate that an individual participates in the reproduction of those structural injustices – here the exploitation of workers – by buying clothes in those shops. As soon as we participate in processes that cause structural injustice we are politically responsible. In cases like this, I argue, we have a responsibility to act. But how can agents acquire enough specific knowledge to collectively overcome the structural injustices they contribute to. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to argue for two other conceptions for responsibility to fill the gap within Young's work. How does the individual know about structural injustice, especially across borders?

The first is a conception of responsibility to publicise which, draws from Young's earlier work in *Inclusion and Democracy*. I argue that we can expand her concept of an inclusive discourse within the nation-state to multiple global inclusive discourses where social structures define the contexts of justice. By discussing her thoughts on representation, discourse theory and the public sphere, I argue, how publicising injustices in order to open up an inclusive discourse can help to make the social connection model a more powerful mechanism.

The second additional conception of responsibility tries to deal with the frontiers of what can be named: Are there forms of injustice that victims cannot articulate? I argue that Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice (and especially hermeneutical injustice) is such a case and hence, we need a conception of a responsibility to be epistemically aware. Highlighting José Medina's epistemic vices and virtues can give an answer to the question of how to deal with epistemic injustices. In this sense, I emphasise a form of awareness that is captured by Medina's Imperative of Epistemic Interaction: being aware of one's own position in difference to others.

The conceptions I argue for are intertwined. Only if we acknowledge our responsibility to act which includes accepting both a responsibility to publicise and to be epistemically aware combined into Young's account, we can effectively aim to overcome structural injustices collectively.

**Sylla, Bernhard** (Germany)

Affiliation: CEPS Universidade do Minho (Portugal)

Session: 20, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

I teach Philosophy of Language, Ontology and Contemporary Philosophy at the University of Minho, where I do research at the Centre for Ethics, Politics and Society (CEPS) and the Centre of Human Studies (CEHUM). My research interests include the analytic and continental tradition of philosophy of language, the phenomenological tradition of philosophy, especially Husserl and Heidegger, and more recently the philosophy of technology related to philosophers like Anders, Blumenberg, Sloterdijk, Marcuse. I am also interested in the relationship between language and politics, and the impact of linguistic, aesthetic and political theory of the Frankfurt School. In 2014, I published a book about continental philosophy of language, and very recently (2017) an Antology of Language Philosophy. I am co-editor of two books on Phenomenology (to be publishes in 2017), and author of peer-reviewed papers on philosophers I mentioned above (Heidegger, Sloterdijk, Anders, Adorno, etc.).

Title: **O anti-dualismo do discurso sobre o Antropoceno**

Keywords: Dualismo; anti-dualismo; Antropoceno

**Abstract:**

O discurso sobre o Antropoceno é um fenómeno recente. Desde que o ecologista Eugene Stoermer e o Nobel da Química Paul Crutzen propuseram o uso do termo 'Antropoceno', em 2000, para dar conta de fenómenos relacionados com o sistema global do planeta Terra que parecem ter suficiente significância e impacto ambiental para justificar que se fale de uma nova época geológica, o uso deste termo em discursos académicos e sociais aumentou quase explosivamente. 18 anos após a sua introdução no vocabulário científico existe um vasto discurso sobre o Antropoceno que se instalou em áreas científicas muito heterogêneas, desde a Biologia e Geologia até às Artes e Humanidades, inclusive na própria Filosofia.

Apesar da sua multidisciplinidade, parece haver neste discurso um pressuposto comum que, não raras vezes, se transforma numa exigência: a de abandonar um falso dualismo alegadamente responsável pela falta de respostas aos desafios que a nova era antropocénica nos coloca. O antidualismo parece ser um denominador comum, largamente partilhado pelos mais diversos autores do discurso antropocénico, mas aquilo que se entende por 'dualismo' parece-me extremamente heterogêneo, abrangendo dimensões ontológicas e epistemológicas e, por vezes, misturando-as. Seja qual for o dualismo combatido – natureza e cultura, sistema social e sistema terrestre, Homem e Terra, biosfera e noosfera, sujeito e objeto, observador e observado, ciências da natureza e ciências humanas, etc. –, a chave de ouro para desencerrar e desenvolver um pensamento diferente, capaz de enfrentar os desafios ambientais do tempo presente, estaria na superação destes dualismos, i.e. numa perspetiva capaz não apenas de dar conta da intersecção e imbricação dos elementos até então opostos, mas que pressupõe, no fundo, a sua equiparação. Como se pode ou deve pensar tanto a imbricação como a equiparação, pode, no entanto, variar bastante de um autor para outro.

Com base nestes pressupostos, focar-me-ei em duas críticas do antidualismo, apresentadas por Andrew Feenberg e por Gernot Böhme. Ambas as críticas escolheram as teorias de Haraway e Latour – autores que se encontram, hoje em dia, entre os mais citados filósofos do pensamento sobre o Antropoceno – como representantes distintos do antidualismo. Defenderei que a crítica ao antidualismo é pertinente e necessária, mas que as alternativas propostas por Feenberg e Böhme não convencem.

**Taylor, Anthony** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: Nuffield College, University of Oxford (United Kingdom)

Session: 29, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow in Politics at Nuffield College, Oxford. I'm currently working on a number of papers on political liberalism.

Title: **Stability and Liberal Justice: The Argument from the Mutability of Social Positions**

Keywords: Political liberalism; Stability for the Right Reasons

**Abstract:**

There is a tradition within recent liberal political philosophy of holding that a distinct kind of stability is a fundamental desideratum for a conception of justice. Proponents of this view hold that liberal principles of political morality must be shown to be capable of generating their own support in ideal conditions given the plurality of views that are typically held in societies that provide robust protections for freedom of conscience, speech and association. Achieving this aim is necessary in order to show that an ideal liberal society is practically possible and thus both worthy of our support and something we can realistically hope for.

This paper addresses a fundamental question for the proponents of this view: what kind of principles of justice, if any, could be stable? This question has been addressed elsewhere, of course. But it is surprisingly difficult to find a general account of the properties a conception of justice would need to have in order to be stable for the right reasons. My aim here is to set out a fully general account. Others who have tackled this question focus on the non-substantive properties that a conception of justice must have in order to be stable. It must be, say, presented in terms of distinctly political values, rather than derived from a moral general moral view. However, an (at least) equally important question is what substantive properties a conception of justice would need to have in order to be stable for the right reasons. What distribution of benefits and burdens does stability require, for example? Whether or not a conception of justice is capable of generating and maintaining its own support in ideal conditions will surely depend on what it actually does as well as how it is presented.

I address the question of the properties a conception of justice would need to have in order to be stable by setting out what I call the argument from the mutability of social positions. This argument aims to show that, if certain background conditions were realised in an ideal society, its citizens would have sufficient reasons from the point of view of wide self-interest to endorse liberal principles of justice. If it succeeds in this aim, it shows that the stability desideratum can be satisfied.

The argument from the mutability of social positions begins from two facts. The first is that we are fallible choosers of our ends, and the second is that how advantaged our position in society is depends, at least to some extent, on what ends we endorse and try to pursue. From these two facts, I argue that how advantaged our position in society is has the potential to change, perhaps even radically, if we come realise our previous conception of the good was mistaken and modify it or abandon it in favour of a different view. This shows that, from the fact that we are fallible choosers of our ends, we can derive a self-interested reason to care about the occupants of other positions in our society: we ourselves could come to occupy those social positions, if our conception of the good were to change in the relevant way.

**Taylor, Isaac** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: University of Colorado Boulder (United States)

Session: 11, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Isaac Taylor is a Scholar in Residence at the Center for Western Civilization, Thought and Policy, the University of Colorado Boulder. He is interested in questions of global justice and security ethics, and his book, *The Ethics of Counterterrorism*, is forthcoming with Routledge.

Title: **Legitimacy and Security Policy**

Keywords: Legitimacy; Security; Defense; International Institutions; Robustness

**Abstract:**

At least since the time of Hobbes, political philosophers have viewed the provision of security to be a core function of the nation-state. More recently, a number of writers have argued that guaranteeing the security of its citizens from external threats is a necessary condition for a state to be legitimate. They go on to suggest that states can meet this "security condition" by providing the standard institutions associated with national defence: a standing army, weapons systems, surveillance, and so on. International cooperation on security matters, although often useful, is not thought to be essential for legitimacy. In this paper, I argue against this received view; in order to meet the security condition, states cannot rely on national defence institutions alone in their efforts to achieve security.

To see this, I begin by examining the concept of security itself. At the very least, of course, one cannot be secure if one is under a significant risk of being killed or maimed. But if this is all we are concerned with when we talk about security, our understanding of the term is highly impoverished. On Jeremy Waldron's "deeper" conception, one cannot be truly secure if one achieves mere safety by cowering in a sealed bunker, or more generally if one's safety comes at the cost of significant inroads on one's liberty.

At the same time, I believe that the reason why others do not harm someone matters in determining whether they are secure. If those others refrain from attacking only because they fear retaliation, we might think that the individual in question lacks genuine security. Philip Pettit has argued that some goods are more valuable when they are provided more robustly, that is, when they are provided out of dispositions that would lead to their provision across a range of variations on the actual circumstances we are in. I think that security is a good of this sort. If I am to be truly secure, I must not only be safe from others harming me. I must be safe because those others are morally committed to not harming me, and so would continue to refrain from not harming me if circumstances were to change and they could do so with impunity.

If we want to understand security in something like this more expansive sense, though, many of the practices undertaken by existing states to achieve security will fail to achieve that goal. Inroads on civil liberties and policies aimed at shielding citizens from international terrorism at significant personal cost to them, although perhaps increasing citizens' safety, do little to increase their security. And much national defense, although perhaps effective in deterring foreign nations from invading, fail to address foreign actors' motives in the way necessary for a sufficiently robust form of security to be provided. I conclude that states must supplement such practices with cooperation in international security institutions – in particular in creating international norms – in order to provide genuine security, and thus be legitimate.

**Taylor Smith, Patrick** (United States)

Affiliation: National University Singapore (Singapore)

Session: 17, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Patrick Taylor Smith is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Global Studies at National University Singapore. He works primarily in the areas of global and intergenerational justice where he is developing an ethics of radical political action and revolution, especially in the context of climate change. His work has appeared in *The Monist*, *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, and others.

Title: **Who May Geoengineer: Global Inequality, Risk, and Supreme Emergency**

Keywords: global justice, non-ideal justice, climate change, dirty hands, geoengineering

**Abstract:**

This paper argues that certain marginalized polities—those with no causal responsibility for climate change yet will suffer its most dire consequences—may have a special permission to engage in risky geoengineering where they deliberately alter our planet's climate system. A common justification for radical geoengineering—such as the injection of reflective aerosols into the atmosphere to increase the Earth's reflectivity—is that they might be needed to avert a 'climate emergency.' However, these arguments, as well as most others concerning geoengineering, assume that the geoengineers will be the powerful and rich nations that have been primarily responsible for climate change. I suggest that we should move our theoretical attention away from the progenitors of climate change and towards its victims. After rejecting some potential accounts, such as self-defense and civil disobedience, I argue that climate change, when we combine its political and environmental effects and causes, constitutes a supreme emergency for marginalized states. The combination of factors is essential. If the climate emergency was, in some sense, a result only of natural processes, then the justification of geoengineering would be very different. Instead, I argue that radical geoengineering as a response to climate change may only be justified if it is an effective response to both its negative environmental impacts as well as the underlying and enabling political injustices and domination.

Michael Walzer famously argued that policy-makers can set aside the deontological constraints of just war only in the context of 'supreme emergency'. Avoiding mere defeat is insufficient; the defeat must express or generate a set of political relations that are beyond the pale. Similarly, he argues that 'unconditional surrender' was appropriate policy in WWII only because of the threat the Nazis presented to the global order. Unlike glib invocations of emergency and the need for a 'plan B' if mitigation and adaptation fail, the supreme emergency justification of risky geoengineering only succeeds if it is deployed by or assented to by those subject to climate-oriented injustice and domination. If these polities find themselves in a supreme emergency, then deontological constraints that would ordinarily make geoengineering wrongful may be set aside. I argue that there are three requirements that need to be met for a marginalized state or coalition of states to act legitimately in a supreme emergency. First, the action must be necessary: there exist no means consistent with the relevant deontological restraints that will achieve the expected justice-based improvements. Second, the actions must be actually successful: good intentions are not sufficient when one violates rights in the name of supreme emergency. Third, the agents invoking the supreme emergency must act inclusively. That is, they must select intervention scenarios that do not merely best serve their interests but distribute the costs as equitably as possible among those subject to negative geoengineering impacts. Furthermore, they need to create decision-making procedures that will include other marginalized states and classes beyond their borders. I then go on to show how some states may be able to satisfy these conditions.



### **Toriz Ramos, Cláudia** (Portugal)

Affiliation: Universidade Fernando Pessoa (Portugal)

Session: 5, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

#### **Short Bio:**

PhD Political Studies University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom. Assistant Professor at FCHS Universidade Fernando Pessoa, Porto. Researcher (CEPESE and CLEPUL). Research areas: European integration; democracy and democratisation; global governance.

Title: **Ecopolitics and global security: from discourse to policies**

Keywords: Ecopolitics; human security; sustainability; anthropocentrism.

#### **Abstract:**

Ecopolitics entered the political discourse firstly as an alternative debate to mainstream politics and ideological refutation of the established political order, and that way gained public expression in social movements of contestation. Subsequently, it emerged intertwined in the discourse of party politics and finally came to reach the core of contemporary political systems and their political agendas.

In the first part of the paper the construction and the spreading of the ecopolitical discourse are addressed. The way it entered the field of public policies is the core concern of the second part, with a focus on international and global security policies. Within this debate, ecopolitics has reintroduced topics that were once within the scope of geopolitics and thus converged with the so called 'new geopolitics' agenda. Ecopolitical thinking has therefore contributed to a shift in international security paradigms, from the conventional, realist and state-centred national security paradigm to approaches that privilege human security and global sustainability. In its margins, the ecopolitical discourse also goes as far as challenging conventional anthropocentrism, a debate that constitutes a major test to mainstream political practices. The paper ends with an overall assessment of the extant matches and mismatches between political discourse in ecopolitics and political practices, and prospectively addresses debates ahead and the political feasibility of their outcomes.

**Umbers, Lachlan** (Australia)

Affiliation: The University of New South Wales (Australia)

Session: 10, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

Lachlan Umbers is a post-doctoral research fellow with the Climate Justice stream of the Practical Justice Initiative at the University of New South Wales, and was awarded his doctorate from the Australian National University in February 2018. His research interests are primarily in democratic theory, but also include distributive justice, moral philosophy, meta-ethics, and applied ethics – especially climate ethics. His dissertation engaged in a series of debates concerning the justification of contemporary democratic institutions, including compulsory voting, bans on vote buying, majority rule, and universal suffrage.

Title: **The Climate Duties of Sub-National Political Communities**

Keywords: Climate Justice; Collective Action; Political Philosophy; Sub-National Duties

**Abstract:**

The climate justice literature is focused heavily upon the duties of nations to engage in mitigation – i.e. to curb the severity of climate change by reducing their emissions. Yet, with recent analyses suggesting that major industrialised nations are unlikely to meet their Paris commitments – commitments increasingly regarded as inadequate – we think the time has come to consider the duties of other actors. In this piece, we consider the climate duties of sub-national political communities, particularly states and municipalities. We defend the claim that many sub-national political communities have moral duties to take unilateral action on climate change, where the national communities to which they belong fail to do so.

We begin by setting out and defending the Devolution Principle, which states that where some collective fails to discharge some collective duty to which it is subject, and where the considerations in virtue of which that duty arises apply also to some sub-collective belonging to the original collective, that sub-collective has a pro tanto duty to, at least partially, discharge the original collective duty. This principle, we argue, explains a number of common-sense intuitions concerning collective duties. It also, we argue, entails that many sub-national political communities have duties to engage in climate mitigation. Our argument proceeds as follows.

We begin by setting out two grounds for national-level collective duties to mitigate climate change. First, many nations have contributed to climate change by emitting excessive greenhouse gases. Second, many nations also have the capacity to mitigate the harms of global warming without incurring unacceptable moral costs. Virtually all national communities are presently failing to discharge these duties, insofar as they have failed, and will likely to continue to fail, to implement adequate emission-reduction policies.

We then argue that the considerations which ground these national-level duties apply also to many sub-national political communities. Many sub-national political communities are major contributors to climate change. The EPA reports that Texas, for example, emitted 708.81 million metric tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub> in 2014, rendering it alone the 8th emitter of greenhouse gases in that year, worldwide. Moreover, many sub-national political communities have the capacity to help mitigate the harms of climate change. Given the extensive contributions of large sub-national communities, even relatively minor reductions might be expected to have non-trivial climatic impacts. Smaller communities cannot expect to have impact in this way. But emissions-reductions by such communities may nevertheless have valuable indirect effects – e.g. prompting the development of new technologies and expertise which might be transferred to other communities, promoting norms encouraging lower-emissions lifestyles, and so on. The devolution principle thus entails that many sub-national political communities, to the extent that they belong to national communities which have failed to implement adequate emission-reduction policies, have duties to unilaterally reduce their emissions.

We then consider and respond to a number of objections, including appeals to counter-productiveness, and fairness. We conclude, then, that many sub-national political communities have duties to mitigate climate change.

**Valadas, M. Alexandra** (Portugal)

Affiliation: Michigan State University (United States)

Session: 8, June 11th, 11h45-13h30

**Short Bio:**

PhD Candidate at Michigan State University, USA, working on the intersection of feminist theory, ethics and philosophy of risk.

Title: **An Ethical Context for Butler's Vulnerability**

Keywords: Vulnerability, Judith Butler. Ethics, Subjectivity, Normativity

**Abstract:**

Vulnerability seems to be at the core of several philosophical discussions, which indicates the breadth and the complexity of the concept. The notion of 'vulnerability' is now a prominent motif in current philosophical discourses on violence, terrorism, war, gender, sexuality, and embodiment. Vulnerability is central in these debates because vulnerability is a fundamental part of the human condition, and one can say that a person's life is conditioned by the way in which her vulnerability plays out under social circumstances. However, most of the current discourses reduce the meaning of vulnerability to one of fragility, defenselessness, deficiency, and passivity, conditions that are frequently associated with risk as a determining factor of human precariousness. Recently, moral and political philosophers, bioethicists and feminist theorists have acknowledged that vulnerability is central for describing human subjectivity, establishing it as normatively significant. However, despite the debates around the concept, there seems to be a lack of a systematic analysis of what vulnerability is and how it is constituted as ethically significant. Most moral considerations that surround vulnerability are rooted in a dichotomous view on protection, i.e., those who need and those who should offer protection against vulnerability. I argue that this is a reductive account that fails to encompass the complexity of vulnerability and its experiences. This view is problematic, not only because such an association of vulnerability with the failure to predict and control forecloses possibilities, but also because it ignores complex ethical and epistemological dimensions. My motivation is, therefore, to articulate a conception of vulnerability that goes beyond these traditional accounts. I propose vulnerability as an openness to oneself, to others and to the world. To be vulnerable is to be receptive to the impact and actions of others, in such a way that the subject is transformed by the process. This openness entails, but is not limited to, the being's susceptibility to disease and physical injury. One's being is vulnerable in that one's existence is in question not just in the sense of being always open to some kind of material destruction caused by uncontrolled physical forces, but also in the sense that one can fail to define oneself adequately, one can fail to achieve appropriate recognition from others, one can fall prey to domination from others, etc. But more than this, vulnerability can be enunciated by the establishment of new meanings and relations, through the intertwining and co-emergence of relations between the self and others. Drawing on Judith Butler's work, I claim that this is a universal vulnerability which is grounded in the idea that as humans we share an ontological and bodily insecurity that can unite us with others in society and which can be a motivator for more careful consideration and treatment of others. I propose then, that by elaborating a more complex and nuanced perspective of vulnerability, we can derive from Butler's work an account that allows us to articulate the normative significance of vulnerability.

### Van de Wall, Ben (Netherlands)

Affiliation: Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven (Belgium)

Session: 21, June 12th, 11h45-13h30

#### Short Bio:

I did my bachelor studies in Arts and Culture at Maastricht University with a specialization in political culture, followed by the master's programme 'politics and society'. Currently I work as a PhD candidate as part of RIPPLE (Research in Political Philosophy Leuven) at KU Leuven funded by the Research Foundation - Flanders.

Title: **The paradoxical relation between state neutrality and political identity**

Keywords: State neutrality, political identity, liberalism, depoliticization, Carl Schmitt

#### Abstract:

In over a decade we've witnessed an increase in a 'culturalization of politics', the rephrasing of the political community and citizenship in cultural terms, notably among right wing politicians and intellectuals. Such a discourse implies a controversial understanding of politics, as it is an attempt to establish a political identity, an identity to which every citizen is automatically subject. This is controversial because it conflicts with pluralism and the notion of state neutrality on individual conceptions of the good life. State neutrality has long been considered a core element of liberal political theory as a guarantee to safeguard the freedom of individuals to pursue their own life plan. Although it has been criticized by perfectionist liberals for providing an incorrect answer to the demands of pluralism and by communitarians for being grounded in a false understanding of human nature, its relation to political identity has been neglected. This perspective is important, because the normative aim of neutrality remains dominant and because of the increasing topicality of political identity in political debate. A conceptual reconsideration of state neutrality is therefore necessary. We will establish that the normative ideal of state neutrality is incompatible with political identity, yet paradoxically an identity constituting element is inextricably part of it. First we will explore the notion of state neutrality in order to understand its normative presuppositions and its negative relation to political identity. Then, perfectionist liberal criticism of neutrality will be discussed. Because it does not depart the neutralists' normative presuppositions, it fails to give an account of the role of political identity. Peter Balint has synthesized this liberal debate in defence of state neutrality as an ideal and a range concept. This approach defends neutralism from the critique of perfectionists, but also opens up a window for a different critique from the perspective of political identity. Considered as a range concept, there is an element present in state neutrality that cannot be derived from its normative presuppositions, but independently constitutes a political identity. In order to provide an understanding of state neutrality that incorporates this element as well, we will proceed by conceptualizing neutrality as depoliticization in the schmittian sense. The goal of state neutrality then shows to be a dual project consisting of internal depoliticization and external politicization, with the latter implicitly constituting a political identity. If we want to understand the rise of political identity, we need to understand its latent presence in the dominant normative ideal in liberal theory.

**Van Goozen, Sara** (Netherlands)

Affiliation: University of York (United Kingdom)

Session: 13, June 11th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

I am an associate lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of York. My main interests are in global/international political philosophy and global ethics. In particular, I work on contemporary just war theory and related areas of research.

Title: **The Moral Relevance of Combatants' Consent**

Keywords: Keywords: just war theory; consent; military recruitment; militarism; adaptive preferences

**Abstract:**

In this paper, I have two aims: first, to elucidate the importance of (just) combatants' consensual membership of the military for the burdens they can be expected to bear when participating in war, and, second, to analyse some of the ways in which combatants' consent can be considered to be nullified by certain recruitment practices, drawing in particular on research into the recruitment of young people into the US military. First, I argue that combatants' consent is important, among other reasons, because it is one way, if not the most important way, in which we can justify combatants' duty to (when necessary) risk their own lives. This argument has important consequences for our understanding of the permissibility of conscription or the draft.

However, military recruitment campaigns often target those from poor neighbourhoods, and advertising often explicitly presents a career in the military as not just a way to earn qualifications but also as a way out of poverty. We might therefore worry whether young recruits can to some extent be considered "forced" by their circumstances. I suggest that those with a very limited, barely acceptable set of options open them may be described as more constrained in their eventual choice than those who have a rich, valuable set of options. In order to understand what counts as a valuable set of options, we may appeal to whether or not a particular option threatens a person's basic needs. However, we need more than that: in order to live a valuable, autonomous life, we do not merely need our basic needs met right now, but we need to have them met with some predictable degree of security. In order to make plans and live our lives, we need to, for instance, be able to trust that we will not suddenly become homeless. So, although a life as an unskilled manual labourer in poor conditions with little job security may not be unacceptable, it may be the case that it does not provide enough security to count as a valuable option. Thus if the options open to a recruit are such a life or joining the military, and the recruit does feel like her choice is somewhat forced by these circumstances, her choice to join the military may be less than fully voluntary.

On the other hand, however, we might worry about other effects of the combination of recruiters targeting certain areas and the relative scarcity of options available to those being targeted. For instance, this situation raises the worry of adaptive preferences, and whether they may affect recruits' ability to meaningfully consent to life in the military and all it entails.

**Wells, Katy** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: Magdalen College, University of Oxford (United Kingdom)

Session: 1, June 11th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

I am a Fellow by Examination at Magdalen College, Oxford. I work on property, housing, and power.

Title: **Risk-aversion about Power**

Keywords: Power, Risk,

**Abstract:**

A prevalent feature of contemporary institutions and organisations is that some wield power –sometimes significant power – over others. Sometimes this power is wielded to positive ends: to empower individuals, to bring about just outcomes, to appropriately recognise merit, effort and contribution. However, those in positions of power can also abuse it.

In this paper, I ask whether concerns about the abuse of power should lead us to adopt a position of risk-aversion about power. This question has not been given significant consideration in the literature on power; yet such a position has had recent support, particularly from social egalitarians. Those who defend such a position argue the following: that because of the troubling things people can do with power when they are in possession of it, often in spite of the relevant constraints being in place, it makes sense to permit people to exercise power as little as possible. Organisations such as our workplaces, therefore, should be structured to involve as little hierarchy of power as possible.

Here, I argue that we should reject risk-aversion about power. The argument I give rests on a claim about what we express when we decide, or don't decide, to structure our organisations and institutions based on an attitude of extreme caution, or risk-aversion about power. I argue that significant expressive disvalue attaches to a decision to structure our organisations and institutions based on an attitude of extreme caution, or risk-aversion about power. In particular, I argue that such a decision expresses a troubling lack of confidence in the participants of the relevant social project; to express such a lack of confidence, I argue, is troubling because expressions of confidence are essential to the success of both individual and collective projects. I develop these claims, in the first instance, by considering a two-person case: that of a manager making a decision whether or not to promote one of their employees to a position in which they will wield power over others.

I end the paper by considering whether the arguments I make issue in a troubling conclusion: that we should not constrain those in power, since doing so has the relevant expressive disvalue. I argue, however, that my claims do not lend support to this conclusion, because what we express when we constrain those in power lacks the relevant troubling dimension.

Rejecting the position of risk-aversion about power has wider significance. Whilst a considerable amount is written about power in contemporary political philosophy, much of it offers only one perspective: a negative perspective. That is, it considers a situation in which one person wields power over another from the perspective of what can be troubling about it. An alternative perspective on power would give an account of why we should value inequalities in power, and why we should include them in our institutions and organisations. Such an account cannot be successfully developed, however, without an explanation of why we should not always be very cautious or risk-averse about allowing people into power.

**Williams, Bekka** (United States)

Affiliation: Minnesota State University, Mankato (United States)

Session: 19, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

Bekka Williams is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Minnesota State University, Mankato. Her work covers issues in both ethical theory and political philosophy, and she is also currently writing on issues in applied ethics (focusing on interpersonal manipulation and sexual consent), as well as conceptual issues regarding pornography.

Title: **Epistemic Carelessness in the Moral Realm**

Keywords: moral epistemology, virtue, moral luck, negligence, blameworthiness

**Abstract:**

In recent decades, there has been a growing literature on epistemic virtue. There is also a large body of work on the moral relevance of culpable ignorance, specifically regarding whether an agent's ignorance of moral or empirical matters is morally exculpatory. Little has been said, however, about the moral status of faulty belief formation. In this paper, I aim to make some first steps toward filling in this gap. I argue that from the perspectives of all three major divisions of normative ethical theory, carelessness in one's formation of beliefs regarding morally-significant propositions is morally problematic, such that agents who are epistemically careless "in the moral realm" are often morally blameworthy for that carelessness itself.

While I am concerned with the formation of beliefs about moral principles, this is not my only concern. The "moral realm", as I intend it, includes not only facts regarding moral principles but also empirical facts, where these are morally relevant. My restriction to the moral realm is meant to highlight that I am not arguing (nor do I think it is plausible) that epistemic carelessness is morally problematic in general. If I flip a coin to decide whether the English alphabet contains greater or fewer than 20 letters, I have been epistemically careless. But this is morally irrelevant. If I instead flip a coin to decide whether non-human animals are part of the moral community, I have been epistemically careless regarding a morally-significant matter—and, I argue, this is morally problematic.

Additionally, although "epistemic carelessness" is importantly related to the concept of culpable ignorance, my project is not limited to cases of mistaken belief—and it is largely separable from cases of wrongful action. I argue that epistemic carelessness in the moral realm is itself morally problematic, even if it results in neither mistaken belief nor morally wrongful action.

In the case of virtue ethics, I build on work in virtue-responsibilism to argue that carelessness in the moral realm rises to the level of a moral vice—a vice best described as "failing to take morality appropriately seriously". Regarding the deontological perspective, I rely on the literature on moral luck along with work by W.D. Ross to defend the plausibility of a moral principle according to which epistemic carelessness in the moral realm is *pro tanto* morally wrong. Finally, I argue that to the extent that agents' carelessness in the moral realm has the tendency to result in morally wrongful actions, consequentialists also have a good reason to condemn such carelessness.

I conclude by discussing common ways in which agents are currently epistemically careless in the moral realm, and I identify social media as an example of an increasingly problematic threat to careful moral belief formation. In particular, I argue that new work on epistemic "bubbles" and "echo chambers" should make us wary of how reliance on social media can easily lead us to be careless with our moral views in a way that is morally blameworthy.

**Wilson, Peter** (United Kingdom)

Affiliation: LSE (United Kingdom)

Session: 16, June 12th, 10h00-11h30

**Short Bio:**

My name is Peter and I am an MSc Political Theory student at the London School of Economics. Prior to my masters, I completed an undergraduate degree in Politics and Philosophy, also at the LSE. My current research interests are quite broad, but focus on: the political philosophy of marriage; the importance of considerations of responsibility and free will in theories of justice; sufficientarianism. I am hoping to pursue a PhD in one of these interests at some point in the next few years!

Title: **Webbed Marriage: The Just Practice of Polygamy**

Keywords: Marriage; Polygamy; Polyamory; Justice; Contracts

**Abstract:**

Should liberal states legalise polygamous marriage? Most disagreement about this question results from a diverging focus on either traditional hierarchical polygamy or modern polyamory in ideal or non-ideal contexts. Traditionally, polygamy has existed exclusively in the form of hub-and-spokes polygamy, a marriage form where one central spouse marries each other spouse. In particular, polygyny, a form of hub-and-spokes polygamy in which multiple women share a husband, has been polygamy's most prevalent form. Yet, in recent times, there has been a rise in the practice of polyamory, polygamous relationships that are open to all genders and lack a central dominant figure.

In this paper, I answer the question by addressing both traditional and modern forms of polygamy and taking account of both ideal and non-ideal considerations. I propose that it is unjust that all forms of polygamy are currently illegal in modern liberal states, and that people in polyamorous relationships are presently unjustly denied marital rights. A new form of marriage based on the structure of polyamorous relationships withstands classical objections: webbed marriage. Webbed marriage does not cause injustice and should be given serious consideration for legalisation by modern liberal states.

I begin the paper by outlining the wrong caused by modern states refusing to recognise polygamous marriage in the same way it recognises monogamous marriage. On this basis, these state's treatment of polygamy would be unjustified unless it could be shown that either (1) the practice of polygamous marriage is intrinsically unjust, or (2) the practice of polygamy leads to significant injustices in non-ideal circumstances. I argue that (1) is false and that despite concerns about its inequalitarian structure and the ensuring of the consent of all spouses, there is nothing intrinsically unjust about the practice of any form of polygamy. However, I argue that (2) is true and that the practice of hub-and-spokes polygamy leads to unjust outcomes in current non-ideal circumstances. I proceed to argue that the harms caused by hub-and-spokes polygamy are significant enough to warrant not legalising all forms of polygamy and that attempting to minimise these harms through decriminalisation would be unjustified.

I demonstrate, however, that polyamory does not suffer from hub-and-spokes polygamy's extrinsic problems. I, therefore, outline a new form of marriage based on the structure of polyamorous relationships: webbed marriage. Webbed marriage would consist of every spouse involved in a relationship marrying every other member of the relationship, forming a marital web. Each spouse would sign the terms of a collective marriage contract, and for anyone else to join the marital web the agreement of all members would be required, with an amendment to the contract signed by every member being necessary to do so. I argue that there is strong case that webbed marriage would not cause injustice, and deal with a potential objection. Finally, I conclude that webbed marriage should be given serious consideration for legalisation by modern liberal states, subject to further (empirical) analysis.



**Yong, Caleb** (Singapore)

Affiliation: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity (Germany)  
Session: 27, June 12th, 15h00-16h30

**Short Bio:**

Caleb Yong is a postdoctoral research fellow in the Department of Ethics, Law, and Politics at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity. His research on the philosophy of international migration has been published in venues such as the Journal of Social Philosophy and Social Theory and Practice.

Title: **Justifying Resistance to Immigration Law: The Case of Mere Noncompliance**

Keywords: Immigration, resistance, legitimacy, authority, civil disobedience

**Abstract:**

Constitutional democracies unilaterally enact primary immigration laws that regulate the admission of immigrants to their territories. When are would-be migrants to a constitutional democracy morally justified in nonviolently breaching its primary immigration law? Receiving states also typically enact secondary immigration laws that require their existing citizens to participate in the implementation of primary immigration law. When are the individual citizens of a constitutional democracy morally justified in nonviolently breaching its secondary immigration law? In this article, I take up these questions concerning the justifiability of nonviolent – or mere – noncompliance with primary and secondary immigration law. Dissenting from Javier Hidalgo's prominent recent treatment, I argue that the injustice of a primary or secondary immigration law is not sufficient to make mere noncompliance justified. Instead, I contend that only if an immigration law lacks legitimate authority are individuals justified in breaching it, since the subjects of an institution with legitimate authority are under a content-independent moral duty to comply with its rules. This duty to comply normally outweighs even our moral reasons to avoid complicity in injustice or to engage in self- and other-defense against unjust threats. I further suggest that a constitutional democracy's regimes of primary and secondary immigration law presumptively have legitimate authority. The secondary immigration law of a constitutional democracy has legitimate authority since the domestic law of a constitutional democracy has legitimate authority, and secondary immigration law relevantly counts as domestic law. The primary immigration law of a constitutional democracy also has legitimate authority, since constitutional democratic states normally enjoy international legitimacy, and a state with international legitimacy has legitimate authority to regulate immigration to its territory. Nevertheless, in certain cases the legitimacy of a constitutional democracy's immigration law is defeated, for example when a specific law violates or unjustly fails to defend would-be migrants' human rights. I also argue that justified mere noncompliance by a constitutional democracy's existing citizens with their state's secondary immigration law can take the form not only of personal disobedience aimed at avoiding complicity in injustice, but also of civil disobedience aimed at publicly contesting unjust immigration restrictions.