Book of Abstracts

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

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Archer, Alfred

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 2, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
Alfred Archer is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at The Department of Philosophy and The Tilburg Center for Logic, Ethics, and Philosophy of Science at Tilburg University. His primary research is in moral philosophy, particularly supererogation (acts beyond the call of duty), the relationship between morality and self-interest and in moral psychology of saints and heroes. He also have research interests in aesthetics, political philosophy, applied ethics and philosophy of emotion. For up-to-date information about his research visit: http://alfredarcher.weebly.com/

Title: **Shame, Well-Being and Inequality**
Keywords: SHAME, POVERTY, INEQUALITY, WELL-BEING, EGALITARIANISM

Abstract
What is the connection between poverty, inequality and well-being? One way in which inequality has been claimed to have a negative influence on well-being is through the emotion of shame. Addressing poverty requires not only that we ensure people meet their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter but also providing people with sufficient resources to live dignified lives free from shame. This claim is advocated by economists such as Adam Smith (1776), philosophers such as Amartya Sen (1983; 2009) and also by think tanks and institutions tasked with alleviating poverty. For example, the UN Development Programme (1997 p.5) stresses the opportunity "to enjoy a decent standard of living, freedom, dignity, self-esteem and the respect of others."

We will provide two reasons for thinking that ensuring that people have sufficient resources in order to appear in public without shame is an important standard that a society must meet in order to protect the well-being of its citizens. First, shame is a key part of experience of poverty across different cultural contexts (Chase, E., & Bantebya-Kyomuhendo 2014; Gubrium et al 2013; Walker et al. 2013). Second, shame has a profoundly negative effect on well-being (Dickerson et al. (2004a ; 2004b ; 2009) Elison et al. (2014)).

We will then argue explore the link between inequality and shame. Status anxiety and related shame have been found to be more common in unequal countries (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Relatedly, the negative association that has been found between relative income and life satisfaction, has been shown to be stronger in more unequal countries (Cheung and Lucas 2016). Moreover, people are more likely to exaggerate their status and achievements in countries with higher inequality (Loughnan at al. 2011).

On the basis of our investigation of the empirical literature, we will argue that the shame test is an important standard that societies must meet in order to protect the well-being of its citizens. However, unlike the three theorists examined in Section One, we will argue that a sufficientarian approach to meeting this test is insufficient. Inequality raises status anxiety and so increases chances and costs of failing the shame test. For this reason, we will argue that lowering inequality has an important role to play in enabling people to pass the shame test. This conclusion has important societal implications. In order to ensure that the worst off live dignified lives, free from stigma and shame, we must act to reduce economic inequality.

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Presentation: 9th June, Session 21, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
Aribiah David Attoe csp, is a Doctoral Student of the Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg, South Africa and also holds a Master's and Bachelor's Degree in Philosophy from the University of Calabar, Nigeria. He is also an active member of the Conversational School of Philosophy (C.S.P.); Head of Research, Project 2031 Nigeria and the Copy Editor of "Filosofia Theoretica: Journal of African Philosophy, Culture and Religions'. Aribiah is an active researcher, having attended conferences and produced publications both "upcoming" and in print.

Title: **On the Possibility of a De-ethnicized Borderless Existence: Essays on a New World Order**
Keywords: De-ethnicise, Globalisation, Ukém, Propaedeutic, Complementarism

Abstract
The human condition has been flooded by consistent instances of ethno-religious conflicts, confrontations, discrimination, misguided and aggressive nationalism and other such maladies. Most recommendations aimed at tackling these problems only tend to appease or tolerate, attempting to address the problem on a superficial level, seeming to inadvertently ignore its foundational cause(s). I argue for the contrary. A common denominator to these existential disconnects is the unrelenting forgetfulness of the human person with regards to the common nature of all humanity as well as the artificial nature of those sociological constructs that help to alienate humans from each other. Tantamount to this forgetfulness is an overemphasis on the existential validity of certain anachronistic sociological themes such as culture, ethnicity, gender disparity, nationalism and other such related concepts; glorifying such themes as such integral part of humanity that one may be tempted to believe that such themes are part and parcel of the human person, even on a biological level. Thus, one's culture and ethnic background is presented as something ingrained in one's DNA; gender roles are seen as inextricable and non-negotiable; religious beliefs, heroes and gods are believed to live within the confines of the individual's body, whose pronouncements are law and as such worth dying for and some governments are wont to establish exclusivity and alienation as immigration policies, often striving - with vigorous assuredness - to place emphasis on invisible lines demarcating one group of humans from the other with the earth itself – the bone of contention – seemingly unaware of any such demarcations which the categories of our thoughts have place on it. In this work I show that there is a need to understand the foundational basis of these malignant issues and then address them. I will therefore in this paper, seek to expose the artificial nature of these categories and foundational beliefs. I will further propose an alternative understanding of human relations that is more akin to our natural conditions as humans. Therefore, I shall propose a naturalised and de-ethnicised propaedeutic that all but eliminates or at best, plays down the artificial categories of culture, gender roles, religion ethnicity and nationalism. I shall finally, also suggest a true social cosmopolitanism that seeks to establish a borderless world and the dynamics that will characterise such an existence. This essay, shall adopt the conversational method in African Philosophy as its preferred methodology.

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Presentation: 9th June, Session 23, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain

I received a Candidate of Philosophical Sciences degree in social philosophy from Lomonosov Moscow State University (2004). Since then I have been working as an assistant professor at the Faculty of Philosophy there till 2015.
Currently I am a PhD student at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, Spain). I am working on a thesis in normative political theory about public justification of religious exemptions from generally applicable laws.

Title: **RELIGIOUS REASONS; FINAL VALUES, AND THE DUTY OF CIVILITY**
Keywords: POLITICAL LIBERALISM; PUBLIC REASON; THE DUTY OF CIVILITY; RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION; RAWLS

Abstract
The duty of civility, as defined in John Rawls's Political Liberalism, requires that citizens justify their preferred laws to one another by reasons "all may reasonably be expected to endorse."
Does it mean that in religiously diverse liberal polities religious reasons should not be used in public justification of coercive laws and exemptions from them?
Some liberals argue that, given the fact of profound disagreement on matters of religion, citizens should restrain themselves from publicly supporting a legal provision if the only justification they can provide for it is derived from their religious convictions (Macedo 1997, Boettcher 2007, Talisse 2014). Others contend that this "doctrine of restraint" goes against the liberal commitment to pluralism and fails to respect the moral integrity of devout believers (Wolterstorff 1997, Eberle 2002, Weithman 2002, Gaus 2010, Vallier 2012).
To defend the "doctrine of restraint" I argue that, insofar as religious reasons are based on faith — an unconditional fidelity to God both in word and deed, — they are essentially non-negotiable, regardless of their intelligibility, "manner," language, and context (cf. Vallier 2011, 2016, Bohman and Richardson 2009, Waldron 2012, March 2013). Non-negotiability makes religious reasons inappropriate for public justification of coercive laws and exemptions from them, because justification of legal provisions by non-negotiable claims is incompatible with respect for fellow citizens as equal partners in democratic deliberation.
However, the notion of "reasons that all may reasonably be expected to endorse" does not stand in a clear opposition to non-negotiable claims in the public square. Therefore I suggest that we reconceptualize the duty of civility in the fallibilistic terms of public reason's rejectability requirement:

Citizens should justify their preferred legal provisions only by reasons that they themselves may reasonably be expected to reject.

This requirement is not merely a rule of courtesy that deals with the rhetorical framing of public argumentation. First and foremost, it implies that members of the public should refrain from addressing each other with reasons that appeal to their favored final values. The latter are incommensurable ends-in-themselves, therefore reasons that refer to them inevitably take the form of non-negotiable claims.
My conclusion is that, given the right to free speech, claims of final values, including religious ones, must not be prohibited in public discussion of concerns related to state laws and policies, but these claims should not be used as public justifications of any legal provisions.

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 7, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
I am a Research Fellow for the Oxford Research Centre in the Humanities (TORCH), and a Senior Research Fellow in Legal and Political Philosophy at the University of Kiel.

Title: **Love & Paternalism**
Keywords: Paternalism; Associative Duties; Love;

Abstract
Paternalism is often thought to be wrong. For example, many liberal philosophers hold that it is all things considered wrong to administer paternalistic medical treatment to a person who has made an informed and competent decision to refuse it, even if the treatment would confer a significant benefit to that person. In this paper, I consider the wrongness of paternalism in personal relationships. Specifically, I focus on the wrongness of paternalism towards those who are in love with you.

Imagine the following: B is in love with A. While A greatly enjoys B's company and would like to spend time with B, A does not love B, and will never love B. A repeatedly tells B this, but B continues to want to spend time with A in hope that she will change her mind. A believes that B's feelings are not good for B, and in order for B to move on with his life, A ignores all communication from B. A's behaviour intends to benefit B while being motivated by a negative judgement of B's mental abilities. Namely, A thinks that by spending time with her, B is failing to do what is best for him. It is a clear case of paternalistic behaviour. Let's call this case Love Paternalism.

A's paternalistic behaviour towards B raises at least two questions. First, we should consider whether A's behaviour is in fact wrong, or merely prima facie wrong. Second, if the behaviour is in fact wrong, is it sufficiently wrong for it to be all things considered wrong, or is A's behaviour toward B pro tanto wrong, and so possibly morally permissible, or even sometimes obligatory?

Suppose we hold that A's behaviour is all things considered wrong in virtue of the fact it is paternalistic. This would be consistent with the commonly held liberal view that we ought not to behave paternalistically towards fully informed, competent adults, regardless of the benefits we can confer by doing so. However, there are implications for holding that A's behaviour is all things considered wrong in Love Paternalism. One is the extent of the harm to B if A does not behave paternalistically towards him. It is plausible to think that B will be miserable for a lengthy period of time if he remains in contact with A. This misery might affect B's employment, and his friendships. Moreover, B may be unable to have relationships with others because of his feelings for A. By behaving paternalistically, A can make B's life go significantly better in the long run.

Perhaps we could claim that if A were to behave paternalistically towards B, it would only be pro tanto wrong. Given the sizable benefits to the paternalizee, the reason not to behave paternalistically would be defeated by the reasons to be concerned with the wellbeing of B. However, this response we would requires us to explain why paternalism is permissible in these cases, but all things considered wrong in other cases such as paternalistic medical treatment towards competent fully informed adults.

The paper then considers a number of possible solutions. I propose that A has associative duties towards B, because the latter is in love with the former. In the cases of A, the paternalistic behaviour could be permissible because the duty to those who love them excludes the reason not to behave paternalistically. This would be compatible with holding that paternalism is all things considered wrong in cases such as paternalistic medical treatment. Nonetheless, I will show that this solution also has problems.

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Short Bio

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Giulia Bistagnino is Research Fellow at the University of Milan. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Studies from the University of Milan and a M.Litt. in Philosophy from the University of St. Andrews. Her main research interests concern the problem of disagreement, the justification of moral and political principles, political legitimacy, and the relation between experts and democracy.

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Enrico Biale is Research Fellow at the University of Piemonte Orientale. His main research interests are in the normative theory of democracy. Among his most recent publications: 'A Multidimensional Account of Democratic Legitimacy: How to Make Robust Decisions in a Non-Idealized Deliberative Context' (with F. Liveriero), CRISPP (forthcoming).

Title: **Citizens, parties, and experts: a complicated relationship**
Keywords: experts; political parties; epistemic function; deliberation; democracy.

Abstract

Normative theory of democracy has traditionally been wary of parties because of their tendency to polarise political debates and create ideological divisions instead of striving for the common good. This antipartisan perspective has been reinforced by the deliberative ideal according to which partisanship undermines the epistemic property of a deliberative process by making citizens insensitive to facts and not allowing a proper assessment of political proposals (Muirhead 2006; Rosenblum 2010). In the past few years, this antipartisan approach has been challenged by claiming that parties are crucial actors in the making of a rich and reliable public sphere by playing important epistemic functions (White and Ypi 2010 and 2011, Ebeling 2016). Though it is often argued that deliberation enhances the epistemic quality of democratic procedures (Estlund 2008; Landemore 2012), this is not necessarily the case. Citizens may be exposed to an overwhelming flux of information and the arguments circulating in the public sphere may be unintelligible to them, especially when they relate to technical matters that involve fair amounts of expertise and specialization. Parties play an essential role in selecting the relevant information and making it accessible to the general public (White and Ypi, 2010) by integrating expert knowledge into their policy agendas (Bonotti 2011; Ebeling 2016) and by connecting principles, policies, and facts to the concrete interests and values of citizens (Bonotti 2011; White and Ypi 2010). Though the epistemic functions of political parties are undeniable, the relation between experts, parties and citizens has been under-theorised. To support this view, we focus our analysis on one of the most influential accounts of the relation between experts and citizens, namely Thomas Christiano's view (2012), and argue that this perspective does not grant that citizens can exercise any control on experts' judgments. To achieve this aim, since citizens lack the technical competence to directly deliberate with experts (Goldman 2001) but need to evaluate the proposals and values of political parties, a deliberation between experts and parties' members need to be organized. This would ensure not only the right balance between the technical opinion of experts and the normative perspective of parties, but also to challenge experts' judgments, to disagree, and to require explanation with regards to the interpretation of the evidence supporting a policy proposal. We thus provide some criteria (correctness, accessibility, acceptability, political feasibility) for deliberation between experts and parties apt to grant a reasoned exchange between members of the parties and

experts. Such deliberation requires that both the opinions of experts and members of the parties can be challenged and revised so as to produce a set of policy proposals that are both politically viable and epistemically sound. Our model, by ensuring a balanced relation between citizens, parties and experts, grants that parties provide their epistemic functions and citizens can exercise control on the values and proposals that a polity needs to pursue.

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Short Bio

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Short Bio:
Eric Brandstedt is a postdoctoral researcher in philosophy at London School of Economics working on normative methodology, with a particular focus on how to understand the guidance function of theories of climate justice in relation to climate politics. Additional research interests include intergenerational justice and human rights.

Title: **Rawlsian Constructivism: A Practical Guide to Reflective Equilibrium**
Keywords: Reflective equilibrium; Rawlsian constructivism; problem formulation; methodology; climate justice.

Abstract

This paper is a contribution to discussions of the justification of normative theories in the field of practical ethics, where the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) is routinely used. On closer inspection, RE is a blunt tool: it is simply a call for a coherentist recalibration of some set of judgments. But there are arguably other desiderata than coherence that must be met for a normative theory to be justified. Most importantly, normative theories should play a practical role by guiding action and contributing to conflict resolution in hard cases, where agents are locked in disagreement. If this is a reasonable expectation, then RE is inadequate as a guiding principle in formulating a normative theory. In this paper, we argue first that Rawls meant the method of RE to be supported by an auxiliary methodology, which unfortunately has been lost in the reception. Secondly, and more importantly, we develop this methodology, which we refer to as Rawlsian constructivism, as a general view by extracting it from Rawls's particular application and giving it a clearer statement.

The main idea of Rawlsian constructivism is that justifying a normative theory is tantamount to renegotiating a conception of the person that has met or will meet with opposition. The aim of the justificatory process is practical: to act or coordinate action successfully. To this end, RE must be supplemented with a problem formulation, in which a subset of all possible normative judgments are encircled as those in need of justification. The process is not open-ended, but rather tailored to particular subjects, who share points of agreement as well as of disagreement, such as to free and equal persons who need to submit to the authoritative rules needed for a cooperative society, as was the problem Rawls addressed. The next step is to move beyond the inherent tension thus described. That is, to justify action guiding normative principles for the antagonistic person thus specified, such that were real agents to identify with it, they could use these principles to resolve the inherent conflict. In the standard procedure of RE, this is carried out by the theorist proposing precisifications and organising principles, as well as by the very process of mutually revising principles and judgments. Rawlsian constructivism adds to this by qualifying the use of thought experiments or models: these are heuristic tools to be used to establish a link between the conception of the person expressed in the problem formulation and proposals of how the problem should be resolved.

We argue that Rawlsian constructivism is a general methodological view, which provides essential support to the method of RE, especially important in hard cases. We demonstrate these virtues by applying it to the case of justifying climate justice.

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Short Bio
University of Iceland

PhD Cornell University 2007. Current projects: "The Reality of Money" and "Feminist Philosophy Transforming Philosophy", both sponsored by the Icelandic Research Fund.

Title: **Serpents and Paupers: Musings on the Harms of Inequality**
Keywords: inequality, money, power, meritocracy, justice

Abstract
With growing inequality in the world in recent years, it is apt to consider what it is about financial inequality that troubles us. One strong reason to find fault with inequality is its close-knit causal relationship with poverty. The focus of this talk, however, will be on other harms of inequality although poverty will still be relevant. I argue that the power imbalance resulting from inequality can cause immeasurable harm. I also argue that our current means of justifying inequality, the myth of meritocracy, rests on a harmful ideology and results in false ideas that go against egalitarianism about human worth.

A powerful description of this kind of power imbalance can be found in Torgny Lindgren's novel The Way of a Serpent. The story takes place in Sweden in the 19th century and is about a family of leaseholders owing money to the wealthy village merchant. As the years go by, they never manage to pay off their debt which only seems to grow. However, the merchant visits regularly to collect payments in sexual favors from the women in the family. Because of the debt, the family is in his power and sees no way out.

We have come to accept that some get paid more than others, as they work harder, have more qualifications, etc. From this we have derived the idea that we should live in a meritocracy: Those who succeed should do so because they deserve it and have worked hard for it. And furthermore, we are constantly told that we do in fact live in a meritocracy. Those who subscribe to egalitarianism, however, demand that people start out on the same playing field. In order to be able to compete fairly, they need equal opportunities. This gets emphasized regarding equality concerning non-financial issues. If so, it ought to hold in the competition for monetary rewards as well. However, it seems quite clear that when it comes to financial equality, we are very far from inhabiting a world of equal opportunities or a level playing field. Some people start out with an enormous inheritance while others start out as children of debt slaves, and the list goes on.

On the basis of this I make two claims: 1) That we have an inherently unjust financial system posing as just. 2) That the myth of meritocracy causes harm by creating the false idea that those who are successful are so due to their own merit and hard work and those who are unsuccessful are good-for-nothing and lazy. This is for various reasons harmful to both parties.

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 9, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
University of Luxembourg

Deven Burks was born in the United States and completed his B.A. in Philosophy at Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island. Following a dual M.A. in Philosophy from the Université du Luxembourg and Université de Lorraine, he spent two years teaching at the latter before deciding in 2016 to pursue a PhD in philosophy at the Université du Luxembourg with Prof. Dr. Lukas K. Sosoe. His ongoing doctoral research bears on conceptions of public discourse, political justification and identity in the work of John Rawls and Jeffrey Stout, as well as in broader Anglo-American political theory.

Title: **Does self-knowledge advance political justification? The case of public philosophy and Stout's "unconstrained discourse"**
Keywords: political justification; reason-giving; self-knowledge; public philosophy; discourse

Abstract
Can self-knowledge of personal attitudes and belief-formation figure as a requirement on those engaging in political justification? Would this not be asking too much of participants both at the personal and associational level and at the institutional and governmental level? Yet such a requirement seems to follow on Jeffrey Stout's pragmatist-expressivist account of political discourse and justification as reason-giving or "unconstrained discourse" (Stout, 2004). This self-knowledge requirement comes out in his emphasis on an individual justificatory standpoint, from which the person articulates reasons and beliefs and engages in (self-)storytelling and narration in order to express openly to the audience that person's motivations and justification for a given political position (Stout, 2010).

If his political epistemology so requires self-knowledge and "public" philosophy serves to guide political justification, the question remains by what means or resources "public" philosophy may advance the kind of self-knowledge required on the behalf of participants. To that end, Leiter (2016) may provide useful contrast as a critique of the notion of "discursive hygiene" in justification (as opposed to "rhetoric") by elaborating the challenges posed to this notion by the obscurity of belief-formation, emotivism and tribalism. If Stout is seen to advance a view of public philosophy and political justification akin to "discursive hygiene", Leiter's critique poses a serious challenge to the former's political epistemology and pragmatist-expressivist account of political justification. In short, "unconstrained discourse" would provide no meaningful standards for such justification or its participants.

Our first question then is to know whether Stout can overcome both the prima facie obstacles which this epistemological requirement sets participants and Leiter's naturalistic challenge to "public" philosophy and political justification. Provisionally, we may respond that Stout takes important steps to circumscribe the role of "public" philosophy and political justification within other publicly available modes of acculturation and moral inculcation. Our second question lies in whether Stout and Leiter then concur on the need for "rhetoric" as an argumentative standard political justification. In the end, we will conclude that Leiter's "rhetoric" and Stout's "unconstrained discourse" are closer than they might at first appear.

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Short Bio
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I am currently a PhD student in philosophy. My research concerns whether conservatism has the support of philosophical arguments and intersects political theory, meta-ethics and epistemology.

Title: **Is Conservatism Vacuous?**
Keywords: Conservatism, Tradition, Civic Peace, Content-Independence, Vacuity.

Abstract
Is Conservatism Vacuous? In this paper, I respond to what I call 'the vacuity objection' against conservatism. This objection states, roughly, that there are no features which individuate conservatism and that the term 'conservatism' is therefore empty. I demonstrate that conservatism is individuated by two features: (1) the claim that civil peace is the highest social good and (2) the claim that traditions have a considerable degree of content-independent default credibility. I call (1) the 'civil peace claim' and (2) the 'tradition claim'. I do not seek to argue for conservatism. Therefore, I offer no argument for the civil peace claim or the tradition claim. Instead, I seek only to show that the vacuity objection fails. First, I explain the objection. The vacuity objection states that while conservatism has content, it has no individuating features, because conservatism's commitments are shared by at least some other political philosophies. One might be tempted by this view if one accepts Honderich's claim that conservatives are motivated by the desire to preserve arrangements which further their own interests. For then it looks as if the conservative will endorse whatever claims they need to endorse to promote their interests. Since conservatism is ad hoc, there is no stable core of essentially conservative commitments. Second, I offer my argument for conservatism's non-vacuity. I argue that conservatives understand civil peace's being the highest social good to consist in it taking priority over other social goods. It is the endorsement of the claim that civil peace has priority over other goods, rather than endorsement of the claim that civil peace is valuable, which individuates conservatism. As far as I know, the adherents of other political philosophies do not make this claim. One might object that conservatives do not believe civil peace to be the highest social good. Instead, they believe that civil peace and freedom, specifically freedom from coercion, are jointly the highest social goods. (This claim has been attributed to Burke and Oakeshott). I reply that we should not accept that claim, because it is conceptually incoherent. There can only be one highest social good, and even if two goods can jointly be highest, civil peace and freedom cannot, for they will frequently conflict. Finally, I argue that the tradition claim individuates conservatism. One might object that conservatives are committed to the claim that traditions are reason-giving, but do not accept that they are reason-giving independently of their content. We can conceive of traditions, e.g. socialist traditions, which the conservative would reject. I reply that conservatives can and must accept socialist traditions, given their stated opposition to assessing existing institutions by appeal to predefined values. This reply raises the worry that conservatism is not then individuated, for it might not be distinguishable from socialism. I argue that socialists accept traditions only if they conform with socialist values. Conservatives, on other hand, accept the traditions because they are traditions not because of their socialist content. So, the vacuity objection fails. Keywords: Conservatism, Tradition, Civic Peace, Content-Independence, Vacuity.

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Short Bio
Susanne Burri is an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Her research interests include the ethics of war, philosophy of death, and decision-making under uncertainty.

Title: **The Option Value of Life**
Keywords: Badness of death, uncertainty, option value, investment theory

Abstract
Imagine that the Grim Reaper pays you a visit. He presents you with the following choice: either you can let him end your life here and now, or you can choose to remain alive for a further five years. If you choose to remain alive, the Grim Reaper will make sure that even though your life goes on, its overall value remains fixed at its current level. You are thus presented with a choice between a shorter and a longer life that are of equivalent value. Which life would you choose?

For most people, the choice is a no-brainer: they decidedly prefer the longer life. Frances Kamm claims that this attitude is justified. Other philosophers are more sceptical. They argue that a person's death isn't bad for her unless it makes that person's life less valuable than it would otherwise have been.

I defend an intermediate position. I argue that the commonsensical preference for the longer life is rational under realistic conditions, but that it ceases to be rational under the stylized conditions of the Grim Reaper case. More precisely, I argue that a preference for the longer life is rational as long as there is some uncertainty with respect to what the longer life will look like. The position I defend builds on Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck's theory of investment under uncertainty. Dixit and Pindyck argue that to price an investment, we need to balance the investment's net present value with the option value lost by investing. I show that when we apply these insights to our thinking about death, it emerges that there is an option value to life. This option value can render continuing to live the right choice even when the expected value of continuing to live is zero or negative. Importantly, the option value of life disappears in a Grim Reaper case where you know with certainty the value of the life that lies ahead of you. In other words, the option value of life is intimately tied to a "within life" perspective from which the future looks undetermined. The option value of life thus forms no part of life's intrinsic value, but is derivative of the fact that we do not have direct epistemic access to the future.

Despite its derivative nature, the option value of life has important moral implications. Suppose that a doctor asks the family of an unconscious patient whether life-sustaining measures should be introduced. The doctor estimates that the expected value of the patient's remaining life is zero, or maybe slightly negative. The family might feel that voting against life-sustaining measures would be in the best interest of the patient, and that they would be acting selfishly if they decided to keep their family member around. However, once option value is introduced into the picture, it becomes apparent that keeping the patient alive might be in the best interest of the patient as well.

Çankaya Eksen, Gaye
Country: Turkey
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Affiliation: Turkey
Presentation: 9th June, Session 22, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Born in Isparta / Turkey in 1977.

PhD degree in philosophy (2013), University of Sorbonne-Paris I and Galatasaray University in a joint PhD program (doctorat en co-tutelle); PhD thesis entitled “Articulation of Ethics and Politics in Spinoza and Sartre” (“L’articulation de l’éthique et de la politique chez Spinoza et Sartre”).

Faculty member of the Department of Philosophy (Lecturer) in Galatasaray University/Istanbul since 2013.

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Title: **ACTIVE PEACE AND THE STRENGTH OF CHARACTER: A NON-CONTRACTARIAN APPROACH TO SPINOZA**
Keywords: SPINOZA; PEACE; STRENGTH OF CHARACTER; TENACITY; GENEROSITY

Abstract
When it comes to the question of the permanence of commonwealth and peace in a political society, Spinoza’s theory is often interpreted as a specific type of contractarianism as he seems to inherit the terminology (i.e. state of nature, civil state, contract etc.) that is regarded to be the main marks of classical Hobbesian political theory. Even though many commentators underline the common terminology that Spinoza shares with a classical account of contractarianism, this conceptual affiliation does not offer a satisfactory legitimate basis for reconciliation between these two political theories. This is why Alexandre Matheron, in his influential commentary, interprets the evolution of Spinoza’s political terminology from Theological-political Treatise to Political Treatise as a fundamental rupture from classical contractarian way of philosophizing. My presentation will be an attempt to support Matheron’s reading, by bringing under focus the Spinozian understanding of “peace” as “a virtue that springs from strength of character” rather than as “a mere absence of war.” My main task will be to analyze the nature of the “strength of character” as a source of virtue and elucidate how its two modalities (i.e tenacity and generosity) emerge in the heart of the Spinozian theory on the enchainment of affects. I will argue that, approaching Spinoza’s conception of peace from this kind of an ethico-political perspective permits us to show the authenticity of his political theory, which is based, not on an irreversible submission to a rational sovereign, but on the affirmation of the unique and irreducible contribution of each individual to the maintenance of a peaceful community. In this context, in opposition to Hobbes’ passive understanding of peace as “the absence of war”, I will bring to the fore Spinoza’s active understanding of peace, which is strictly tied to a continual regulation of inter-individual conflicts in political society.

Cohen, Josh
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Affiliation: United Kingdom
Presentation: 8th June, Session 8, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
University of Cambridge.
Josh Cohen is an MPhil Philosophy student at the University of Cambridge. He is interested in the metaphysics and epistemology of modality, and feminist philosophy.

Title: **Gender Identity and Feminism**
Keywords: feminism, transgender, gender identity, gender

Abstract
Many people have non-binary or trans gender-identities. Many feminists (e.g. T. Bettcher and B. R. George) hold that we should have a principle of first person authority (FPA) about gender, i.e. we should (at least) now disavow people's gender self-categorizations. Such feminists argue that these practices are already prevalent in trans-friendly subcultures. They additionally argue that adhering to FPA about gender is morally superior to adhering to mainstream gender practices, which demarcate gender on the basis of genitalia or chromosomes. However, there is a longstanding tradition in feminism resistant to FPA about gender, which may be characterised as "radical feminism" (for example, feminists such as Janice Raymond, Sheila Jeffreys, and Rebecca Reilly-Cooper). Such feminists hold that the best way to understand, and to fight, the patriarchy involves recognising the importance of biological sex to female oppression. They do so because they view gendered socialisation to be allocated on the basis of visible sexual characteristics, and they argue that the oppressive division of labour within the nuclear family plausibly stems from female sexual biology. They advocate defining gender-categories on the basis of biological sex, and thus rule out the possibility of respecting non-binary and trans self-identifications.

Building on a taxonomy created by B. R. George, we are able to demystify the concept of gender. The taxonomy has three core nodes: sexed-biology, gender-practice, and gender-category. It additionally has three gender-identities: sex-identity, practice-identity, and category-identity. There are families of associations (norms, rules or definitions) connecting the nodes and identities. With the fine-grain approach allowed by the taxonomy, we are able to clearly differentiate alternative conceptions of gender, and model various feminist approaches. It becomes easier to see how conceptualisations of gender which allow for FPA often do not allow for understanding female subjugation as being rooted in reproductive biology, as per radical feminism. I put forward a novel conceptual scheme, radical FPA feminism, in order to bridge the divide between FPA feminist and radical feminist approaches to gender. Radical FPA feminism understands gender-categories as being historically, rather than normatively, related to aspects of biology and gender-practice. Additionally, radical FPA feminism retains the conceptual possibility of grouping people together on the basis of biology or gender-practice, thus allowing for radical feminist theory and praxis. I discuss potential behavioural groupings, such as “femme” and “masc”, and potential biological groupings, such as “biologically female”, “womb-havers” and “assigned female at birth”. If we are to accept both trans self-identifications and central radical feminist claims, then radical FPA feminism is a useful way of conceptualising gender.

Colen, Jose
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Affiliation: Portugal
Presentation: 9th June, Session 18, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
CEH da Universidade do Minho
Cambridge University

Title: **UNICORNS, NATURAL RIGHTS, AND NON-HUMAN PERSONS**
Keywords: HUMAN RIGHTS; NON-HUMAN PERSONS; PERSONHOOD; AQUINAS; MACINTYRE

Abstract
How can we support the idea of animal rights, if we not even believe in human rights? Indeed, MacIntyre famously asserted that “there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with belief in witches and in unicorns.” Per him all attempts by 18th century philosophers at justifying the existence of human rights as “self-evident truths” eventually failed. He argues that there are no such things as self-evident truths and all appeals to intuition are but a flaw in reasoning.
The failure of the Enlightenment project resulted in disparaged moral stances disputing the findings of the rival justifications of morality. Rival moral traditions explain the “intractable moral disagreements” that occur in society. He acknowledges that although the inability to demonstrate a theory does not imply its falsity—as Dworkin e.g. noted—but the same argument can be applied in relation to witches and unicorns. This is the more paradoxical because MacIntyre, as a Thomist, believes in equally indemonstrable first principles of practical reason and if not in witches, in the concept of natural law, a true “unicorn.” Natural law is indeed, seemingly, per the classics whose ancestry he claims (e.g. Plato and Aristotle) almost a contradiction in terms, in that combines “natural” and (usually) man made “law.”
The question of what a right is or a person is can be answered in legal terms rather than philosophical terms: A Roman slave or a baby (or fetus) is not or was not a person with rights in some historical moments but, on the contrary, “something” that was born, bought “its” freedom or died in servitude. If in legal terms the answers seem clear though arbitrary—social fiat dominates—the most common philosophical justification is that being a person is inextricably linked to certain “mental” or “moral” properties that the slave lacked only legally, but fools and babies lack de facto.
The concept of “person” was not introduced in philosophy without a cost: The Greek word designated both the mask used by actors in the tragic theater and when the word was translated into Latin, Christian theologians had to clarify that they meant an “an individual substance of a rational nature.” “Person” designated not only an outward manifestation, but an individual being. Similarly, today, those who think that dolphins or pigs have intelligence justifiably call them “non-human persons.” Unlike the legal definition, the philosophical concept pertains to the individual whose nature is rational from cradle (and even before birth) to grave: idiots and infants alike. The issue became cloudier when we ceased to think in terms of “nature.” The notion of rights seems closely tied with the notion of person as its subject.
This paper will try to explore MacIntyre presentation of Aquinas precepts of natural law and his debate with other interpretations in what concerns the relation between moral rights or “principles” and the concept of personhood as the subject of rights and its relation to the rights of non-human persons.

Cormier , Andrée-Anne
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Affiliation: Spain
Presentation: 8th June, Session 4, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
Andrée-Anne Cormier is a postdoctoral fellow in the Law Department at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, working as a member of the Family Justice research project, funded by the European Research Council Consolidator Grants programme. She works primarily on issues of legitimacy and justice in upbringing.

Title: **The ethics of parenting and children's consent**
Keywords: Children; Retrospective Consent; Parental Duties; Parent-Child Relationship; Matthew Clayton

Abstract
Obtaining and respecting another individual's consent is of great moral importance in a range of interpersonal contexts. Consent has the potential to transform an otherwise impermissible act into a morally permissible one. It has 'moral magic', as some consent theorists put it (Hurd 1996, Alexander 1996). Some individuals, however, lack the cognitive and emotional competences required to give meaningful consent. Most young children seem to fall into this category. In this case, we normally think that it is their parents who should decide – and consent to – how children are treated, on their behalf. This leaves open the question of whether, and how, parents' decisions should themselves be constrained by considerations about children's future consent. A number of philosophers have suggested that future consent is indeed morally relevant at least in some circumstances in which an individual's present consent cannot be obtained (Gerald Dworkin 1972, Carter 1977, Chwang 2009). More recently, moreover, Matthew Clayton (2006, 2012, forthcoming) has defended a principle of retrospective consent specifically in the context of parenting. Essentially, Clayton's principle states that parents ought to treat their children in ways that they can reasonably expect them to retrospectively consent to, once they become capable of giving meaningful consent. While this is an intuitively appealing idea to many people, including to many parents, to date the principle has not been the object of systematic philosophical examination. In this presentation, I am going to consider the two most plausible ways of formulating the principle of retrospective consent in parenting and argue that they both have problematic implications. I will argue, on the one hand, that if the principle is understood in terms of expectations about the likelihood of children's actual future consent, it potentially permits indoctrination. If, on the other hand, the principle is understood in terms of expectations based on some notion of idealized counterfactual consent, it does not (in most cases) appropriately track the particular interests of actual children/future adults. I conclude that the principle of retrospective consent in parenting should be rejected. I shall also argue, however, that children are capable of giving meaningful consent to how they are treated much earlier than it is typically assumed in the literature. This is true at least in some spheres of activity. This implies, in my view, that parents not only have a moral obligation to develop and promote children's ability to validly consent to how they are treated, but also a prima facie obligation to seek and respect their children's consent in a range of cases. I will suggest that this has important implications for the moral permissibility of practices, such as involving a reluctant child into religious, sport, and artistic activities 'for the child's own good'

Cox, Damian
Country: Australia
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Affiliation: Australia
Presentation: 8th June, Session 13, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Bond University, Gold Coast, Australia

Damian Cox teaches ethics, political philosophy and philosophy and film. He is co-author of Integrity and the Fragile Self (2003); Politics Most Unusual (2009); Thinking Through Film (2012).

Title: **The Moral Responsibility of International Actors**

Keywords: Moral Responsibility; Consequentialism; Accountability; Answerability; International Relations

Abstract
If moral discourse has a serious role to play in discussions of international affairs – beyond the biographical assessment of leaders and individual players – this is because institutions and groups operate as genuine agents. But do they? International affairs involve the actions of both state and non-state actors. Some of these actions appear to be legitimate objects of moral judgement. But what assumptions underlie this judgement? Typically, actors in international relations contexts are not individuals, with individual consciences, but bodies of diverse and distributed decision makers. Under what conditions, then, does it make sense to attribute moral responsibility to them?

In this paper I set up an account of these conditions. The key idea is that moral responsibility is tied directly to satisfactory attributions of agency. A body can only be held morally responsible for its actions if it has acted as an agent. And a body can be said to have acted as an agent only if it has acted for reasons. It is a simple idea in outline, but things quickly get complicated.

There is more to the attribution of moral responsibility than attribution of agency. To hold somebody morally responsible for their actions is to invite either praise or blame, commendation or condemnation, approbation or disapprobation. This is the expressive or reactive core of attributions of moral responsibility, but there is more to it than this. What else is required for successful attribution of moral responsibility? Four main approaches have been taken in the philosophical literature on moral responsibility. I label them: consequentialist accounts; attribution accounts; accountability accounts; and answerability accounts.

After briefly outlining these accounts, I turn to the question of how they fare when applied to the actions of coordinated groups: a government, a terrorist organisation, an army, and so on. Agency requires responsiveness to reasons. These may be shared reason-responses (desires, beliefs, plans, and other attitudes shared by individual members of the group) or a systematic reason-responses that emerge from interactions between parts of the group. In the latter case, one part of the organisation may set objectives (desires), another develop plans (intentions), another implement them, another review and assess them, another coordinate the other parts, and so on. It might be that no individual element of the whole is fully morally responsible for the actions of the group (though they are likely responsible for the part they play within the group), whereas the group itself is morally responsible for what it has done.

How do philosophical accounts of moral responsible apply to this kind of agency? I argue that answerability accounts of moral responsibility fail to satisfactorily capture the sense in which groups exhibiting distributed agency may be held moral responsible whereas alternative accounts do.

Cranmer-Byng, Sheila

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Affiliation: Canada
Presentation: 8th June, Session 6, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
Sheila Cranmer-Byng is a PhD Candidate in the School of Social Work, a social justice-oriented program, at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. Sheila has worked in the area of homelessness, poverty, social housing, mental health, employment, and freedom of expression for over 20 years before returning to academia to pursue her PhD. Sheila's research focuses on anti-poverty activism using a feminist ethics of care lens.

Title: **Bridging the theoretical divide: Anti-poverty activism and the ethics of care**
Keywords: Ethics of care; poverty; activism, social justice; feminism

Abstract
Poverty remains a pressing problem, both globally and locally, as inequality widens leaving the hope of a universal justice-for-all significantly diminished. Within this context, anti-poverty activism and politics of the Left signals hope for the future. Yet, despite the recent emergence of social movements and collective action, such as Occupy, Idle No More, and Black Lives Matter, a gap or impasse exists at the conceptual and theoretical level. The challenge manifests in the bifurcation of theories of redistribution (political economy) and theories of recognition and representation (radical democracy), making it difficult to find a common grammar and the conceptual means for mounting a strong and effective offensive (Butler & Athanasiou, 2013; Chari, 2015; Fraser, 2008). Nancy Fraser (2008) argues that current justice debates can be best characterized by abnormal justice, which entails a lack of shared understanding about the grammar of justice, the form of agency or redress, what constitutes justice, who is entitled to considerations of justice, and the appropriate process or conceptual space—economic or cultural—for discussing and settling justice claims. As a result, there is a lack of consensus on how to move forward. In this paper I use feminist ethics of care theory to critique the bifurcated theories of redistribution and recognition/representation and argue that a feminist ethics of care lens helps to bridge the theoretical divide and works toward an integrated, complementary conceptualization of the current bifurcated theories, thereby creating the potential for a more transformative approach to social justice.
In section one, I discuss the two dominant, bifurcated theories associated with politics of the left: theories of redistribution (political economy), and theories of recognition and representation. I sketch out, in broad terms, the boundaries and key features of each theoretical approach, offering a generalized or idealized view of each theory rather than a nuanced account of the differences. I discuss the strengths and limitations of each approach as well as the challenges associated with the theoretical divide.
In section two, I outline the key elements of ethics of care and how these concepts are useful for creating a theory that moves beyond the current theoretical divide. I explore the key ontological and epistemological assumptions associated with ethics of care and contrast these to Kantian universalistic justice. The radical potential of ethics of care lies in the ontology of interdependence rather than an autonomous independent being. In viewing humans as essentially dependent upon one another, and the world around us, ethics of care sheds light on the important relations of care that remain hidden or sidelined to the private sphere. Politicizing care and contextualizing care and caring relations provides a useful lens for both analyzing current social policies and practices and for exploring alternative ways of arriving at a more just world.
In the final section I reflect, briefly, on where ethics of care is best located within normative philosophy and the implications of this.

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Fraser, N. (2008). Abnormal justice, Critical Inquiry, 34(3), 393-422.

D'Aleo, Paolo (& De Iuliis , Carla)
Country: Italy
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Affiliation: Italy
Presentation: 9th June, Session 14, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
University of Teramo (ITALY)

My name is Carla De Iuliis graduated in Law at the University of Bologna. I'm a public official since 1996 and, at the moment, I'm attending a Ph.D. (GIASDI) at the University of Teramo about European Funds and European Cohesion Policy.

My name is Paolo D'Aleo, graduated in Political Science at the University of Rome "La Sapienza". I'm a Ph.D student (GIASDI) in "Political Philosophy" at University of Teramo, Faculty of Political Science, History and Criticism of Politics Department. My scientific interests are currently focused on relation between pluralism, multiculturalism and intercultural philosophy, about perspective of the commons and best practices.

Title: **The challenges of multiculturalism in the European framework**
Keywords: multiculturalism; pluralism; liberals and communitarians; intercultural philosophy; Europe 2020.

Abstract
The multicultural nature of our society stimulates theoretical reflections that goes on the implementation of public policies.
Multiculturalism points out a society in which conflicts linked to the identity claims of a community and a subjectivity that go together with the traditional conflicts of distribution of wealth.
A fundamental aspect of the politic of multiculturalism is the development of pluralism with a special attention to the inequalities between majorities and minorities.
Only in the 80 we start to find Multiculturalism in the lexicon of the political policies of the EU as a principle of tolerance. This represents the peculiar aspect of every speech about multiculturalism.
At the centre of the philosophical debate on multiculturalism we find the dispute on the opportunity to recognize common rights to the cultural minorities.
This contraposition, inside the liberal paradigm, constitutes the core of the two main philosophies, the two views on society, one proposed by the liberals, the other from communitarians.
The classic liberals sustain the importance of individual rights and the ethic neutrality as tools to guarantee equal rights and dignity; vice versa, the communitarians sustain the insufficiency of individual rights and the renewed importance of the collective rights.
However, we find ourselves in front of two kinds of problems that makes prevail logics of inclusion/exclusion: from one side, a vision that tends to ignore the cultural differences recalling an acritical universalism; from the other side the risk of the particularism that translates into an impossible dialogue between different cultures.
From our analysis emerges a conviction of a basic need of an intercultural approach.
The intercultural philosophy presents itself as a project of interlocution based on the idea that cultures, in the public sphere, open one another and promote a common transformation without losing their differences.
On the juridical side the EU, since the Treaty of Lisbon (13th December 2007) first, and then with various dispositions contained in the Treaties, gave an enormous relevance to the multicultural dialogue and the protection of the cultural European pluralism.
Among the priorities of the Union, since the very beginning, emerges the commitment to respect "the richness of its cultural and linguistic diversity and (to vigil on) the safeguard of the European cultural patrimony " (art. 3rd of the Treaty on the EU). Since 2007 the European agenda for culture constitute the general strategic frame of the EU action in the cultural sector, with a focus on the promotion of three strategic targets: the cultural diversity and the intercultural dialogue; culture seen as a catalyst of creativity and culture as a prominent component of international relationships. Even the worktable for culture between 2015/2018 makes the agenda more relevant, defining the related priorities that translates in twenty concrete actions. The substance of the intercultural dialogue represents a constant theme of the EU since the Treaty of Lisbon. Even in the actual Program European Programming 2020 too, a lot of Action Programs will be devoted to the intercultural dialogue between Member States and Third Countries.

De Iuliis , Carla (& D'Aleo, Paolo)
Country: Italy
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 14, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
University of Teramo (ITALY)

My name is Carla De Iuliis graduated in Law at the University of Bologna. I'm a public official since 1996 and, at the moment, I'm attending a Ph.D. (GIASDI) at the University of Teramo about European Funds and European Cohesion Policy.

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Eggert, Linda
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Affiliation: United Kingdom
Presentation: 9th June, Session 21, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
University of Oxford
Department of Politics and International Relations

Linda is a first-year doctoral student in ethics and political philosophy at the University of Oxford. Her doctoral thesis concerns the ethics of killing in wars of humanitarian intervention and consequent post-bellum duties of rectification.

Title: **The Moral Costs of 'Costless' Warfare: Distributing Harms and Risks in Armed Humanitarian Intervention**
Keywords: just war theory, humanitarian intervention, cosmopolitanism, supererogation, harm

Abstract
In recent decades, over a thousand civilians have died as a direct result of military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Libya. The interveners, however, did not suffer a single casualty in these operations. This paper asks whether it is permissible for an intervening party to shift harms and risks to intended beneficiaries of an armed humanitarian intervention in order to ensure the security of intervening combatants and neutral bystanders.

I consider two arguments in favour of shifting harms. The first claims that the intended beneficiaries of the intervention are not as morally immune to collateral harm as bystanders, and have no claim against suffering concomitant harms of their rescue so long as they would still derive a net benefit from the intervention. I suggest that there are at least three reasons for rejecting this argument: it (1) conflates benefit and group membership, (2) inadequately equates individuals with collectives, thereby disregarding individual rights, and (3) is inconsistent with the common intuition that just combatants should exercise more restraint when confronted with non-responsible or innocent threats: If just combatants should accept more risks onto themselves to protect, for instance, child soldiers fighting for the unjust side, they should also accept risks to protect victims of atrocity crimes whose rescue justified the intervention in the first place.

The second argument presupposes that humanitarian intervention is not morally required if it is very costly, and claims that interveners are permitted to shift harms and risks away from themselves if the intervention is supererogatory. I reject this argument as well, on the grounds that certain duties are not diminished or weakened by high costs when these can be justly redistributed, and consider the possibility that all permissible wars of humanitarian intervention are in fact morally required.

I finally suggest that what a just distribution of harms and risks looks like is contingent partly on the strength of different agents' humanitarian duties, which is sensitive to a number of variables. I tentatively propose that just interveners may only shift harms and risks to civilians of the target party if their obligation to intervene is 'derivative', such as if they are taking up the slack when other parties fail to discharge their own duty to intervene, and if they are intervening purely for humanitarian reasons and not for national self-interest. I argue that intervening parties may not transfer risks and harms when their duty to intervene is partly rectificatory, i.e. arising from a certain degree of responsibility for the injustice whose halting requires intervention, and when they also intervene in pursuit of national interests. I conclude with reflections on what this tells us about supererogation and the limits of moral duties, and about how the jus in bello principles of proportionality and necessity should be interpreted in wars whose justification is distinctly humanitarian.

Fanton, Marcos
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 1, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
I am professor of political philosophy at Federal University of Pernambuco (UFPE). I am interested in studying the emergence of norms and social cooperation/conflict.

Title: **Rawls's point of view**
Keywords: justice as fairnes; point of view; considered judgments; methodology; reflective equilibrium

Abstract
I will offer a systematic reading of justice as fairness based on the notion of 'point of view'. In the first part of the presentation, I draw attention to the fact that there are several initial assumptions in Rawlsian theory that cannot be fully elucidated through the ideas of original position, political constructivism, or social contract. Such assumptions have already been discussed in the literature, but I want to draw attention to their political consequences, since they serve as criteria for the selection and exclusion of political ideas and values suitable for the future elaboration of adequate political conceptions. The concept of reflective judgments is a clear example and, therefore, is considered in depth. In the second part, I clarify what we should understand by point of view and determine its main elements. Every point of view of justice as fairness, as I shall argue, is defined by a set of four elements: (1) Identification of social practices and their fundamental problems; (2) Circumstances (social and political ones) and access to certain information; (3) Identification of the persons involved and their interests and/or intellectual and moral desires and capacities; (4) Mode of reflection and/or deliberation of people (or constructs). That is, each point of view represents an adequate role or perspective of practical reason for solving a particular political problem, which involves describing the circumstances and the mode of deliberation, identifying the parties involved and their interests, and the information relevant to their decisions. Finally, in the third part, I apply this proposal of interpretation to what I shall call "Rawls's point of view", which marks the beginning of justice as fairness. This point of view is interpreted as the starting point of justice as fairness: it is a historical point of view, which is developed from a certain political tradition, and it is an intuitive one, that is, it elaborates abstract ideas without priority criteria developed from the observation of existing social practices in the public political culture. The elaboration of justice as fairness has deep roots in the liberal political tradition and is not a view based exclusively on social and economic models nor on the style and method of analytic philosophy . However, by believing that its core values were present in the common sense of everyday life, as a comprehension of our time, Rawls presupposed a minimal consensus (an implicit understanding) between citizens and completely set aside specific criteria for constructing or selecting ideas about which we could disagree.

Fornaroli, Giulio
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 20, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
University College London, School of Public Policy.
I am a PhD candidate in political theory at UCL School of Public Policy, where I work on a project about the significance of disagreeement with Saladin Meckled-Garcia and Avia Pasternak. I hold a laurea (BA) and laurea magistrale (MA), both in philosophy, from the University of Pavia.

Title: **Objectivity, Normativity and Contentiousness. Why Liberals Shouldn't Be Scared by Truth**

Keywords: 'Truth-avoidance' – Political realism – Rawls – Normative objectivity - Contentiousness

Abstract
Imagine a public official who affirms first that 'abortion is morally permissible' (ϕ) and then that 'ϕ is true' (ϕ*). Whereas in other contexts the addition of the truth predicate would have added nothing to ϕ, in the political context it might plausibly raise some worries. Indeed, one could argue, a good mark of tolerance and reasonableness in politics would be that of separating one's statement from a blunt affirmation of truth.
The presentation will show that any attempt to derive positive conclusions in political theory from this apparently trivial reflection is doomed to fail. I will consider two stances in the recent literature that seem to be sensitive to the aforementioned worry, namely Rawls's 'truth-avoidance' and the downright rejection of objectivity typical of some versions of contemporary 'political realism'.
I will start with John Rawls's normative suggestion to 'refrain' from using the language of truth to qualify the principles of justice as fairness (Political Liberalism, IV.4.4). Against Rawls, I argue that a 'semantic' use of truth, as the one exhibited in the 'truth-avoidance' argument, cannot do much to increase or decrease the 'empirical contentiousness' of a claim, for which I mean the mere perception, limited to a specific social environment, that a certain claim is controversial or problematic. On the contrary, the use of truth that affects this type of contentiousness is an 'emphatic' one, typically found in some comprehensive doctrines, which proclaim the truth of their precepts in order to emphasise their salience. However, I will show that the attitude of those that are influenced by this emphatic use of truth is unreasonable, and as such, following Rawls himself, should be 'contained' or at most addresses through a modus vivendi mechanism, instead of having such a significant bearing on the elaboration itself of principles of justice.
I then move to consider the rejection of universal objectivity that characterises certain versions of contemporary 'political realism' to see whether this is a more plausible response to the starting worry. Against anti-objectivists, I introduce a distinction between two components of a normative claim, one of which, I argue, is inseparable from objectivity. I distinguish between the normative content (equivalent to the expression of the deontic modality) and the justification (the reason offered to justify the claim) of a normative claim. I then notice how normative judgements that are used, in a social context, as norms, must necessarily include an element of objectivity at least in their normative content (even if their justification is allegedly detached from objectivist considerations). In case their normative content were not taken as objective, the reason why the normative claim could generate reasons for action, motivating agents to adjust their conduct in a certain way, would remain utterly mysterious.
I conclude, therefore, that the complete separation of normativity and objectivity is impossible because it would render principles of justice incapable to demand any form of compliance, whereas the restraint from the use of truth is incapable to solve the problem of contentiousness. In political theory, we should welcome the expression of truth when connected to normative claims and we can further legitimately dismiss as unreasonable the worry this use of truth might generate.

Freter, Björn
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 7, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
Björn Freter studied Philosophy‹ and ›Modern German Literature‹ in Kiel and Berlin. 2014 he received his doctorate with his thesis »On Facticity and Existentiality. Preliminary studies for a phenomenology of normativity«. He is now working as an Independent Scholar in Berlin, Germany

Title: **An attempt to establish the genesis of the ought**
Keywords: Ought, Normativity, Care, Will, Vitality

Abstract
Philosophy mostly connects the ought with a dependence on an external will, with coercion or subjugation emanating from others. However, there is at least one form of the ought for which this is most certainly not the case. This ought, we suspect, is born of care. In this contribution, we will attempt to outline the genesis of this ought.
In order to arrive at an adequate grasp of the ought, we will first turn our attention to a description of care. Care is always initiated by an appeal. Something appeals to us – perhaps purely coincidentally. We then allow this appeal to become a matter of our concern. In accordance with this concern, we develop a volition: we want that which promotes the thriving – even to the smallest extent – of that which has appealed to us, that which concerns us, regardless of how we may establish what that entails. Eventually we take practical action. This connection is what we refer to as care.
Let us imagine that something untoward happens to a person who is of concern to us, to a friend. We do not want our friend to suffer, we do not want the situation as it is. Our concern intensifies to become a volition, or to be more precise: a volition for the sake of the one who appeals to us.
Such volitions that we take practical action to follow arise because we wish to address the concern of the one who appeals to us. We posit in this case a practical causality, a practical necessity, from which we can no longer withdraw once it has been posited.
We place our volition in the service of our friend's interests. The will at work in the realisation of our care is a will to which we obligate ourselves. This will is by no means purely a matter of reason. We are this will. In the act of volition, our vitality is stirred in elemental fashion.
We can express this volition, in turn, as an ought: our friend ought not to suffer. The situation ought to be different: it ought not to be as it is.
When we practically obligate ourselves to a will, the implementation of which is our concern, we subjugate ourselves to the demands of an ought. By allowing the appeal of our friend to become our concern, we have indeed instantiated this ought ourselves. This seems to us to be the decisive point: in caring, we have instantiated an ought, a regulative factor, which we have then wilfully followed.
Normativity is thus arrived at first and foremost because we want it: normativity is essentially nothing other than a desire that we perceive as being addressed to us and that we wish to fulfil, and indeed that we ought to fulfil: in the ought, the vigorous appropriation of our reality through our care comes to the fore.

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Presentation: 9th June, Session 22, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
I am a PhD student in philosophy at University College London. I am working on the permissibility of state enforcement, and in particular the role of feasibility considerations in its justification. I have interests in state legitimacy, coercion, political obligation, feasibility and ideal theory.
I have a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from Oxford and an MPhil Stud in Philosophy from UCL.

Title: **HOBBES: A VOLUNTARIST ABOUT THE PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE ENFORCEMENT?**
Keywords: HOBBES; LEGITIMACY; ENFORCEMENT; AUTHORISATION; SOCIAL CONTRACT

Abstract
In this paper, I take up the question of what argument, if any, Hobbes has for state legitimacy, which term I stipulatively use to mean the general, exclusive permission to enforce compliance with their directives or laws that states are standardly taken to have. The question of what I am calling legitimacy is distinct from questions about whether subjects of a state have an obligation (or reason) to obey its commands or laws and questions about whether the existence of a state is a good thing (for answers to which it is common to look to Hobbes), but it is quite natural to expect that we will find as well some argument in Hobbes for the permissibility of state enforcement. I will argue that, contrary to what one might imagine, the ground of state legitimacy for Hobbes is not to be found in the social contract or the authorisation of the state's subjects, but rather in the absence of anything that might make state enforcement impermissible.
There is what might appear to be an argument for state legitimacy based in Hobbes's notion of authorisation. Hobbes's contractors authorise the actions of the sovereign when they covenant together to create the sovereign. By authorising the acts of another, we can come to own their acts and, he says, 'he that doth anything by authority from another, doth therein no injury to him by whose authority he acteth' (18:6:90). This is the basis of what can easily be read as an argument for the permissibility of enforcement: it cannot be impermissible for a state formed by social contract to enforce its directives on its subjects because when it does so those subjects in fact enforce these directives on themselves, and what one does to oneself cannot be impermissible. However, I argue that this cannot be the basis of Hobbes's argument for legitimacy. Since for Hobbes the point of a covenant is to achieve some good for oneself, 'it cannot be intended, that he [a covenanter] gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person' (28:2:161). Rather, I argue, Hobbes does not need any special argument for legitimacy. In the state of nature, Hobbes thinks, there are no moral constraints on what it is permissible for people to do to each other. When inhabitants of the state of nature covenant together to form a commonwealth, there come to be constraints on what they may do, as a result of their being subject to a higher power. However, the sovereign makes no covenant with anyone and is subject to no higher power nor, therefore, to the sort of constraints that might make enforcement impermissible. Though this must be nuanced (the sovereign does not literally retain its right to all things from the state of nature, since no sovereign existed in the state of nature), the permissibility of enforcement for Hobbes is to be found simply in the lack of anything that might make it impermissible.

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Presentation: 9th June, Session 20, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
Post-doc lecturer at the Charles University in Prague. I studied anthropology, philosophy, religious studies and social sciences in Prague, Dresden and Bayreuth. I did my Ph.D. (in 2014) on Saint Paul and contemporary philosophy. I published one book and few articles on political theology, Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt's political thought. I am currently working on book about privacy.

Title: **How to defend privacy?**

Keywords: privacy, surveillance, post-privacy, right to privacy, social aspects

Abstract
Private sphere has been under constant attack for many reasons and from many sides. It has been often seen as facilitating selfishness and immorality. This assumption was firstly formulated by Plato in the Republic. According to his arguments, without a permanent social control one is tempted to behave dissolutely. Even the existence of the traditional household poses a threat to unity and order of the city. Therefore in the just city, the decisive classes must be posed under constant surveillance and deprived of private property and all intimate relations. Similar assumptions can be heard from advocates of so called post-privacy and proponents of transparent governing. Sharing of thoughts, feelings and emotions, creations and ideas is often seen as a sign and condition of progress, while secludedness is equated to conservatism or reactionism. Additionally to it, the sense of what should remain private and invisible to public rapidly changes as a result of the rise of social media and especially Facebook. The present fear of social media user is not a fear of a prisoner in Bentham's (or rather Foucault's) Panopticon that he or she can be observed at any time. The common fear of the people in the post-panoptical society is rather that no one would follow and see them. A modern surveillance is less pursued by an oppressive power but rather by companies the services of which billions of users joyfully use. Another threat to privacy comes from the demands of citizens on security. It doesn't matter, whether practices of mass surveillance proves to be ineffective, the politicians are expected to use them to prevent terrorist attacks. Security and not privacy is a legitimate goal of politics. Such a situation put those who consider privacy as a vital value on the defensive. In this context, the paper is conceived as an attempt to discuss possible arguments defending privacy. There have been numerous attempts to defend privacy in the liberal manner as a good of the individual and condition of the freedom of the individual which a state should not undermine. In regard to the social and political threat of terrorism such an argumentation which put emphasis on privacy as an autonomous sphere that protects only individual interests can be easily dismissed as unimportant and obsolete. Another type of arguments have discussed privacy in terms of social good. Privacy has been seen as a necessary condition for trust among institutions as well as among individuals. The danger of this argumentation is however that it can moralize privacy and thus undermine the freedom of the individual which need not be used only for socially beneficial purposes. In the paper I will argue that a reasonable way to defend privacy is to combine both type of arguments, i.e. that privacy is a condition of dignity and freedom of the individual and on the other hand it is a very condition of trust, healthy relations and the basis for democratic and open political culture.

Hecht, Lisa
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 20, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
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Title: **Provocateurs and their rights to self-defence**

Keywords: provocation, self-defence, rights, forfeiture, actio libera in causa

Abstract
A provocateur does not pose a threat of harm. So how could it be that she lacks a right of self-defence if her provocation leads to a violent response? Most jurisdictions grant at most a partial excuse to those responding violently to provocation. That is, responding with force to a provocation is considered wrongful. And yet, if she defends herself against a violent response the provocateur is often denied recourse to a self-defence justification on grounds of the actio libera in causa principle. According to this principle, an agent cannot invoke an excuse or justification for the otherwise wrongful act if she brought about the excusing or justifying conditions herself.

In recent work, Kimberly Ferzan offers a defence for the moral underpinnings of the actio libera in causa principle as applied to provocation cases. She argues that despite not being liable to harm provocateurs forfeit their right to self-defence. According to Ferzan, a provocateur's rights forfeiture cannot be explained in the same way as rights forfeiture in "ordinary" defence cases. Ordinarily, one forfeits the right not to be harmed and to self-defend against such harm by threatening to violate another person's rights. But provocateurs forfeit their defensive rights for the very simple reason that they start the fight.

As I will argue here, a distinction of those two types of forfeiture justifications is neither desirable nor necessary. Such distinction has the odd implication that in some situations aggressors could be better off in terms of self-defence than provocateurs. Even if this problem can be circumvented, Ferzan's account still cannot offer a suitable constraint on rights forfeiture and hence clashes with strong intuitions about the importance of proportionality. Both these problems flow directly from the separation of forfeiture justifications in provocation and aggression cases. I will show that such separation only holds for a narrow conception of aggressors. The distinction is less plausible when we use the broader and more common understanding of aggressors as those who are morally responsible for an unjust threat.

Taking a unified approach to defensive rights forfeiture in provocation and ordinary defence cases could avoid the problems that Ferzan's account is facing. Daniel Farrell suggests such a unified approach. He applies his distributive justice account of self-defence across a range of cases, including provocation cases. I will suggest that even though the distributive justice account gets roughly the right answer with respect to provocateurs, it is undermined by more general problems with distributive justice accounts of forfeiture.

I defend an alternative account which avoids the problems faced by Ferzan's account, and better coheres with the dominant account of self-defence, which appeals to forfeiture rather than distributive justice considerations. My account does justice to the intuition that provocateurs should not be treated similarly to innocent victims but still they are not the main wrongdoers. Ultimately, the account objects to the application of the actio libera in causa principle in provocation cases.

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Presentation: 9th June, Session 19, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
PhD Candidate in Political Theory, the University of Hong Kong

Elizabeth is a 3rd year PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and Public Administration at the University of Hong Kong. She is also an Adam Smith Fellow at the Mercatus Centre of George Mason University.

Title: **Independence and Open Borders: Defending a Human Right to Immigrate**
Keywords: Immigration, rights, interests, autonomy, independence

Abstract
A growing body of literature in normative political theory is focussed on the question of whether there is a moral right to immigrate. A prominent defence of this right understands it as grounded in the human interests it protects. Call this the interest account. On this account, the right to immigrate is underpinned by the interests individuals have in accessing the full range of available life options. The key argument of this account is that without rights of immigration, individuals will be unable to access those life options which only exist in other states; for example the option to participate in a specific, rare religion, or to pursue a relationship with a partner from overseas. Given that these are the types of things individuals may well have important interests in doing, immigration controls violate a moral right.

The interest account taps into something intuitive about the value of freedom; that we want to be at liberty to pursue the kind of life we choose, without restriction. However, in grounding the right to immigrate in specific human interests, this account opens itself up to objection: If my interest in a particular way of life is sufficient to ground my right to participate in that way of life, then the set of things to which humans have rights will proliferate almost endlessly. It is for this reason that David Miller argues, in his recent book Strangers in our Midst, that only general interests, necessary to leading a decent human life, can underpin rights. Subjective interests in specific life options cannot ground a general right to immigrate. Rather than access to the full range of available life options then, humans have a right to access a range of options adequate to lead a decent human life; and this range will generally be available domestically.

This paper defends a prima facie, moral right to immigrate by proposing a reframing of the interest account. Instead of grounding the right to immigrate in the interest humans have in accessing any from the full set of existing life options, this paper grounds the right to immigrate in a single, general interest; independence. Independence, as described by Joseph Raz, is a necessary condition of autonomy, requiring that we not be subjected to the coercive will of others. On the independence account developed here, only the right of independence is grounded in human interests, with additional rights – including the right of immigration – being derived from it. We possess these derivative rights not because of our subjective interest in their substantive content, but because of a general interest in the ability to pursue life options we choose for ourselves. This paper will defend the derivative right to immigrate by drawing on accounts of the coercive nature of immigration controls offered by Arash Abizadeh, which demonstrate how immigration controls generally violate independence. The ultimate aim of this paper is to rescue the interest account of the right of immigration from the objections outlined above.

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Presentation: 9th June, Session 25, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
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Neil Hibbert is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Studies at the University of Saskatchewan (Canada). His research interests are in the areas of justice, legitimacy and democratic theory. His work has appeared in journals such as the Canadian Journal of Political Science, Theoria and the Journal of International Political Theory.

Title: **Political Obligation, Fairness and Involuntary Benefit**
Keywords: Political Obligation, Fairness, Public Goods, Involuntary Benefit, Political Legitimacy

Abstract
This paper addresses the challenge non-excludable public goods pose to fairness theories of political obligation. Fairness theories of political obligation hold that by benefitting from political cooperation, persons are justifiably subject to mutual burdens to avoid unfair free-riding. One criticism of fairness theory concerns the possibility of unfair imposition of obligations through unilateral benefit conferral. To address this, fairness theorists often include the further requirement of some notion of acceptance of cooperative benefits. This modification, however, is challenged by the fact that many of the core benefits secured by states are non-excludable and cannot be rejected in the sense of non-receipt. Public goods thus pose the dilemma of either imposing obligations through conferral of benefits, or permitting free-ridership by not requiring contributions from would-be rejecters of received benefits.

The paper considers three attempts to solve the dilemma facing fairness theory by public good provision. The first is Simmons' view that public goods can in fact be accepted or rejected by inferred signs of 'willingly and knowingly' approving receiving certain goods. It is argued that because of dependence on subjective preferences, this modification is vulnerable to persons hiding their preferences in order to benefit while not incurring burdens. The second is Arneson's 'stringency' test for justifying coerced contributions to 'uncontroversial benefit' provision – i.e., benefits needed for a leading an 'acceptable life'. This account is criticized for leaving a significant asymmetry between the scope of enforceable obligations and the full range of functions that are performed by modern states. 'Uncontroversial benefit' is also insufficiently determinate to justify enforced contributions even in the case of the constitutive functions of the basic idea a state. The third is Klosko's 'alternative test' required of potential rejecters of 'presumptively beneficial' public goods in which they have the burden of showing how they could lead an 'acceptable life' without the good in question as a condition of being freed of the expected contribution. It is argued that this is also subject to the asymmetry problem and is inconsistent with the very idea of political obligations as pre-emptive reasons for compliance.

Building on Klosko's subsequent modification in light of the asymmetry concern that the general value of state stability and success in delivering core public goods justifies enforced contributions to discretionary goods (that can in principle be rejected), the paper concludes by re-locating the site of political obligation to systemic compliance rather than a good-by-good assessment. Given the overarching value of general stability in a theory of legitimacy, the focus of political legitimacy is more appropriately placed on fairness in decision-making procedures, which can produce what Barry calls 'justification in abstraction from outcome'. This pre-empts after-the-fact assessment of a good's acceptability and generates a more general duty not to interfere with administrative functioning in successful and reasonably just cooperative schemes. It also widens the scope of relevant attitudes and behaviours involved in an adequate conception of political obligation beyond obligatory abidance with formal requirements.

Howard, Jeffrey
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 10, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Jeffrey Howard is Lecturer in Political Theory & Normative Methods at the School of Public Policy at University College London.

Title: **Mass Incarceration, Moral Subversion, and Criminal Protection**
Keywords: Punishment – Mass Incarceration – Subversion – Protection from Crime

Abstract
The U.S. has roughly 5% of the world's population and yet 25% of the world's prisoners. A litany of unjust policies contribute to this arrangement. Rampant overcriminalization means that many people are in prison for committing acts that never should have been criminalized in the first place. Disproportionately severe sentences, often legislatively required, mean that many people are in prison beyond what any plausible theory of punishment would countenance as legitimate. Racial bias in the criminal justice system, prosecution of children and cognitively disabled persons, and objectionably aggressive plea-bargaining of economically disadvantaged defendants all mean that countless people are in prison who would not be in prison if the criminal justice system met the standard of procedural fairness. Finally, economic injustice generates conditions of social deprivation that have the foreseeable effect of increasing the crime rate, leading to more criminals than would exist in a society in which the basic structure were just.

These familiar complaints against mass incarceration are all vitally important. Here my aim is to develop a new line of criticism against mass incarceration that has not received the attention it deserves from political philosophers, and that offers a more promising basis for public criticism of the phenomenon. The objection I want to advance is based on a wealth of empirical evidence that shows that prisons, as currently run in the United States and also in the UK and across the world, are criminogenic. Most contemporary prisons, in short, create crime. They create crime by facilitating relationships between criminal offenders that enable the transference of criminal skills and set the stage for future criminal collaborations; they create crime by incentivizing the development of aggressive and anti-social personality types in inmates, which serve offenders well while in prison but very poorly once released; and they create crime by facilitating the destruction of offenders' intimate relationships with friends and family, which help to militate against recidivism. Moreover, evidence suggests that the features of incarceration that generate these criminogenic effects of incarceration are simply unnecessary to achieve prisons' deterrent and incapacitative purposes.

This paper argues that this under-discussed feature of mass incarceration is a serious injustice. I argue that by administering prisons that increase offenders' likelihood of recidivism, the state violates two important moral duties. First, the state has a duty not to subvert the moral capacities of its citizens—i.e., not to take measures that make it more likely that citizens will decide to act impermissibly. This duty, I argue, is grounded in the significance of respecting citizens' moral agency. Present incarceration practices, however, contravene it. Second, the state has a duty to protect its citizens from crime. Present incarceration practices, by needlessly creating more crime, contravene this duty. I argue that these duties are a sufficiently weighty basis to object to prevailing incarceration practices; even those who do not recognize the aforementioned injustices of overcriminalization, disrproportionate punishment, and so on should condemn contemporary prisons on this more austere basis alone. I also argue that these objections have force whether or not one endorses a deterrent, a communicative, or a retributive justification of criminal punishment.

Ibsen , Malte Føslee
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 16, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
I'm currently doing a postdoc at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. I hold an MPhil in political theory from the University of Oxford and a PhD in political science from the Goethe University Frankfurt.

Title: **Rawls and Structural Injustice**
Keywords: Rawls structural injustice ideal theory nonideal theory background justice

Abstract
John Rawls famously claims that justice is the first virtue of social institutions. The first virtue view is substantiated in the claim that principles of justice are supposed to continuously regulate the basic structure of society, in order to preclude the unintended aggregate effects of unblamewothy individual (market) interactions from undermining what Rawls calls “background justice”. Even so, in Rawls’s work, we find a remarkable absence of reflection on the reverse implication of the first virtue view: namely, on the view of injustice as the first vice of social institutions - what we can call the first vice view. Indeed, rather than the structuralist view of injustice suggested by the first virtue view, we instead tend to encounter an exhaustive conceptualization of injustice in Rawls’s work as intentional wrongdoing, which is inconsistent with the first virtue view.

In this paper, I argue that this inconsistency has methodological roots. More specifically, I argue that Rawls’s substantial blind spot when it comes to structural injustice is an implication of his conceptualization of the distinction between ideal theory and nonideal theory. Rawls conceives of this distinction as divided into two distinct branches: whereas ideal theory is defined in terms of the two idealized conditions of full compliance and favorable circumstances, nonideal theory falls into two parallel branches given by the relaxation of the two idealized conditions, namely noncompliance and unfavorable conditions. Where noncompliance comprises obstacles to the realization of justice that derive from the intentional wrongdoing of individual or collective agents, unfavorable conditions comprises mere happenstance, such as natural disasters or chronic underdevelopment.

However, this methodological distinction between two kinds of obstacles to the realization of a well-ordered society leaves out precisely the structuralist view of injustice suggested by the first vice view, since structural injustice (or the erosion of background justice) is neither intentional (as in noncompliance) nor non-intentional (as with unfavorable conditions), but rather unintentional. Rawls is thus compelled by his own methodology to reduce structural injustice either to intentional wrongdoing or to a case of natural happenstance, which conflicts with the first virtue view as one of the central philosophical advantages of his theory of justice: namely, its conceptualization of justice as a predicate of a well-regulated basic structure, where principles of justice control for the erosion of background justice that would otherwise result as the unintended aggregate effects of unblameworthy individual (market) interaction.

Furthermore, the paper clarifies the moral status of structural injustice with reference to T.M. Scanlon’s account of judgment-sensitive attitudes – and, in particular, his account of how the idea of judgment-sensitive attitudes can help us makes sense of how we can be morally responsible for “unbidden attitudes”, which do not arise as a result of conscious choice or decisions. The paper concludes by arguing that the insights reaped from Rawls's inconsistencies when it comes to structural injustice are relevant way beyond Rawls's own work.

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 3, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
The Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

I am a second-year PhD student in the philosophy department at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Most of my research is in normative ethics. My thesis is about the morality of killing and the badness of death for the person who dies.

Title: **Moral Luck and Authorship**
Keywords: Moral luck, blameworthiness, responsibility, authorship, control

Abstract
Common-sense morality suggests that we are often the subjects of moral luck: our praise- or blameworthiness varies according to the results of the choices we make, even when those results were beyond our control. Consider Thomas Nagel's cases of a would-be assassin or a person who chooses to drive recklessly. Nagel notes that we are inclined to judge the assassin more harshly if his bullet hits and kills his mark than we would if his bullet happened to be blocked by a low-flying bird, and we judge the reckless driver more harshly if his behaviour kills a pedestrian than we would if he behaved in exactly the same manner but reached his destination without doing harm. Some philosophers embrace these pre-theoretic judgments as correct assessments of blameworthiness. Many others have been sceptical of moral luck, maintaining that we should revise our common-sense assessments in light of the view that one cannot be morally responsible for what one cannot control.

I shall argue that it has been a mistake to assume, as those on both sides this debate have done, that examples like those above must stand or fall together. While in the case of the assassin luck determines the realisation of an intended or "countenanced" result of the agent's wrongdoing, in the drunk driving case it merely determines the realisation of a foreseeable but unintended prospect of wrongdoing. I claim that rational agents are the appropriate recipients of moral blame in virtue of luck in the result of their intended harms, but not in virtue of luck in the result of harms that are merely foreseeable. In brief, although the assassin who successfully kills is ipso facto more blameworthy than his counterpart who misses, the typical reckless driver who kills is not more blameworthy than his counterpart who does no harm.

My presentation is divided into three parts. First, I argue that blameworthiness in virtue of the success or failure of one's intended harming is often warranted. I first show that a moral system which did not assign blame in greater measure to successful wrongdoers would involve higher-order luck, because it would in a sense allow them to have achieved their aims at no additional moral costs. This higher-order luck renders such a moral system defective, I argue, because it appears to condone wrongdoing. Importantly, this argument does not apply to moral luck in virtue of harms that are the merely foreseeable side-effects of wrongdoing.

Second, I argue that increased blameworthiness is not warranted in virtue of luck in the realisation of the unintended, merely foreseeable prospects of one's wrongdoing. In short, I propose that there is no way, even in principle, to separate the portion of merely foreseeable harms for which the agent is responsible from that portion that is due to luck. Consequently, the proponent of moral luck in virtue of merely foreseeable harms is committed to the unpalatable conclusion that any two wrongful acts that lead to equivalent harms are equally wrong. As before, I show why this argument does not extend to wrongdoing involving intended harms.

Lastly, I propose a rationalising account that explains why moral luck is warranted in virtue intended harms but not merely foreseeable ones. At its heart is an insufficiently appreciated distinction between responsibility and authorship, which I claim maps onto the distinction between intended and unintended results. I show that there are good reasons for thinking blameworthiness is sensitive to authorship but not to responsibility.

Khan, Abubakr
Country: Pakistan
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Affiliation: Pakistan
Presentation: 9th June, Session 18, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
Dr. Abubakr Khan
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
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ITU – Punjab.

I was awarded the Fulbright MA and PhD scholarship in 2010, and I went on to complete my doctorate, in philosophy, from the State University of New York at Binghamton in early 2016. For my dissertation and other supporting projects, I also worked at New York University (NYU) and The New School.

Title: **The Hidden Yes of Nietzsche:**
Ethics and Responsibility in a Dionysian Life-World
Keywords: ethics, responsibility, Nietzsche, ekstasis, praxis

Abstract
In discussions on virtue, ethics, and responsibility, the mention of Nietzsche the "immoralist" might come as a surprise to most. As a genealogist, he had dug into the roots of old values and morality, to expose their false origins. And if one also takes note of his avowal of utter groundlessness, his apotheosis of Dionysus, his cosmology of dissonance, and his dismissal of the transcendent and the transcendental, then ethics seems quite impossible. And yet, there is “a hidden yes [verborgene Ja]” to be found in Nietzsche’s oeuvre, which points to the possibility of a particular re-framing of ethics. Although unconventional, and perhaps controversial, such a revaluation nevertheless holds much promise, because it ties the possibility of ethics to life-affirmation. Nietzsche was repulsed by the otherworldly and abstract, so that any such possibility must pertain to “the sense of the earth,” and to the actuality of existence; it must therefore concern lived functionalities and events. As Nietzsche criticized ascetic ideals, and insisted on a “return” to life on earth, he also urged human beings to reassess the value of their own bodies, which they had previously been taught to despise. Thus, at some level, his work can be interpreted in terms of an ethics of life and corporeality. As such an embodied life offers no certainties and no reliabilities, one must learn to embrace danger, risk, pain, chance, and tragedy. Such a yes is, for Nietzsche, a new ideal for sensibility and praxis, and this is related to what Nietzsche means by “health”. So, one must learn to walk on shaking ground. At its most basic, ethics is about the capacity to live life as one’s own, and to also relate to the “outside” in a somewhat responsible manner. Nietzsche often chastised those who cannot “endure within themselves”: those who seek to ‘fly away’ from life. Even when he celebrated Dionysian ecstasy, the point was not to encourage escapes to any Beyond; so, this must never be understood in terms of a turning-away from life. Nietzschean ekstasis, in fact, corresponds to the virtue of being immanently responsible for life. And life, for Nietzsche, is excessive in itself. It is the utter disruption of all Withins [Innere]. Life, which he calls the “great self-overcoming,” throws open all interiorities. Hence, as so many of his ideas conflict with traditional notions of subjectivity and self, responsibility cannot be isolated—to live is therefore to be, in some sense, responsible for much more than oneself. We are, ab initio, thrown outside ourselves—this is the reality of living in a cosmos of dissonance and flux. And Nietzsche will remind us that the work of such a cosmos “is also our work [Werke]—let us be proud of it”. For ethics revalued in terms of Nietzsche’s ideas, praxis is crucial: what matters is a practical engagement with one’s life (which is excessive and ecstatic in essence). And so, Nietzsche will write: “The hidden yes in you is stronger than all no’s and maybe’s.”

Kim, Hochan "Sonny"
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Affiliation: United Kingdom
Presentation: 9th June, Session 16, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
University of Oxford, BPhil

Hochan "Sonny" Kim is currently studying for the BPhil at the University of Oxford. His primary interest is political philosophy, particularly social justice.

Title: **Collective Responsibility and Racial Inequality in the U.S.: A Social Connection Model**
Keywords: systemic racism, collective responsibility, shared responsibility, social connection model, race relations

Abstract
An increasingly prominent position regarding race relations in the U.S., recently popularized by the Black Lives Matter movement, comprises three core claims. First, although racism as a prejudiced attitude or belief is dwindling, structural and institutional factors systematically harm black Americans and maintain de facto racial inequality, i.e. systemic racism. Second, this state of affairs correspondingly privileges white Americans. Third, white Americans collectively bear some responsibility for addressing this inequality.

In this paper, I propose an understanding of collective responsibility sensitive to these claims. In doing so, I consider a theoretical question by addressing an applied one. The applied question is: in what sense might white Americans be collectively responsible for present-day racial inequalities? Addressing this question requires considering a theoretical question: how should collective responsibility be understood in contexts of structural injustice?

I take as my starting point Iris Marion Young's social connection model of responsibility (2006). Young's model holds agents responsible for unjust structural harms in virtue of their participation and contribution – i.e. their social connections – to those structures, in contrast with the so-called liability model, which only assigns responsibility for harms directly and distinctly linked to an agent's specific actions, e.g. a robbery. The liability model, I argue, has difficulty grounding collective responsibility for the type of injustice that Yancy condemns. Accordingly, I propose a view of collective responsibility based on the social connection model, which explains why one might rightfully assign collective responsibility to white Americans for present-day racial inequalities.

My argument proceeds as follows. First, I explain the difficulties of extending the liability model to collectives – particularly in structural contexts – using the example of systemic racism. I show that these difficulties are generalizable to any theory of collective responsibility based on the liability model.

Second, I argue that Young's social connection model provides a better model of responsibility in structural contexts insofar as it avoids these difficulties. However, Young's social connection model as originally stated fails to ground a theory of collective responsibility, for two reasons. The first is Young's explicit disavowal of collective responsibility as an upshot of her theory, opting instead to argue for so-called shared responsibility: each individual agent who participates in unjust structures shares responsibility for their outcomes. This is problematically vague, which brings me to the second reason: the social connection model fails to adequately explain how this shared responsibility should be distributed among those responsible, or who has to do what. The model thus makes it difficult to assign a particular collective responsibility under shared injustices.

Finally, I propose a view of collective responsibility based on a revised social connection model: a collective is responsible for a structural injustice when it has unique social connections to its perpetuation. I argue that this view best captures Yancy's position regarding white Americans' collective responsibility to confront systemic racism; it also helps to partially address the important question of "who has to do what?" that the original social connection model left unanswered. I conclude by addressing objections to this view.

Lane, Ashley
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 3, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
PhD student, Birkbeck, University of London

Ashley Lane is a PhD student at Birkbeck, University of London. He specialises in metaethics and moral psychology.

Title: **Are moral functionalism's a priori commitments really a priori?**
Keywords: Moral functionalism, Frank Jackson, metaethics, metaphysics, a priori

Abstract
Moral functionalism, a metaethical theory developed by Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit, claims that we are able to attain moral knowledge by ascertaining the commonplaces about morality that are typically accepted by actual agents. These commonplaces constitute a folk morality, which is a moral theory that we can use to identify moral properties and ascertain moral facts. Whilst acknowledging that we can discover many moral commonplaces empirically, by investigating the commonplaces that agents actually accept, Jackson and Pettit hold that moral functionalism also has important a priori underpinnings. We may be able to discover empirically (a posteriori) that a particular descriptive property is identical to a particular moral property, but it is an a priori fact that the thing that is identical to the moral property, whatever that thing actually is, plays a particular moral role.

Moral functionalism is part of Jackson's broader metaphysics, which relies on the a priori identification of A-extensions of terms. The A-extension of a term T in w is the actual extension of T in world w, where w may be our world or another possible world. In our world, the A-extension of 'water' includes all and only occurrences of water. Jackson holds that A-extensions are a priori, because we do not need to know what particular substance water is (i.e. that water is H2O) to know the A-extension of 'water' in the actual world. It is a priori that water is whatever plays the role of being transparent, drinkable, having solvent powers, and so on. It is a posteriori that H2O plays that role, and so that H2O is identical to water. D.H. Mellor objects to Jackson's metaphysics on the grounds that X may play the role of Y without X being identical to Y. H2O plays a particular 'watery' role, but it is not identical to water.

I use this objection to show that moral A-extensions are not a priori. Following Jackson's metaphysics, the moral functionalist can claim that the property of moral rightness is whatever plays the moral-rightness role. My argument is not that this is false, but that the moral functionalist can only find out whether it true or false through empirical investigation. Moral functionalism tells us that we must discover empirically what plays the moral-rightness role. It is only after we have done that, though, that we can discover whether the thing that plays the role is identical to the property of moral rightness. A-extensions of moral terms can only be ascertained after empirical research. Therefore moral functionalism cannot have the a priori underpinnings that Jackson claims.

Lattanzi, Luca
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 24, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
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Biography: Luca Lattanzi born in Mirano (VE) Italy on 24/01/1988 I am a doctorate student in philosophy at the University of Padova. I graduated in philosophy at the University of Padova following the double title study course Padova-Jena (double degree) with a thesis on the thoughts of the late Schelling with the final mark 110/110 cum laude. Currently I am carrying out a research on the internationalist thoughts of Carl Schmitt within the doctorate school of philosophy at the University of Padova. From 01/01/2017 i start a co-tutorship with the University of Coimbra. My doctorate tutors are Prof. Antonino Scalone (Padova) and Prof. Alexandre Franco De Sà (Coimbra).

Title: **Right and technicity in Carl Schmitt's international thought**
Keywords: Carl Schmitt, Political Philosophy, International law, Technicity, Decisionism.

Abstract
This Paper proposes an interpretation of some of Carl Schmitt's fundamental passages on internationalism, based on the contrast between law and technicity. Our goal will be to clarify how, for Schmitt, the political space, acknowledging the historic crisis of modern statehood, can be reconstructed, in contrast with the spiritual neutralisation of technicity, by simply reviving and reshaping modern political rationale, on the basis of secularism, beyond the space of nation states. For Schmitt, the law is always purely the result of the mediation of a conflict. Technicity instead aims to reach a neutral state which, far from destroying the forces that are naturally opposed in the struggle for political dominance, surreptitiously brings about an intensification and deregulation of the conflict itself. In our view, the doctrine of large spaces, which will result in the theory of Nomos, is therefore intended to first establish a new balance between the system and normativity. On closer inspection, however, Schmitt finds that this new balance is designed to reestablish a dynamic between constituent power and constituted power, with implementation and coercion in the name of political and legal order founded on the irrevocable decision-making power of a dominant force, the Reich. If the power of the state, for the German jurist, found its real legal/political effectuality in the representative motion of the sovreign, expressed as a command, the Groβraum can constitute a political space only by allowing an imperial hegemonic power, the Reich, the legality of an exclusive use of force.
Referring to the critical debate on the periodisation of Schmitt's thought, our interpretation therefore supports the continuist theory. In fact, it does not appear that the last phase of the German jurist's work falls back in line with institutionalist legal thought. Such continuity in terms of legal decisionism seems to emerge very clearly when the focus is turned to the contrast between technicity and law, which we believe to be the true leitmotif of Carl Schmitt's work. In the wake of Max Weber, it seems, in fact, that the German jurist was driven by the conviction that politics can only arrive at its own autonomy (in the sense of a real ability to influence social, economic, cultural processes etc.), by combining a rationale based on values (wertrational) and a rationale based on purpose (zweckrational). Politics can only survive the technological age if it retains a capacity to address the spiritual or value-based aspects of society, established in a concrete system.

Luzio, Hugo
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 15, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
Finalist Undergraduate Student of Philosophy at the Faculty of Letters of the University of Lisbon (FLUL).

Member of the 'Argument Clinic' philosophical discussion group (FLUL) and founding member of the 'Center for Political Studies of the University of Lisbon' (FLUL); Honorable Mention at the II National Philosophy Olympiad (2014); Bronze Medal at the I Iberoamerican Philosophy Olympiad (2014); Professor Doutor Joaquim Cerqueira Gonçalves 2015 Essay Prize (Philosophica, FLUL); 2015 Philosophical Essay Prize of the Portuguese Society for Philosophy; Invited speaker at the 2nd Portuguese Congress of Philosophy (2016); Organizing member of the 11th Oficina de Filosofia Analítica (2017); Researcher on analytic metaphysics and political philosophy.

Title: **Against Hershenov's Epistemic Accounts of Deliberative Democracy**
Keywords: Deliberative Democracy; David Hershenov; Epistemology; Majority Rule; Political Legitimacy

Abstract
Deliberative democratic theorists commonly consider that the maintenance of public deliberative processes is a normative condition for justice. Authentic deliberations, i.e. analyzable, informed and informative views, connect rationality with justice or truth-aptness: e.g. public deliberative processes must refine pre-electoral beliefs, so that post-deliberative beliefs output maximally clearheaded and fairer or closer-to-the-truth votes. In general, an epistemic account of voting assents that votes don't merely express aggregative preferences, but beliefs about global justice. If there are procedurally and rationally independent truths about the common good, i.e. a definite fairer state-of-affairs that univocally results from a definite set of political options, then no particular deliberative procedure is able to increase the probability of justice or truth achievement. However, on deliberative democracies (DD), political agents are ultrarational truthful beings: if rationality and truth-achievement capacities are unconnected fields, then rational agreements/disagreements are politically irrelevant as a means to justice.

Hershenov [2005] argues that a rational, deliberative, democratic process can reliably track procedure-independent substantive truths. This claim is grounded on the ethical supposition that moral truths shape social organization and on the metaethical supposition that moral truths are intuitively accessible. Hence, political debaters dispute moral intuitions about global justice. However, on (DD), post-deliberative political minorities' views (pm) are wishfully as rational as post-deliberative political majorities' views (PM). If there aren't epistemic differences between (pm) and (PM)'s views, what justifies (PM)'s legitimacy? Hershenov's first epistemic account holds the application of the traditional 'majority rule' to cases of rational disagreement: given the comparatively lower probability of devious cognitive failures concerning (PM)'s moral intuition's module, (PM)'s views are epistemically safer than (pm)'s views. His second proposal is an epistemically compatibilist account towards (pm) and (PM)'s views on justice.

On this talk, we'll argue that none of these accounts solves the problem of (PM)'s legitimacy. The non-qualification of the relevant intuition's module for moral truth-assessment, on the first case, and the fact that, by definition, the recognition of rational ties must not be a political aim in deliberative democratic scenarios, on the second case, undermine Hershenov's epistemic accounts. Even if (pm) and (PM) accept the mutually equivalent fairness of their views, felling a pull in two distinct directions, it doesn't follow that both views – especially if they are contradictory ones – are compatible with justice. Finally, we'll reject Hershenov's claim that, assuming the compatibilist account's soundness, endorsing (PM)'s views increases fairness due to the maximization of interests' satisfaction. This doesn't seem to be defensible: if the acceptance of any of the disputant views produces identically rational results, then the aggregative gain produced by the satisfaction of (PM)'s interests cannot increase fairness.

* David B. Harshenov. 2005. 'Two Epistemic Arguments for Deliberative Democracy'. In The Journal of the Northeastern Political Science Association, 37: 216-234.

Marshall, Christopher

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 2, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
I am a fourth year PhD candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science, supervised by Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve.

My thesis is an enquiry into what agents faced with unjust inequality are required to do, permitted to do, and forbidden from doing, in the name of equality.

Title: **FAIR SHARES AND DEGREES OF INEQUALITY**
Keywords: Injustice, Inequality, Fairness, Partial Compliance

Abstract
The distribution of benefits and burdens in the actual world is unjustly unequal and will continue to be unjustly unequal for the foreseeable future. For the fortunate few, life is better than it would be if our unjust world were transformed into a just one. By contrast, many people are worse off than they could be if unjust inequality were removed.

Most egalitarians agree that the state has an egalitarian reason to coercively reduce unjust inequality through redistributive policies. However, the question of whether individuals have an egalitarian reason to reduce unjust inequality through redistributive voluntary choices has received little attention.

Some believe that individuals faced with unjust inequality have no egalitarian reason to carry out voluntary redistributive acts if the state does not legally compel them to do so, because there is a special connection between justice and the state (call this “the institutional view”).

Others believe that, although some individuals faced with injustice do have an egalitarian reason to carry out direct redistributive acts, there is no reason for a person to worsen their own situation beyond the share of goods that they would have in the counterfactual world in which existing benefits and burdens were justly distributed (call this “the fair shares view”).

I argue that both of these views are mistaken. First, I argue that the reasons to believe that fully just institutions are necessary, sufficient, or both, to bring about a just distribution do not support the claim that only institutions can reduce injustice.

Second, I argue that “the fair shares view” is not supported by our three best ways of measuring the injustice of inequality. The three ways of ranking unjust distributions, are (1) a consequentialist account suggested by Larry Temkin, (2) a contractualist account suggested by Thomas Nagel, and (3) a veil of ignorance account, adapted from John Rawls. On these views, any transfer which reduces or removes a gap without giving rise to a worse gap will reduce injustice and there is often an egalitarian reason to redistribute even when one has less than one’s fair share. An implication of this is that every individual faced with distributive injustice, other than the very worst off individual, has an egalitarian reason to redistribute goods to the worse off.

If one were to combine these claims with the claim that reasons of justice have special force or priority over other reasons, we must conclude that each of us has powerful reasons, which go beyond mere beneficence, to transfer advantages to the worse off.

Marway, Herjeet
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 11, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Affiliation: Department of Philosophy, University of Birmingham

Bio: Herjeet Marway works in the area of global ethics, feminist philosophy and philosophy of race. She has written on relational autonomy (2015), migration and health (2015), topics in bioethics (2012-2015), and female violence (2011, 2015). Most recently she has published on genetic selection of embryos for fair skin (2017), and is working on papers on relational autonomy and terrorism.

Title: **Procreative Justice and Genetic Selection for Fair Skin.**

Keywords: Key terms: procreative justice; racial discrimination; genetic selection; fair skin.

Abstract
I aim to explore moral and political issues surrounding genetic selection of embryos. A salient question in the literature is whether we should genetically select embryos for advantageous non-disease traits, such as greater intelligence, a particular sex, or above average height. There are a range of reasons offered for why such selection is permissible, including parental choice under the principle of Procreative Autonomy (PA) (Robertson 1996) and the child's wellbeing under Procreative Beneficence (PB) (Savulescu 2001). There are a host of reasons too for why it is not, including the child lacking an open future (Habermas 2003), playing God (Coady 2008), the commodification of children (Widdows 2009), and gender inequality (Overall 2010). In this paper I want to focus on a different set of traits relating to race – and the trait of fair skin specifically – and explore another reason not to select – that of racial discrimination. My question then is: should we genetically select embryos for advantageous non-disease traits, like fair skin?

Skin colour is often regarded as a highly racialised feature as it is one immediate way in which to categorise racial groups. Fair skin is also often regarded as a preferential feature given the prejudice experienced by those with darker skin in contexts like the US and India (e.g. Hunter 2007; Banks 1999; Marway 2017). There are plausible reasons, then, for why reproducers may want to select for fair skin akin to reasons for selection in general, including parental choice (PA) and children's wellbeing in racialised contexts (PB). I argue, however, that we should not make such selections and introduce a new principle, Procreative Justice (PJ), which asks reproducers and the state to avoid being unfairly racially prejudiced or completing unfair racial discrimination in selection decisions.

Though PA and PB could endorse such selection, advocates of these principles also offer some possible (not absolute) restraints to such selection, including when it harms particular groups (Robertson 1996; Savulescu 2001). I argue, however, that these limits are not enough of a restraint to deal with the problem of various forms, and differing extents, of racially unjust reproductive selection. This is so in what I deem to be easy cases (of explicit prejudices) and even in more difficult ones (like implicit biases and tragic dilemmas). I argue that there are, even in the more difficult cases, reasons to avoid, what I call, the completion of racial injustice. I use PJ to argue that this makes genetic selection for fair skin morally impermissible (though the question of blameworthiness is separate, especially in so-called tragic cases). This is so even if selection leads to children who are likely to have lives with greater wellbeing because they are less likely to suffer prejudice (PB) and even if it interferes with parental choice to have the sorts of children they want (PA). Further, given its impermissibility, a further recommendation I propose is that the state should, as a matter of policy, prohibit selection for fair skin.

McLeod, Stephen K.
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 25, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Stephen McLeod is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Liverpool. For further information about him, please visit http://skmcleod.weebly.com/.

Title: **ON A RAWLSIAN ROUTE TOWARDS WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY**
Keywords: BASIC LIBERTY; ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY; LIBERALISM; RAWLS; WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY

Abstract
The conception of justice as fairness regards citizens as persons engaged in social co-operation who have 'what we may call "the two moral powers"': 'the capacity for a sense of justice' and 'a capacity for a conception of the good' (John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001, 18-19). The principles of justice concern the design of the basic structure of society, which 'is the way in which the main political and social institutions of a society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arise from social co-operation over time' (Rawls, 10).

The fundamental case in which the capacity for a sense of justice is exercised is in 'the application of the principles of justice to the basic structure and its social policies' (Rawls, 112). The fundamental case in which the capacity for a conception of the good is exercised is in 'forming, revising, and rationally pursuing such a conception over a complete life' (Rawls, 113).

Martin O'Neill ('Three Rawlsian Routes Towards Economic Democracy', Revue de philosophie économique 8: 29–55) discusses, but ultimately rejects, a Rawlsian argument for workplace democracy called 'the Fundamental Liberties argument'.

According to Rawls, a liberty is basic if and only if it is necessary to the provision of 'the social conditions essential for the adequate development and the full and informed exercise of [people's] two moral powers […] in the two fundamental cases' (Rawls 2001, 112).

The Fundamental Liberties contends that the 'freedom to take part in decisions about economic production' is necessary to the provision of these conditions (O'Neill, 35). Since this freedom requires a degree of workplace democracy, it is a basic liberty. Accordingly, justice requires a degree of democracy in the workplace.

This presentation has three main aims. First, it aims to explain the Fundamental Liberties argument and to reconstruct it in detail in standard form, in a manner more explicit than has previously featured in the literature. Second, it aims to explain the Rawlsian case, previously summarized by O'Neill, for considering the argument to be unsound. Thirdly, it aims to shows that the bases on which O'Neill ultimately rejects the argument, an appropriate response to which involves close analysis and critique of Rawls's explication of the notion of a basic liberty, ultimately do not stand up to rigorous conceptual analysis.

The main outcome is that, on a charitable understanding, or rejigging, of the Fundamental Liberties argument and of Rawls's notion of a basic liberty, the Rawlsian reasons accepted by O'Neill for considering the argument unsound are undermined. The Fundamental Liberties argument, when understood in the light of close consideration of how Rawlsian basic liberties should properly be defined, remains a serious contender for showing that a degree of workplace democracy is a requirement of Rawlsian justice.

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 12, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
Affiliation:

LanCog, Centro de Filosofia, Universidade de Lisboa

Bio:

Licenciatura (BA) in Philosophy and Mestrado em Ensino de Filosofia (MAT Philosophy), both from University of Lisbon. Ricardo is currently studying for a Ph.D. at the same University (FCT studentship SFRH/BD/107907/2015) with a thesis on the moral status of animals and the problem of replaceability.

Title: **Rawlsian animal justice?**
Keywords: Animals, Contractarianism, Fortune, Marginal cases, Rawlsian justice

Abstract
Rawls' denial that A Theory of Justice (1990) applies to animals is explicit and well known. Despite this, there are various attempts to use his theory, or a similar one, to account for animal justice or "interspecies justice", to use Vandeveer's (1979) phrase. Two interesting moves in that direction are (i) a conception of the original position in which the parties are interested (in a way to be specified) in animals and (ii) a conception of animals as a contributing part in society. Following Garner (2012), I agree that these moves are insufficient to provide an acceptable basis for the treatment of animals. I will start by briefly reviewing those proposals and their weaknesses. I then sketch an alternative proposal, closely inspired by Kagan's (2016) Modal Personism pertaining to moral status, which appears to extend the Rawlsian framework of justice as intended. The core of this proposal is the Modal Agency Requirement (MAR): x is a beneficiary of justice only if x could be a moral agent. MAR looks promising in two significant ways: it seems compatible with recognizing justice to animals; and, contrarily to Rawls' theory, it seems to allow marginal humans – those who lack moral agency – to be rightful recipients of justice.

If there is a Rawlsian ground for MAR, it would be Rawls' few and rather unclear words on why marginal humans should enjoy equal justice: "When someone lacks the requisite potentiality [for moral agency] either from birth or accident, this is regarded as a defect or deprivation" (Rawls 1990: 506). The idea seems to be that although they are not moral agents, they are unfortunately so. Thus, using MAR to extend Rawls' theory of justice presupposes that a correct account of an individual's fortune would imply that animals too are unfortunate for not being moral agents.

However, I argue that an account of fortune with this consequence not only deviates from Rawls' thought but is also untenable. On the one hand, a charitable interpretation of Rawls' silence about the fortune of animals in this regard would say that he did not consider that animals were unfortunate for not being moral agents. Moreover, an understanding of MAR that does not exclude animals involves a much more permissive modality, such as logical or metaphysical possibility, than Rawls' theory admits, since it is focused on individuals' capacities and potential. On the other hand, in general we do not think that an individual, e.g., a human, is unfortunate for being unable to do things that require a substantially different nature than his. I, therefore, conclude that MAR offers no basis for a Rawlsian theory of animal justice.

Miller, Calum
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 12, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
Affiliation - University of Manchester
Short bio - Calum Miller is a practising medical doctor, having graduated from Oxford Medical School. He will shortly be taking up a Visiting Research Scholarship in Bioethics at the University of Oxford. He is completing an MA in Biblical Studies. His current research focuses on beginning of life ethics, formal epistemology, the philosophy of science and the philosophy of religion.

Title: **Do animals feel morally relevant pain?**
Keywords: animals, pain, epistemology, evolution, neuroscience

Abstract
The thesis that animals feel a morally relevant kind of pain is an incredibly popular one, but it is difficult to substantiate. Michael Murray defends a kind of neo-Cartesianism, arguing that morally significant pain requires certain psychological conditions plausibly not met in lower animals. These include continuity of consciousness and higher order mental states. Murray invokes a variety of neuroscientific literature exploring this idea. I defend Murray's approach from a variety of common arguments for the thesis that animals feel morally relevant pain. In doing so, I explicate the evidential principles involved in such discussions, as well as introducing further neuroscientific data.

One particularly relevant question is whether we have evidence to believe that animals have any pain qualia at all. I argue that the fact of evolution screens off pain qualia from 'pain behaviour' and thereby renders the latter obsolete as evidence for the former. The reason for this is that, given the standard scientific consensus on evolution, we would expect pain behaviour regardless of whether animals were genuinely in pain or not. Bayesian principles show that the evidence from pain behaviour is thereby nullified.

I then examine some senses in which pain qualia might not be morally relevant. For example, it is possible that pain with only a discriminatory aspect and not an affective aspect is not morally relevant. Other candidates for components of morally relevant pain – which may not attend all pain experiences – include a sense that the pain is owned by someone, and sufficiently strong psychological connections (and connections of the right kind) between the painful experience and the mind at other times. Whether these pertain to animals is a matter open to debate and, in part, a matter open to future empirical investigation. Either way, it cannot be settled decisively with the resources currently available to us.

I then discuss the implications of current neuroscientific resources for a final major argument for the animal pain thesis: the similar neuroanatomy of animals and humans. These resources are at best inconclusive. The neuroanatomical correlates of relevant moral pain are variable between mammals and, even if there is reasonable evidence that some mammals similar to humans have relevantly similar neuroanatomy, there is still ground for considerable doubt concerning other – perhaps most – animals.

I conclude by discussing the implications of my argument. Chief among these is the question of whether it is morally wrong to cause (or seem to cause) animals pain – indeed, the wrongness of doing so has been used as an argument against my position. I note that this response fails since there is at least a reasonable probability that they feel pain. This paper does have a quite different implication in a quite separate field, however: since we have no standard evidential reason to think that animals feel pain, if we think it is reasonable to believe that they feel pain, this paper raises further questions in epistemology, including moral epistemology.

Miller, Laura
Country: United States
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Affiliation: United States
Presentation: 8th June, Session 6, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
Laura Miller
University of Missouri - St. Louis, USA

Laura Miller is a graduate student of philosophy at the University of Missouri - St. Louis. Her main focuses of study include social and political philosophy, moral psychology, and gender. She is the founder of MOSAIC, a non-profit that community center serves to eliminate hunger for disadvantaged higher education students.

Title: **ADAPTIVE VALUE: FINDING RATIONALITY IN THE RISKS OF THE GLOBAL POOR**

Keywords: poverty, rationality, choice, dignity and value.

Abstract
Helping the poor involves trusting the poor to make the best possible choices. What is often missed is that the poor make choices in ways that are foreign to those providing assistance and who create policies to support the poor. I will argue that this difference in the decision making process is responsible for the failure of programs and policies focused on poverty alleviation efforts. Therefore, a new approach to global poverty initiatives, one that focuses on the poor's method of choice, is needed.

It is my assertion that those intending to assist the poor should undertake their review of the poor's choices through what I have coined the adaptive value (AV) approach. This view states that the poor view their choices by weighting the costs and benefits differently than the financially secure. Imagine a scale with both sides balanced and an impending choice. You decide to use the scale and weigh the pros and cons of the choice. Each benefit results in a weight being placed on the scale. Each cost receives a corresponding weight on the opposite side. When the poor use the scale they add two weights for each benefit and only one for each cost. Under extreme poverty, they may add three weights for each benefit while only adding one weight for every two costs. This process results in very different choice selection depending on the weight afforded to each cost or benefit.

Traditional philosophical argument regarding poverty alleviation focuses on the rationality of choice (Baber, Nussbaum) while AV focuses on the rational weighting of choice. The benefit of the AV approach is that it rightly views the poor's dire circumstances and the risks they are willing accept. In misunderstanding the poor's view of risk (and their cost benefit analysis) those seeking to assist the poor have been misguided in their attempts to address poverty.

It is possible to object to this position by claiming that it is personal circumstance that influences the poor or that they need better choices. This would not be wholly incorrect. Still, it should be noted that the problem of poverty should not be evaluated by the choice that is made, but rather by how the poor determine which choice will be made. AV allows us to modify our assistance efforts based on the needs of the group or population, not through our perspective but through theirs. When we value the poor's choices and the value they place on alleviation efforts, only then can we make inroads in eliminating poverty.

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Nogradi, Noa
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Affiliation: United Kingdom
Presentation: 8th June, Session 6, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
Affiliation: PhD student and teaching assistant at the University of Leeds, School of Politics and International Studies

Bio: I received my BA in Philosophy at ELTE University's Faculty of Arts and Humanities (Budapest). Subsequently I studied at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), to gain an MSc in Social and Political Sciences and an MA in Political Philosophy.

Title: **Worldwide violence against women as global injustice: patriarchal structures and the duty not to harm**
Keywords: global justice; gender justice; violence against women; human rights; structural injustice

Abstract
This paper aims to combine the conceptual frameworks of feminist theory and research on VAW, and of theories of justice in political philosophy. It conceptualises VAW as a global injustice on the basis of Iris Marion Young's (2011) concept of structural injustice and Thomas Pogge's (2008) theory on global justice and notion of institutional human rights.
Scholarship in VAW has for decades recognized and shown the role not only of direct perpetrators, but also of institutions and of society more broadly in the violence continuously perpetrated against women worldwide. Feminists identify both national and international institutional responsibilities related to VAW and its causes, which were also articulated in international conventions and declarations.
The paper aims to provide a normative justification for these responsibilities as moral requirements of justice and seeks to identify the types of duties and responsibilities implied for various kinds of actors. In doing so, it uses the work of two prominent political philosophers who address pervasive and grave injustices resulting from structural causes. Pogge's theory focuses on the role of formal institutions and legal and economic practice, whereas Young focuses on the role of the cumulative actions of individuals which result in large-scale social and global processes and structures. Both theories were originally devised to address injustices of an economic nature. Nevertheless, the paper argues that the arguments and conceptual frameworks employed by them can be of great use in identifying and providing normative justification for the various kinds of duties and responsibilities that different actors have in relation to VAW and its (re)production. Further to Pogge's and Young's, the paper also uses Serena Parekh's (2007, 2011, 2012; Libal and Parekh 2009) and Alison Jaggar's (2014a, 2014b) work to devise a theory of VAW as a matter of global justice.
The paper argues that Young's theory and the type of responsibility she describes is useful in conceptualising the responsibility of individuals participating in patriarchal societies and practices that uphold gender norms, maintaining the root-causes that (re)produce VAW. The cumulative actions of individuals come together to form social structures (including cross-border structures) that result in unjust outcomes. At the same time, Pogge's account on the responsibility of institutions, which is formulated in terms of a negative duty, is also useful. State and international institutions and institutional actors with power to coerce and to impose rules and laws, by virtue of their power, are special kinds of agents who do not only share in a collective responsibility, but are accountable and blameworthy when imposing systems producing unjust outcomes. Pogge's concept of institutional (in contrast to interactional) human rights to describe the case in which institutions are responsible for generating what he calls "human rights deficits" (rather than "violations") is especially useful in conceptualising the massive undefulfillment of women's human rights to security.
The paper also outlines some particular qualities of VAW and gender injustice that call for alterations in existing arguments originally devised for addressing other types of injustice.

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 12, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
Department of Philosophy
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I'm a postgraduate student in philosophy at University College London and a visiting researcher at the London Mathematical Laboratory.

Title: **When should numbers count?**
Keywords: numbers, self-consciousness, personhood, moral decision-making, rationality

Abstract
John Taurek challenges the idea that, in moral decision-making, numbers of stakeholders should influence and perhaps even determine the decision in favour of the larger set of stakeholders. He says they shouldn't. He grounds this conclusion on the argument than suffering cannot be aggregated and thus compared quantitatively. According to Taurek, this only applies to human beings, which implies there is a line that divides cases in which non-aggregability of suffering is in force from cases in which it isn't. But Taurek's suggestion that humans lie on one side and objects on the other is all we get from him, and this leaves open questions concerning famously problematic stakeholders such as lower and higher-order animals, unborn children, comma patients, and the like. My paper's aim, then, is to provide eligibility criteria. I first show how Taurek's argument is implicitly a phenomenological argument and then how this allows for a first line dividing subjects and objects rather than humans and objects. This still leaving loose ends, I then draw on Chrstine Korsgaard's account of rationality to suggest a further line that privileges, among subjects, persons (not necessarily humans) as bearers of natural duties. This, however, demands a way for the moral decider to assess whether the stakeholders are persons. I suggest one such way by connecting the social-relational condition in Korsgaard's account with Christopher Peacocke's account of self-consciousness, and claim that a moral decider recognises a subject as a person if the subject recognises the decider as a person as well – a result endorsed by early insights from the phenomenological tradition. This conclusion suggests three plausible degrees of applicability of the non-aggregability argument and therefore of duty owed: (1) objects don't qualify; (2) subjects qualify but no natural duty is owed to them, and (3) persons qualify, and natural duties are owed to them. This framework may allow to assess, if we sympathise with Taurek, the status of problematic stakeholders that his initial argument had left open.

Palynchuk, Matthew
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 17, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
Concordia University, Montreal, Canada.

I am currently completing my MA in Philosophy at Concordia University, under the supervision of Pablo Gilabert. My research interests include contemporary political philosophy, normative ethics, and analytical Marxism.

Title: **Human Rights for Persons with Disabilities and the Site of Justice**
Keywords: Basic Structure, Disability, Duties of Justice, Rights, Site of Justice

Abstract
My project is most broadly aimed at applying pressure to a common position that actions which do not deviate from the law are sufficient for fulfilling the duties individuals owe to society and that the task of redressing injustice is a matter to be delegated to the state and important institutions. Through the rights and duties articulated in the United Nation's Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), I will argue that meeting the demands of human rights for persons with disabilities requires clarifying duties of justice in personal choice rather than focusing exclusively on major institutions such as the state (or, in Rawlsian language, the basic structure of society). I motivate this claim by revisiting and moving forward the discussion on the "site of justice" between G.A Cohen, John Rawls, Liam Murphy, and Andrew Williams. In the first part of the paper I want to argue that the institutional form of redress of the basic structure to group-specific needs, when those groups are minorities or otherwise disadvantaged, will entail either undesirable coercion to enforce duties to meet those needs or those needs will fall beyond the scope of legitimate enforcement of institutional action. The latter has a distributive remainder in terms of what persons, like people with disabilities, are minimally owed according to human rights treaties. More pointedly, I will advance the claim that meeting such demands will require that personal choices and actions outside the purview of the basic structure are constrained by and a duty of justice. The second part of this paper is concerned with spelling out what these duties of justice are and their status in the project of human rights specifically and social justice generally. Grounding the CRPD in theories of social justice that are sensitive to group-specific needs and the role of personal choice in promoting justice (such as Iris Young, Susan Okin, Anita Silvers, and G.A Cohen), my work intends to show that these personal duties of justice for persons with disabilities are not restricted to the realm of human rights discourse, but are constitutive of the broader aims of social justice and require serious attention. In sum, my paper has three positive aims: The first is developing the duties of justice for persons with disabilities; the second is to show the systematic consequences these duties have for social justice in terms of what they bear on the question of the site of justice; and the third is fully fleshing out the duties that are correlated to the rights specified in the CRPD more specifically.

Peeters, Wouter
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 19, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
I am a Lecturer in Global Ethics at the University of Birmingham (Centre for the Study of Global Ethics). I obtained my MA (2010) and PhD (2014) in Philosophy and Moral Sciences from the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. My main research interests include political philosophy, global ethics and intersubjective ethics. More specifically, I am currently working on social justice, climate change, and environmental sustainability.

Title: **A multilevel sufficientarian framework for social justice**
Keywords: social justice, sufficientarianism, sufficiency, distributive justice, environmental sustainability

Abstract
At the heart of debates about social justice is the question regarding the pattern of distribution or, in other words, according to which principle distribution should take place. The principle of sufficiency has recently gained considerable attention as an alternative to the notions of equality and priority, essentially holding that the goal of distribution is to secure a good enough level of advantage for everyone.

However, sufficientarian accounts have faced forceful objections. For example, critics argue that the threshold of sufficiency cannot nonarbitrarily or unambiguously be determined. In addition, sufficientarian accounts have not been clear on the importance of this threshold in determining the relative moral value of benefitting people. With their emphasis on the importance of the notion of sufficiency, these accounts have also disregarded the question as to how distribution should take place below and above the threshold. The compatibility of the doctrine of sufficiency with concerns for the worst off, personal responsibility and choice has remained underexplored. Finally, the issue of environmental sustainability has remained unaddressed: can sufficiency be secured for everyone without transgressing the biophysical constraints of the ecosphere?

Sufficientarianism thus stands in need for further development in order to address these issues. In this paper, we will therefore defend an innovative multilevel sufficientarian framework of social justice. We will first describe the framework, specifying its thresholds as well as the normative structure of distribution. Second, drawing upon the existing political philosophical debate generated by the doctrine of sufficiency, we will argue that this framework is able to address the issues sufficientarian accounts continue to grapple with. Third, we will discuss some implications for the practical debates regarding the politics of redistribution and recognition. Finally, we will indicate how sufficiency understood in these terms can be secured while preserving the environmental preconditions for human life.

Rajão, Hugo
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 18, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
Licenciado em Filosofia e Mestre em Filosofia Contemporânea, pela Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto. Membro (sem vínculo) do Instituto de Filosofia.

Title: **Ronald Dwokin e Philippe Van Parijs: A que distância está a Igualdade de Recursos da distribuição de um Rendimento Básico Incondicional?**
Keywords: Rendimento Básico Incondicional, justiça, recursos, leilão, seguro

Abstract
Apesar das diferenças existentes entre as conceções apresentadas por Donald Dworkin e Philippe Van Parijs, ambas parecem ter em comum a defesa para cada pessoa da propriedade de uma parte igual, ou 'leximin', dos ativos da sociedade, dentro de um quadro de liberdades básicas do ponto de vista formal, pelo simples facto de aí existirem e, por conseguinte, serem seus membros. Por este prisma, a 'Igualdade de Recursos', proposta pelo primeiro, conduz, de alguma forma, à distribuição de um Rendimento Básico Incondicional, conforme advoga o segundo? Ou seja, como o nome indica, um rendimento atribuído a cada um independentemente (1) da situação laboral e da disponibilidade, ou não, para trabalhar, (2) do nível de riqueza, (3) da composição do agregado familiar e (4) da localização geográfica. Resumidamente, Dworkin considera que uma sociedade só é justa caso demonstre por todos os cidadãos igual preocupação e respeito. Nesse sentido propõe-se em encontrar a conceção de justiça que melhor interprete esse ideal, o que significa, fazer cumprir os dois princípios do individualismo ético. O princípio da importância igual consiste na ideia de que todas as vidas humanas merecem ser bem-sucedidas, sendo igualmente importantes do ponto de vista objetivo. O princípio da responsabilidade especial defende que não obstante isso cada pessoa deve ser responsável por esse mesmo sucesso, no que concerne à sua própria vida. Seguindo os dois princípios esta impõe, como justa, uma distribuição, individualizada, dos recursos do mundo que obedeça a dois requisitos. Por um lado, associada ao segundo, deve ser 'ambition- sensitive', ou seja, tem de refletir as consequências das escolhas que cada um decide fazer. Por outro, associado ao primeiro, não pode ser 'endowment – sensitive', isto é, que alguém tenha, a dado momento, menos recursos simplesmente em virtude dos efeitos não das suas escolhas, mas das circunstâncias, não se constituindo desse modo responsável - menos talentos para produzir o que os demais apreciam, padecer de uma doença, sofrer um acidente, etc. De modo a concretizá-lo Dworkin recorre a dois dispositivos hipotéticos: um leilão e mercado de seguros. Numa intuição primordial, se por um lado o primeiro princípio do individualismo ético e o requisito distributivo ao qual está associado parece poder justificar um RBI, o segundo, e respetivo requisito, deixa mais dúvidas dada a maneira particular como Dworkin interpreta o papel da responsabilidade individual. Se a fase inicial do leilão abre algum caminho, já não é tão crível no que respeita ao mercado de seguros
Assim, na presente comunicação procuro analisar até que ponto a teoria da justiça proposta por Ronald Dworkin - a 'Igualdade de Recursos' - pode justificar a atribuição de um Rendimento Básico Incondicional, centrando-me no artigo "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources".

Reglitz, Merten
Country: Germany
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Affiliation: United Kingdom
Presentation: 9th June, Session 14, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
I'm a lecturer in Global Ethics at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Birmingham.
Before starting this position in September 2016, I was a post-doc at the Cluster of Excellence 'Normative Orders' at the Goethe University Frankfurt.
In 2012/13 I was an assistant visiting professor at the Central European University in Budapest.
I completed a PhD in Philosophy at the University of Warwick in 2011 and was a visiting research student at the University of Arizona in 2009/10.

Title: **A RECONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TOWARD EUROPEAN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE**
Keywords: social justice, reciprocity, EU treaties, transfer mechanisms

Abstract
There is great disagreement among the EU member states about what distributive justice ought to mean in the context of the European Union (exemplary for this disagreement are the debates about 'Eurobonds' and the distribution of refugees within the Union as well as the prevalence of national stereotypes as explanations for the economic situation of the member states). Positions are often informed by the historical experiences of nations and their current economic situation. Thus these positions vary dramatically, ranging from greater European integration to outright rejection of the idea of intra-EU redistribution. In this situation it is difficult to even find common ground for debating the requirements of distributive justice.
In this paper, I argue that we can find a common foundation from which to begin our conversation: the founding treaties of the European Union. A reconstructive approach toward these documents shows that the Union is indeed based on common values and goals, such as to 'promote and protect democracy, […] solidarity, […] equality [and to] help Europe benefit economically and socially from globalization'. However, given its current setup, the Union lacks the redistributive mechanisms and policies necessary for realizing these common values and objectives. Thus, in the face of rising inequality among its member states, the EU must make an effort to develop a greater consensus on European distributive justice, in order for it to be morally justified in wielding all of the powers it has assumed.
While the existing disagreement about European distributive justice is undeniable, the growing anti-EU sentiment in many member states puts pressure on the status quo and those who most benefit from it. While it would be inaccurate to attribute primary responsibility to the EU for many of the members' problems, it is plausible to claim that the EU does not provide the institutional structures that are required for its members to profit as intended from membership in the Union. The paper thus has the following aims:
1. To analyze some of the core EU treaties in terms of the motivations of the member states for joining the union and the self-conception of the EU (i.e. its purposes and goals);
2. To identify existing policies, structures, and narratives (e.g. austerity politics; a common currency without a common fiscal policy or budget; and politicians' insistence that domestic problems have domestic causes) that suggest that the EU is failing its self-attributed and intended objectives;
3. And to suggest what would have to be done minimally so that the EU can fulfill its own purposes and goals.
My argument is that without a new focus on social justice and the implementation of certain redistributive mechanisms and policies, the EU is (a) unlikely to deliver on its own aims, (b) will continue to lack legitimacy for some of the policies it enforces on its members, and (c) cannot hope to regain popular support among those for whom the EU currently does not make good on its intended purposes and goals. My conclusion is that (notwithstanding the current disagreements) unless the EU members accept greater distributive obligations among themselves, the Union is unlikely to solve its current problems of internal division and dwindling public support, which increasingly are seen to threaten the entire project that is the EU.

Risberg, Eirik Julius
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 13, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Eirik Julius Risberg holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Oslo, Norway. He was a Fulbright Fellow at UC Berkeley, California in 2011/2012, and is currently employed as a researcher at the Falstad Centre for Democracy and Human Rights.

Title: **Forward-looking Collective Responsibility and the Problem of Shared Intentionality**
Keywords: Shared intentionality, collective responsibility, individual responsibility, agency, blame
Abstract
Some actions are collective in nature; playing a game, dancing a dance, or engaging in a war are all examples of collective actions. Unlike the spontaneous scramble to seek refuge from a sudden rain shower, as John Searle (1990) has argued, the same movement, as part of a coordinated performance requires that we act collectively, and may arguably – in certain cases – engender collective moral responsibility.
The notion of collective agency and collective moral responsibility however, give rise to several intractable problems. One such problem is how to account for the metaphysics of collective agency. While it is often assumed that collective agency and collective responsibility requires shared intentionality, it has proven particularly difficult to offer an account of the ontology of shared intentionality. The problem is not merely of theoretical interest but goes to the heart of the question of the nature of collective agency: Is the intentionality of collective action merely an accumulation of individual intentions or is it shared among the individual members – and can the moral blame for a collective transgression be distributed across individual members?
While most contributions to the scholarly debate on collective agency and collective moral responsibility address the question of backward-looking moral responsibility, especially the question of how to account for collective moral responsibility for past transgressions and whether the blame for past transgressions can be distributed across individual members of the collective, a discussion has recently appeared, addressing forward-looking collective responsibility. Forward-looking moral responsibility does not address the responsibility an agent may be said to bear for some previous wrong, but argues that we have certain responsibilities to bring about a future state of affairs that we consider desirable. While encountering many of the same problems as those addressing backward-looking moral responsibility, it is generally assumed that forward-looking collective moral responsibility avoids some of the intractable metaphysical problems that dog backward-looking moral responsibility. Thus, Marion Smiley argues that “while forward looking collective responsibility only works with purposeful agents, it does not require either a “collective mind” or that an agent be able to form “we intentions” (Smiley 2017). However, if we are to talk of collective responsibility for bringing about future affairs, it seems that we do need to form or establish some form of collective agency (e.g. we-intentions) also for these forward-looking issues. Firstly, it seems that in the absence of such a collective agency, we would simply be talking about individual forward-looking responsibility. And secondly, since most of the challenges that face us are extremely complex and truly global in nature, it seems that in order to have any hope of solving some of the most pressing issues ahead we need to develop a kind of shared intentionality and collective responsibility also for future problems.
In this exploratory paper, I wish to address the question of how to ground a forward-looking collective moral responsibility in the idea of a shared intentionality and collective moral responsibility for future global challenges. I wish to argue that it is of paramount importance that we are able to develop a notion of collective agency also for forward-looking action. The work will engage with a recent collection of essays on the topic (French and Wettstein 2014), drawing in particular on a critical appraisal of Felix Pinkert’s (2014) recent suggestion of how we can “do a whole lot more than we currently do” (Pinkert 2014: 202).
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 5, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
I am an Associate Lecturer with the Open University. I have an MA in Philosophy; my dissertation was 'Can liberalism and nationalism co-habit?' I am in year 5 of a part-time PhD with the Open University. My thesis title is 'Should a liberal state ban the burqa?' My supervisors are Dr Jon Pike and Dr Sean Cordell.

Title: **THE LIBERAL RESPONSE TO VOLUNTARY HABITUAL PUBLIC FACE-COVERING PER SE**
Keywords: LIBERAL; BAN; BURQA; MULTICULTURALISM; FEMINISM

Abstract
A number of countries, such as France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Chad and Cameroon, have enacted legislation to ban the wearing of the burqa and niqab in public. Arguments about whether such a ban is justified seem to be bedevilled by imputations of bad faith; the agenda or motivations behind the ban, or behind objections to the ban, become the focus of the argument. To bring some light to this debate I consider the question purely in the abstract, putting aside questions of religion, culture or domestic politics.

To do this I make certain stipulations. First I stipulate that the question is to be considered only in the context of a liberal state – that is, a state which regards all citizens as free and equal. What an illiberal or theocratic state might do is another question.

Second, I take the position that it is face-covering that is the key issue; that the burqa and niqab are associated with Islam is disregarded.

Third, I assume that the face-covering is voluntary. Coerced face-covering raises different issues; it might justifiably be banned by a liberal state on the grounds of the coercion rather than the face-covering itself.

Fourth, I assume that the face-covering is habitual, i.e. that it is worn all the time in public, unlike scarves, ski-goggles, motorcycle helmets etc.

Fifth, I put aside the fact that burqas and niqabs are worn only by women; my aim is to clarify the liberal position on the act of voluntary habitual public face-covering per se.

In the paper I argue that the face occupies a special significance in human society. Covering it is more problematic than covering any other part of the body and brings severe disadvantages. Nevertheless a liberal state ought not to ban face-covering for that reason; in liberal states citizens are allowed to make choices to their own disadvantage. A liberal state should therefore allow voluntary habitual public face-covering, with the proviso that temporary removal could legitimately be required in situations where security, communication or identification were at issue.

That is only the beginning of the debate. Subsequently we will want to enquire whether other considerations could justify modifying this general position. The (changing) realities of the situation might give us cause to make the liberal position on face-covering per se either less or more severe. But securing agreement on the liberal position on face-covering per se is an essential starting point for further debate.

Rossi, Mauro
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 4, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
Author 1: Mauro Rossi
Affiliation: Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM)
Short Bio: Mauro Rossi is an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM). His research interests are in value theory and philosophy of economics. His current scholarship focuses particularly on well-being, psychological happiness, interpersonal utility comparisons, and the fitting-attitude analysis of value.

Author 2: Andrée-Anne Cormier
Affiliation: Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Short Bio: Andrée-Anne Cormier is a postdoctoral fellow in the Law Department at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, working as a member of the Family Justice research project, funded by the European Research Council Consolidator Grants programme. She works primarily on issues of legitimacy and justice in upbringing. Her research interests also include educational justice, public reason and animal ethics.

Title: **Is children's well-being the same as adults' well-being?**
Keywords: Well-being; Children; Adults; Special goods of childhood; Emotions and moods.

Abstract
A little more than twenty years ago, Wayne Sumner (1996: 13-14) claimed that a theory of well-being must be 'general' in two distinct senses. First, it must help us make sense of "all of the different sorts of welfare assessments we make", most notably assessments concerning an individual's well-being levels and well-being gains and losses. Second, it must equally apply to all (paradigmatic) well-being subjects, including children, infants, and many non-human animals, in addition to adults. Recently, however, Andrew Skelton (2015) has challenged Sumner's requirement. Skelton has claimed that a theory of well-being must be general only in the first sense, but not necessarily in the second. In fact, it might be the case that what makes a life go well is different for children and for adults, so that we need two distinct theories of well-being for these stages of life.

The question that we want to consider in this paper is whether well-being is, as a matter of fact, general in the second sense distinguished by Sumner. In other words, we want to examine the question of whether, and in what sense, well-being is the same for children and adults. Our paper is divided into two parts. In the first, we consider four arguments for thinking that children's and adults' well-being is fundamentally different: the argument from contextualism about well-being judgments, the argument from the subject-relativity of well-being, the argument from the special goods of childhood, and the argument from the role of rational capacities for well-being. We argue that all these arguments can be challenged. In the second part, we propose three arguments in favour of the claim that children's well-being is the same as adults' well-being, at least at the explanatory level, that is, when it comes to the explanation of why certain items are good for children and adults. We call these the argument from descriptive adequacy, the argument from practical utility, and the substantive argument.

In a nutshell, our positive arguments are the following. First, if children's well-being is fundamentally different from adults', then there exists a point where the standards of an individual's well-being fundamentally change. However, this seems inconsistent with the gradual character of the transition from childhood to adulthood. Second, insofar as a plausible theory of well-being must help us make sense of our assessments of well-being levels and differences, then it must avoid construing intra-personal inter-temporal comparisons as well as inter-personal comparisons of children's and adults' well-being as meaningless. However, this is precisely what follows if children's and adults' well-being are conceived of as fundamentally different. Third, we argue that the most plausible theory of well-being applies equally to children and adults. The view that we defend assigns a special importance to fitting emotions and moods as constituents of well-being. We show that, insofar as children's emotions and moods become, over time, more complex, intertwined, and identity-defining, this account can account for the variations in well-being occurring during the transition from childhood to adulthood, while preserving a substantial explanatory unity.

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Presentation: 9th June, Session 19, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
I am a PhD student in Philosophy at the London School of Economics. My work is in the ethics of risk and uncertainty. I am also interested in ethics and political philosophy more generally. I received a masters in Political Theory from the University of Sheffield and a BA in PPE from the University of Manchester.

Title: **Fairness and the Satisfaction of Unequal Claims**
Keywords: fairness, competing claims, risk, lotteries, John Broome

Abstract
What does fairness require in cases where individuals have unequal claims to a good? Some have argued that what fairness requires depends on the strength of claims of those who have their interests at stake (Broome, 1990; Piller forthcoming). On this view, when claims are very unequal fairness requires giving the good directly to the person with the strongest claim, and when claims are slightly unequal, fairness requires the use of a weighted lottery. Broome claims that whether it is fairest to give the good to the person with the strongest claim or hold a weighted lottery "depends on a complicated judgment" (1990: 98-99), where one has to weigh the fairness contribution of the lottery against the fairness that can be achieved directly in outcome. Others have questioned the contribution to fairness made by weighted lotteries and have argued that fairness requires that the person with the strongest claim ought to receive the good directly (Hooker, 2005: 348-9; Lazenby 2014). Hugh Lazenby, for example, has recently argued that "any contribution to fairness from entering claims into a lottery is lexically posterior to fairness in outcome." (2014: 331).

I shall argue for the inverse of Lazenby's lexical ordering: that in distributive cases with indivisible goods and unequal claims, fairness requires that a weighted lottery be selected over an option that directly guarantees fairness in outcome. Fairness in outcome is the fairness of the pattern of actual satisfaction of claims. In establishing this conclusion, I outline and defend an account of distributive fairness called Fairness as Proper Recognition of Claims. This account is grounded in a deontological account of what it means to respect claims. The account provides a justification for lotteries in cases with unequal claims and is appropriately sensitive to changes to the number and strength of claims. I argue that in competing claims cases with unequal claims, fairness requires the use of a weighted lottery. In Section 1 I outline Lazenby's account and in Section 2 I consider three objections to this account. I outline my justification of weighted lotteries in Section 3 before responding to potential objections to my view in Section 4. I offer my conclusion in Section 5. My focus in this paper is on what fairness requires, rather than what one ought to do all things considered. An option being more fair than another does not imply that it is all-things-considered superior. For example, even if it is fairer to destroy the good in question, considerations of utility might outweigh those of fairness.

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Piller, Christian, forthcoming, "Treating Broome Fairly", Utilitas, pp. 1-25.

Rudas, Sebastián
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 23, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
About: I am a post-doctoral researcher in political philosophy at the University of São Paulo (Brazil) and a visiting post-doctoral researcher at University of Leuven (Belgium). My research focuses on contemporary debates about secularism. In particular, I analyze how to interpret the relationship between the state and institutionalized religions in contexts where the latter are not completely disestablished and defend a conception of a public morality that is either sectarian or at odds with the ideals of a liberal state.

Title: **Against Moralized Secularism**
Keywords: liberalism, separation of church and state, religion, pluralism

Abstract
The purpose of this article is to propose a non-moralized interpretation of what secularism is. Moralized definitions of secularism are those that situate moral values at the core of their definitions. Joselyn Maclure's and Charles Taylor's "liberal pluralism" is emblematic for it states that freedom of conscience and equal respect are the fundamental moral values of secularism, while separation of church and state and neutrality of the state are the institutional means of secularism. Importantly, these definitions rule out conceptualizations of secularism that rely exclusively on defenses of the principle of separation and thereby legitimize restrictions of freedom of religion to minorities. Against these views, I advance an objection according to which secularism ends up being a redundant category as it carries no distinctive normative content that cannot be found in the more general, and less divisive, terminology of liberalism and democracy. This objection supports Veit Bader's farewell to secularism in favor of what he calls the "priority for democracy." According to Bader, political philosophers should stop using the terminology of secularism and instead focus on promoting and defending liberal and democratic institutions. In order to avoid the redundancy objection, I suggest to conceive secularism in a non-moralized manner that refers uniquely to the institutional arrangements that a state can set in place in order to address possible conflicts with organized religion(s) that might emerge as an effect of the implementation of its broader political project. Under this interpretation, it is possible to conceptualize expressions of secularism that are either non-liberal (i.e. republican) or not motivated by the acknowledgment of new forms of pluralism as being the prime challenge a state might face for advancing its political project (i.e. anticlerical). As the redundancy objection shows, this is a possibility that moralized accounts of secularism preclude.

Santander-Martinez, Claudio
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 17, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
Claudio Santander-Martinez
PhD Student, Politics, Economics and Philosophy
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Title: **Civic Autonomy and Distributive Justice.**
Keywords: Personal Autonomy, Distributive Justice, Legitimacy, J. Rawls, G.A. Cohen

Abstract
Should autonomous persons' reasonable plans of life play a normative role in legitimising political and economic institutions in particular, and distributive justice in general? One way to answer this is to revisit G.A. Cohen's critics to J. Rawls's incentive argument. Cohen claims that Rawls' justice as fairness is an insufficient conception of justice to account for a truly egalitarian ethos that informs and guides persons' motivations and actions, because its principles of justice are designed to organise the major institutions of the basic structure of society. In particular, Rawls' difference principle implies that a just social cooperation might justifiably allocates incentives for talented workers so that their high productivity benefits the worst-off. Cohen argues that the difference principle might accept that those incentives be necessary since the talented could decide not to work as productively as in cases where such rewards were granted. The rationale behind such "incentive argument", according to Cohen, is that justice so conceived places no moral limits on persons' economic behaviour, which in turn would imply unjust inequalities. The aim of this paper is to argue that a more satisfactory way to morally justify economic behaviour in cases as the ones implied in the incentive argument discussion is by assessing how economic institutions of the basic structure value persons' autonomy as free and equal citizens and not merely as self-interested agents. To show this, I firstly reconstruct a Standard Rawlsian Response (SRR) to Cohen's criticism by following the incentive argument literature, that replies that the difference principle applies to the basic structure of society as long as an individual prerogative view is implied. According to this view, society's members have a legitimate personal prerogative to perform actions that produces less than the best outcome within the moral constrain that imposes the principles of justice. Secondly, I argue that the personal prerogative view to be morally justified should be framed as expression of a conception of citizen's autonomy or civic autonomy. Finally, I argue that by grounding the SRR on such civic conception of autonomy society gets a legitimate egalitarian ethos of social and economic institutions since autonomous citizens so conceived are committed to social relations through a twofold view: one regarding their comprehensive conceptions of the good and another, regarding their political conception of social justice. In doing so, persons commit to a division of moral labour and exercise public practical reasoning that accommodates persons' own conception of good life with a regulative desire of adopting the egalitarian justice standpoint. Citizen's reasonable and autonomous plan of life then are accountable not only in regards to their decisions and preferences in realising their plans but also in relation to distributive social inequalities.

Schäfferle, Eva-Maria

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Presentation: 9th June, Session 14, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
Affiliation: Goethe University Frankfurt and University of Grenoble (Sciences Po Grenoble)

Graduating in the field of normative political theory, Eva-Maria Schäfferle is actually carrying out her research within the framework of a bi-national doctoral programme (cotutelle de thèse) at the University of Grenoble (Sciences Po Grenoble) and the Goethe University Frankfurt. The title of her PhD thesis which will be defended in July 2018 reads as follows: "The Paradox of Democratic Legitimacy and its Implications for European Union Citizenship: The rights of Third Country Nationals in the European Union". Eva-Maria Schäfferle is particularly interested in questions regarding democratic theory, the principle of self-determination, the concept of citizenship as well as in transnational and European politics.

Title: **Between individual and collective self-determination: which rights should be granted to Third Country Nationals?**

Keywords: Democratic Boundary Problem, Self-determination, Citizenship, European Union, Third Country Nationals

Abstract
Between individual and collective self-determination: which rights should be granted to Third Country Nationals?

Arguing from the perspective of democratic theory, this contribution wishes to discuss which civil, social and political rights EU member states should grant not only to European citizens but also to legally residing third country nationals (TCNs) in order to do justice to the democratic values of individual liberty and autonomy.
While such questions concerning the appropriate treatment of non-citizens have for a long time been largely neglected by political theorists, they have become particularly salient in recent years. Indeed, with globalization and transnationalization proceeding apace, an increasing number of people currently reside in states whose citizenship they have not (yet) acquired. Deprived of the rights traditionally attached to state citizenship, they are subjected to the law of their host state without, however, having a say in its making – a situation which clearly undermines the core democratic ideal of individual self-determination.
Nevertheless, a closer look at the principle of self-determination reveals a major paradox of democratic thinking: even if it depends on a clearly defined 'demos' as an indispensable prerequisite for any democratic procedure, democratic theory seems incapable of legitimizing the distinction between citizens and non-citizens that this would require. Revealing the arbitrary nature of modern membership regimes, this so-called "Democratic Boundary Problem" has recently sparked an intense debate about the legitimacy of contemporary citizenship and immigration policies. While this debate is largely dominated by an opposition between (liberal) national and cosmopolitan thinkers, the present contribution will argue that neither their concepts of state citizenship nor of a global citizenry provide convincing answers to the paradox described above. It will focus instead on the concrete rights traditionally attached to citizenship thereby seeking to determine those rights that should be granted to nationals and non-nationals alike as well as those which can legitimately be reserved for citizens only.
In order to do so, the contribution proposed here will concentrate on EU citizenship and the rights of legally residing third country nationals. As first membership regime beyond the nation state, Union citizenship undoubtedly provides a novelty within political theory: by conferring upon all European citizens residing in another member state essential rights and liberties, it ensures that they enjoy a minimum of political autonomy and self-determination outside their home state. Because of Union citizenship's derivative character, all TCNs remain, however, excluded from these beneficial effects. Based on an analysis of the rights European states grant to their non-European population, this contribution will investigate the legitimacy of the current differentiation between European and non-European residents. While defending the basic right of states to discriminate between citizens and non-citizens, it will argue that democratic theory provides no arguments able to justify the unequal treatment between European and non-European residents. All rights granted to European citizens by virtue of their Union citizenship should consequently also be accorded to TNCs residing on a legal and permanent basis within the European Union.

Simoncelli, Damiano
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 22, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Damiano Simoncelli - PhD Student, University of Genoa-FINO Consortium

Damiano Simoncelli graduated in Philosophy at "Ca' Foscari" University of Venice in 2016 with a thesis on Natural Law in Thomas Aquinas, under the direction of Professor Paolo Pagani. Since October 2016, he is PhD Student at the University of Genoa (FINO Consortium). He is working on the relationship of Virtues and Law in MacIntyre's thought and in his German critics (tutor: Prof Angelo Campodonico). He is also member of the Venetian research group of the Interuniversity Centre of Studies on Ethics (CISE) and junior researcher of Aretai. Center on Virtues.

Title: **From Natural Law to the Golden Rule**
Aquinas Re-visited
Keywords: Natural Law, Aquinas' Ethics, Golden Rule, Intercultural Ethics, MacIntyre.

Abstract
These days, the Thomistic account of Natural Law is object of a renewed interest, especially related to the current multicultural context (e.g. Cunningham 2009). A number of objections are usually lodged to the idea of a human nature and a shared human good, in that it might seem that these ideas are definitely culturally-related and that local cultural boundaries cannot be crossed. At the same time, the concept of 'human nature' is often misunderstood, as if it only meant 'human biology' (physicalist reading). If so understood, Natural Law would limit the comprehension of human being to its physiology only. In this paper, I shall propose a reinterpretation of the Thomistic doctrine of Natural Law, which may allow to overcome these problems. To do this, my starting point will be the reading of the Thomistic thought proposed by the Italian ethicist Carmelo Vigna, who rephrases Aquinas' doctrine of Natural Law as a form of Golden Rule ("Do unto others as you would have them do unto you"). Indeed, according to Vigna (Vigna 2008 and 2015), Natural Law, in its minimal form, can be expressed in terms of the first principle of practical reason "Good is to be done and pursued and evil is to be avoided". Accordingly, the answer about what the good to be done is, is to be found in the link with the Golden Rule: is to be done and pursued that good I would others do unto me.
A similar solution can be found in Macintyrean thought. In MacIntyre's Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (MacIntyre 1990), the Scottish philosopher argues that Natural Law is discovered when a person enters a community and, at the same time, it is the condition of that community, since, in order to enter a community, someone has to recognize the other's good as his own. In subsequent Macintyrean works (e.g. MacIntyre 2009) the focus is moved to the relationships between different communities and traditions: in such a debate, the comparison presupposes the reciprocal acknowledgement of who is debating. According to MacIntyre, in this way Aquinas' doctrine of ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 2 can be recovered not in an abstract manner, regardless of the specificity of the different traditions.
Finally, I will consider the opportunities opened up by this reinterpretation, for instance the intersubjective ground versus the physicalist one, the importance of a social placement and the potentialities for an intercultural shared ethics.
Keywords: Natural Law, Aquinas' Ethics, Golden Rule, Intercultural Ethics, MacIntyre.
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Short Bio
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Title: **Privilege and Luck Egalitarianism**
Keywords: Privilege, Luck Egalitarianism, Injustice, Liberalism, Private-Public Distinction

Abstract
Luck egalitarians hold, roughly speaking, that justice requires that the state compensate and correct for inequalities that are the result of arbitrary circumstances. Luck egalitarianism is not necessarily committed to what the currency of such a distributive scheme should be. Some have argued that the state should distribute resources equally (Dworkin, 1981). Others have argued that welfare (or opportunity for welfare) should be the focus of distributive justice (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989). Sidestepping the controversy over the currency of distributive justice, contemporary Luck egalitarians (Segall, 2016; Tan, 2012) emphasize the institutional character of luck egalitarianism. This emphasis amounts to the claim that justice (and in particular distributive justice) is inherently related to the behavior of states and state-directed institutions, not the (autonomous) choices of individuals. Luck egalitarianism, as such, is a liberal theory, which relies on (some version of) the distinction between 'private' and 'public'. This is evident both in luck egalitarianism's treatment of the state as the agent of justice, and the further specification of what kinds of outcomes comprise injustice and require state involvement. The idea that the outcomes of (autonomous) poor choices do not justify state-administered compensation presupposes that the state has no business compensating or rewarding people for the private choices they make freely and autonomously.
Privilege is often construed as a set of unearned benefits and advantages people of some group in society enjoy as the result of the habitual and systematic oppression of – and bias against – other groups in society (Bailey, 1998; McIntosh, 1988; Pease, 2010; Sullivan, 2006). These benefits penetrate to all aspects of one's life: family, work, safety and security, treatment by the state and its agents, and so on. If you're a luck egalitarian, then privilege should be an obvious candidate for equalizing distribution. It is arbitrary, it is unearned, it implicates welfare, resources, access to advantage, opportunity for welfare, and capabilities.
I argue that luck egalitarianism cannot provide an appropriate remedy to the injustice inherent in privilege. Specifically, luck egalitarians who wish to remain liberal cannot apply their theory to privilege. Privilege cuts across the distinction between the private and the public. It is a public benefit systematically distributed through private actions. Overcoming privilege through distribution alone requires complete regulation and control of the market, or complete control of each and every aspect of people's lives (and, perhaps, minds). Thus, if luck egalitarianism tries to appropriately address the injustice inherent in privilege through distribution, it ends up leading to either a radical form of socialism, or to a totalitarian state. Conversely, if luck egalitarianism remains a liberal theory, then it fails to overcome a form of injustice which seems to be a glaring fit for luck egalitarianism.

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SWIANIEWICZ, JAN
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 11, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Jan Swianiewicz (Department of Philosophy, University of Warsaw) received his PhD degree in philosophy in 2013. His thesis (published in 2014) concerned the philosophy and methodology of contemporary macrohistorical studies of capitalism. He specializes in ethics, continental philosophy and philosophy of history. Currently he is leading the project "Population Ethics and Theories of Biopolitics" (founded by Polish National Science Center) and teaching at the Institute of Philosophy, UW.

Title: **Population Ethics and Becoming an Ethcial Subject of Procreation**
Keywords: population ethics, procreation, responsibility for future generations, history of the family, biopolitics

Abstract
My presentation will consist of three parts: (1) a review of chosen literature from the field of Population Ethics guided by the question about responsible procreation, (2) a comparison to chosen hypothesis made by historians of the institution of the family, (3) a suggestion of addressing the problem recalling chosen ethical concepts of Spinoza and Nietzsche.

(1) Population ethics is a fascinating field of studies because in it a reflection on morality of human procreation bypasses the exacerbated metaphysical "beginning of life issues" and morphs into a challenge to understand human life on the level of population, that is on a level where the protagonists are individuals and collective, present and future, aggregate and the abstract "human mass". However population ethicists very rarely or indirectly address the question who and in what way is to assume the responsibility for future people. This interpretation will by consider mostly on the examples of D. Parfit's „impersonal approach", its main theoretical opponent: the „person-affecting approach" (in D. Heyd's formulation), and Melinda A. Roberts as she poses the „Child versus Childmaker" problem in the title of her 1998 book. What do the findings of population ethicists can tell us about our efforts to procreate "responsibly" and "consciously"? I will suggest a more precise way to formulate this question based on a distinction between "the object of moral theory", the concept of "moral agent", and the concept of "ethical subject".

(2) The question about individual reproductive choices is being posed in many fields of knowledge, among them by social historians studying the history of the family or history of private life. I will focus mainly on the concept of the so called „Malthusian family" referring briefly its formulations (and criticisms) by J.-L. Flandrin, P. Veyne and M. Foucault. In such historiographical light a political meaning underlying two paradoxes accoutered in the field of population ethics – Parfit's "Repugnant Conclusion" and ethical skepticism of Heyd's Person-Affecting Approach – will be suggested. It is my belief that such rereading of these paradoxes demonstrates in what sense the questions how do we have, and how else can we have children is valid and pressing.

(3) As a conclusion I will suggest that this question can be fruitfully addressed in the alternative tradition of ethics originating from Spinoza and Nietzsche. A promising starting point for such an endeavor is a critique of the concepts of „species" and „person" by these philosophers and the reformulation of the idea of „reproduction" that follows from this critique.

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 10, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool
I am currently a lecturer in ethics and applied ethics in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Liverpool. I specialize in moral and political philosophy but my work stretches over disciplinary boundaries.
(Note: This is a co-authored paper with Stephen McLeod and Daniel Hill, both University of Liverpool.)

Title: **THE CONCEPT OF ENTRAPMENT**
Keywords: civil entrapment, crime, entrapment, intentions, legal entrapment, proactive law enforcement

Abstract
Regarding entrapment, one can distinguish three questions. Whether entrapment has occurred is one question. In order to answer this question, an extensionally correct definition of entrapment is required. Whether the agent erred (morally or legally) in entrapping is another question. To put the question another way, when, if at all, is entrapment permissible? Whether the target ought to be held (morally or legally) responsible is a third question. That is to say, under what conditions, if any, is an entrapped party properly to be held culpable for the act that they have been entrapped into committing?

Our focus in this article is exclusively on the first question. This question, we believe, must be answered in a rigorous and extensionally adequate manner before the other two questions can best be addressed. For reasons presented in the paper, we do not believe that attempts to do this that have featured in the literature so far have managed to reach this goal.

Our question is then this: what makes an act one of entrapment? We make a standard distinction between legal entrapment, which is carried out by parties acting in their capacities as law-enforcement agents, and civil entrapment, which is not. Our aim is to provide a definition of entrapment that encompasses both civil and legal instances and that makes some crucial improvements, in ways we explain as we go along, upon existing definitions (which cover legal entrapment only) that have previously been published elsewhere. Section I is primarily concerned with these preliminary matters of clarification and with setting the stage to the substantial discussion that follows.

In section II, we explain why, in our view, a normatively thin definition of legal entrapment —that is, according to our usage, one that, of itself, does not settle the questions of permissibility or culpability— is needed.

In section III, we explain two existing normatively thin definitions of legal entrapment and we point out some problems with their extensional adequacy. One of the existing definitions includes as a necessary condition of an act's being one of legal entrapment that the agent arrests the target. The other includes, instead, the condition that the agent is able to observe the target committing the crime. We explain why we consider neither these two conditions nor certain weakened versions of them to be necessary conditions of an act's being one of legal entrapment.

In section IV, we provide a new definition of legal entrapment that builds on the previous two but which excises what we take to be the problems with their extensional adequacy. In this definition, we replace the arrest and observability conditions with a new condition, the traceability condition. We explain and justify this condition. We include an additional new condition, which we also explain and justify, relating to the agent's intention to render the target vulnerable to the agent's (or a third party's) power.

In section V, we generalize our new definition of legal entrapment to obtain a definition of entrapment that encompasses all cases classified in Section I.

In section VI, we spell out some implications of our account. Section VII includes a brief summary and some concluding remarks.

Taylor, Isaac
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 21, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
Affiliation: Goethe University Frankfurt

Bio: Isaac Taylor is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Goethe University Frankfurt. His current work focuses on the ethics of counter-terrorism, and he has recently published papers in CRISPP, Ethics and Global Politics, and Public Affairs Quarterly.

Title: **You Talkin' to Me? The Moral Prohibition on Negotiating with Terrorists**
Keywords: terrorism; negotiation; just war theory; last resort; violence

Abstract
The absolute moral prohibition on negotiating with terrorists is so widely endorsed that few democratic politicians ever bring it into question. Those who support dialogue with terrorist groups are viewed, at best, as naive or, more often, as extremist sympathisers. Yet advocates of the prohibition do not always fully explain its rationale. In this paper, I explore what possible grounds there could be for not negotiating. Against the grain of received wisdom, I offer a qualified defence of talking with terrorists.

Some argue that the tactics that terrorists use - the deliberate targeting of civilians - should lead us to avoid negotiations. This is because (1) negotiating creates incentives for others to use those tactics; and/or (2) negotiating undeservedly rewards terrorists by granting them perceived legitimacy. Against (1), I argue that the cost-benefit structure facing potential terrorists is more complex than the argument suggests. Whether or not incentives will be created will depend on how non-terrorists' grievances are treated. Further, empirical studies show that the decision to use terrorism is not usually the result of a simple calculation about the most likely way to achieve one's goals; the willingness to use political violence is rather fostered over a long period of time, beginning in adolescence. Against (2), I suggest that, although negotiations may undeservedly reward terrorist groups, we need to balance this against the undeserved suffering that may result if negotiations are not pursued. Often, this will tell in favour of negotiation.

Others claim that it is the organisational structure of terrorist groups that should lead us to avoid negotiation. The terrorist groups we face today - ISIS and, before them, al-Qaeda - are highly decentralised. Nicholas Fotion has argued that negotiations with these sorts of entities need not be pursued since, even of agreement is reached with one faction of the group in question, the agreement may count for nothing with other factions. In response, I argue that, if negotiations with one faction address grievances that are shared across the group as a whole, an agreement can count for something with other factions. And, even if they do not, reaching agreement with one faction may still be worthwhile.

Finally, it has been said that the goals of terrorist organisations are often so extreme - in the case of ISIS, for example, involving an ever-expanding caliphate implementing totalitarian rule on an unwilling population - that they are not the sort of thing we can compromise on in negotiation. However, I argue that negotiation can achieve a number of valuable side effects even when we do not make compromises. It can provide intelligence about how the group operates; it can lead terrorists to modify their demands when they see how they are viewed by outsiders; it can be used to undermine moderate members' support for a terrorist group's leadership if they are shown to be intractable. Negotiation need not involve compromising with evil if done carefully.

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 10, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Affiliation: University of Oxford

I am a DPhil candidate in Philosophy at the University of Oxford, working on Rawlsian contractualism and the questions of exclusion that arise due to the theory's account of personhood (e.g. the implications for foetuses, children, future generations, non-human animals etc.) Prior to joining Oxford, I completed an MSc in Political Theory at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and a BA in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE) at the University of Warwick.

Title: **Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice: The Fortificationist Argument**
Keywords: criminal justice; neurointerventions; John Rawls; political liberalism; fortificationist theory of punishment

Abstract
Certain criminal offenders are required or given the option to undergo neurointerventions – interventions that act on individuals' brain – either as part of their sentence or as a condition of their parole. Most commonly, this occurs in the form of lowering sex offenders' testosterone through the administration of drugs, such as Triptorelin. Due to the increasing possibilities of using such interventions, there is a growing academic debate on the moral questions regarding their potential uses to achieve greater empathy and impulse control in offenders.

In this paper, I argue that neurointerventions are prima facie permissible. The first part of the argument is premised on Jeffrey Howard's case for the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment. According to this view, criminal offenders who violate just laws demonstrate that they cannot act on the basis of their first moral power, 'reasonableness', which is the capacity to understand and be motivated by the requirements of justice. When citizens violate their duty to demonstrate the reliability of their first moral power, states ought to ensure that they will comply with it in the future. Thus, in this interpretation of the rehabilitative approach to punishment, the purpose of a criminal justice system must be to foster offenders' capacity to both understand and be motivated by justice. Although neurointerventions are not typically included in the recommendations of the practical ways in which this capacity can be developed, I contend that the Fortificationist Theory of Punishment offers a pro tanto reason in favour of this policy.

In the second part of the argument, I claim that those who lack the first moral power have an interest in developing it, at least to the degree that enables them to participate in social cooperation. If this is true, states must ensure that all their citizens become reasonable, not only because they must make sure that their citizens can comply with their duties towards each other, but also because they have the duty to satisfy their citizens' interest in developing the first moral power. If neurointerventions are the only way to ensure that certain criminal offenders can develop those capacities, states seem to have a second kind of prima facie duty to provide these neurointerventions.

Torres Quiroga, Miguel Angel
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 4, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
My name is Miguel Angel, and I am a 33-year philosophy student from Mexico currently based in Spain. My educational background is in psychology, and after many years as a practicing psychologist I have decided to shift from the behavioral sciences to a new path in the field of Ethics and Philosophy of Science.
Affiliation: Ph.D. student at the Autonomous University of Madrid. Spain.

Title: **A socialist approach on distributive justice in gestational surrogacy**
Keywords: 1.- Altruistic & commercial Surrogacy 2.- Reproductive freedom 3.- Equality of opportunities 4.- Gerald A. Cohen 5.- Commodification of human reproduction

Abstract
Currently, the gestational surrogacy context in the UK and Canada is going to face enormous pressure: intended parents are increasingly making their reproductive dreams into reality not in their own countries but in the USA, Russia, and Ukraine, where commercial surrogacy is allowed. In this sense, altruism, as it has been hitherto understood, is being replaced by the free market's commercial arrangements wherever governments giving markets control over more and more issues. Markets have been increasingly empowered by governments to manage many of the issues we care most about, such as health services and food prices.

According to Gerald Cohen (Freedom and money, in On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other Essays, ed. Michael Otsuka. OUP. Oxford. 1999), the negative concept of liberty fostered and upheld by Isaiah Berlin has more to do with non-capitalist left-wing distributive justice than with the right-wing concept of liberty whereby each individual holds property rights (above all to key resources like land and means of production) which the government has a duty to protect above any other interest. Berlin (Two concepts of liberty, 1969) rejected almost all state interference in the private lives of citizens, but this stance was demonstrated more as a defence against totalitarianism than as a libertarian right over any kind of property. As an Analytical Marxist, Cohen held that poverty is not only a limitation on the exercise of freedom –as many liberals like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin pointed out- but that is also an interference that is hard to overcome for anyone in a position of economic disadvantage, given the enormous gap between the well-off and the worst-off that we live with. Of particular interest are Cohen's contributions on the decision-making process restricted by the lack of money in later market societies. Given that money is the passport to get what we need or to exercise the freedom to do what we want, in that context low-income or lack of money is not only an obstacle we have to overcome, but it is also an interference with freedom by itself. Even though the state should acknowledge reproductive freedom, I intend to cast light on the whole picture of commercial surrogacy: the women without properly satisfied needs and no other chance to earn enough money. The lack of opportunities for surrogates and the decisions they take within a restricted context is at the heart of the debate.

Therefore, it is urgent to pose questions only a few are asking: How could the state foster policies of reproductive freedom while defending equality of opportunity? To do so, I propose to address the following issues:

1) Does Cohen provide a normative theoretical framework capable of facing the liberal/libertarian endorsement of commercial surrogacy and the primary role the free market in it?

2) Is there any moral basis to both support reproductive freedom and equality of opportunities through a payment to surrogate mothers covered by the public health services?

3) On which way does the community Ethos suggested by Cohen in 'Why not Socialism?' enable us to propose cooperative and compensated terms for Surrogacy?

Tskhadadze, Tamar

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 8, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
Ilia State University, Tbilisi, Georgia.
College of Arts and Sciences.
Currently is an associate professor in Philosophy at Ilia State University since 2012. Worked as an associate professor in Gender Studies at Ivane Javakhishvili State University of Tbilisi (2009-2012) and assistant professor (2006-2008) and lecturer (2001-2006) in Philosophy at the same university.
At various times was a visiting scholar or a guest professor at Appalachian State University (2003), Stanford University (2004-2005), Friebourg University (2013), Ruhr University Bochum (2016).
Studied Philosophy at Tbilisi State University (1989-1995 - Diploma, 1996-1998 - Postgraduate Studies), from which obtained a PhD in History of Philosophy in 2006.
Has published a number of articles on problems of philosophy of science, feminist epistemology, rationality and values.
Has edited several edited volumes on problems of philosophy.

Title: **Whose Is the Injury and Whose Can Be Anger? Hume on the Origin of 'Moral Feelings' and the Feminist Reclamation of Anger.**
Keywords: Emotions, Flourishing, Hume, Moral Anger, Virtue

Abstract
Theorizing 'moral anger' has been one among many important contributions of feminist philosophers to moral and political philosophy. The moral value of the anger of the oppressed at the injustice they endure has been addressed by many feminist theorists and from many different angels. In almost all of these treatments, however, it is assumed that the righteous anger has to be the anger of the oppressed themselves, of those who have been injured by the injustice.
In his second Enquiry (Section IX. Conclusion), Hume, in his discussion of the origin of altruistic feelings ('feelings of humanity'), highlights an interesting aspect of these feelings – an aspect that, I argue, can be interpreted as Hume's standard for distinguishing the moral standpoint from the standpoint of 'self-love' (if any such sharp distinction can be at all ascribed to him). Roughly, his reasoning can be summarized in the following manner: It is not just having a feeling that you were wronged what makes your indignation a moral feeling, but your claim that it does not matter that it was you; in other words, when your anger for an endured injury is moral, you demand that the whole mankind to be indignant about the action, to condemn it and its perpetrator.
This Humean insight of moral anger as 'selfless' can be understood as Hume's version of universalizability requirement known in moral theory. I argue that it is largely overlooked in discussions of moral anger, feminist or not, and can be fruitfully applied to a number of problems arising within these discussions. One such problem is that of considering moral anger as a virtue under grossly non-ideal circumstances, which is articulated by Lisa Tessman in the context of her attempt to accommodate the virtue of moral anger within her neo-Aristotelian theory of virtue as related with human flourishing (Tessman 2005, Bell 2009). Humean insight has implications for current criticisms of moral anger too (e.g. Pettigrove 2012) as well as criticisms that are based on conflation of moral anger with Nietzschean 'resentiment' (e.g. Brown 1993).
After discussing these implications, the paper will address the plausible worry that what I call Humean insight of the selflessness of moral anger may undermine the authority of oppressed over their injury and anger.
The paper will conclude by discussing a more general applicability of Humean sentimentalist ethics to feminist theorizing of anger. The apparent problem here is that while the latter is predominantly predicated on undermining the reason / emotion dichotomy and insisting on a cognitive aspect of emotions, Hume's theory rests on a sharp dichotomy of cognitions and passions. However, I argue that Humean theory of action makes this conflict of lesser consequence, rendering his view of emotions better compatible with feminist views of emotions.
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Presentation: 9th June, Session 16, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
D.Phil Candidate, University of Oxford.

My research focus is in applied ethics and analytic political philosophy; I am particularly interested in the application of ethical reasoning to current social and policy debates. My recent work has concentrated on free speech, harm, and disrespect.

Title: **What Is Wrong with Cultural Appropriation? Cultural Appropriation as Disrespect**
Keywords: cultural appropriation, disrespect, insult, representation

Abstract
"Cultural appropriation" remains a highly controversial subject of public discussion. At Yale University, two professors resigned from university positions in the aftermath of a heated debate sparked in part by cultural appropriation. At the 2017 Whitney Biennial in New York City, critics have demanded that Dana Schutz' painting of murdered African-American teenager Emmett Till be destroyed, on the grounds that it appropriates African-American suffering. And novelist Lionel Shriver's 2016 speech at the Brisbane Writers' Festival, in which she advanced the hope that cultural appropriation would be considered a "passing fad," prompted a vehement backlash and led several critics to walk out of the speech in protest.

Cultural appropriation has received relatively little attention, however, in analytic political philosophy, and several avenues for discussion of the subject remain entirely unexplored. In this paper, I examine what exactly cultural appropriation is and why it could be wrong.

First, I clarify several basic concepts which are central to understanding the idea of cultural appropriation. The paper defines cultural appropriation as the normatively wrongful use of insider cultural elements by cultural outsiders, and defends this definition against alternatives. The paper then distinguishes between three types of appropriation: object appropriation, subject appropriation, and content appropriation. It focuses its analysis solely upon the latter two classes of appropriation.

Second, I outline the state of the philosophical literature on appropriation and suggest that it is valuable but incomplete, as it does not conceptually account for a range of plausible reasons that cultural appropriation could be wrong. And third, I examine in more detail one of these unexplored wrongs: the wrong of insult.

This section first draws upon general theories of insult - including those developed by Archard, Feinberg, and Neu - to offer a working definition of insults. It then identifies four specific ways in which acts of cultural appropriation could be insulting. First, they may be improperly inaccurate. Second, they may be improperly reductive. Third, they may be accurate but improperly attention-drawing. Fourth, they may improperly omit.

I then argue that not all acts of cultural transfer which are inaccurate, reductive, or attention-drawing - and not all cultural transfers which omit - are actually insulting. This is because we must apply a reasonable effort standard in evaluating whether any alleged act of appropriation actually qualifies as insulting. I argue that any theory of cultural appropriation as insult which does not include at least some type of reasonable effort standard generates highly implausible implications.

Lastly, the paper attempts to measure the normative weight we ought to assign to wrongs of cultural appropriation as insult. In other words, it examines just how bad it is to insultingly appropriate. Employing a framework developed by Sarah Buss, I argue that people have a right to be treated with social regard, and that unjustified insults violate this right. I conclude by arguing, however, that the right to be treated with social regard is a relatively weak rights claim when weighed against other prudential and normative considerations.

Waldorf, Steven
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 7, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
Steven Waldorf is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Thought and Intellectual History at the University of Cambridge.

Title: **The Incompleteness of Philosophy: Human Ends and Moral Normativity**
Keywords: End, Normativity, Virtue, Secular, Incompleteness

Abstract
In the teleological tradition of moral philosophy, the source of normativity in human actions is the end of human nature. Actions which conduce to the end are virtuous, while actions which are incompatible with achievement of the end are vicious. In this tradition of theorizing, the two most important sources are Aristotle and Aquinas, whose thought concerning the human telos and the ethics which derives from it continues to be important to contemporary proponents of teleological ethics. Some present-day secular philosophers, such as Bonnie Kent, use Aristotelian-Thomistic teleological ethics to argue that individuals can have true virtue independent of religion, a position she maintains in opposition to Alasdair MacIntyre. In Kent's view, Aquinas posited two intrinsically complete human ends. One, the happiness which comes from the life of intellectual and moral virtue in this world, is entirely natural and can be achieved without the help of divine grace. The second end, which is extraneous to the already-complete natural end, is the happiness associated with the beatific vision in the afterlife, which is known about only through Christian revelation and which requires divine grace to achieve. Since the former end is, like the latter, intrinsically complete, the natural virtues are themselves intrinsically complete and hence true virtues. Since non-religious people can have the natural virtues just as much as religious people, they are capable of being equally virtuous.

Assessing Kent's argument about the possibility of virtue in a non-religious context necessarily involves assessing her reading of Aquinas, since she explicitly grounds her claim about the possibility of secular virtue in what she takes to be Aquinas's view that there is an intrinsically complete natural human end. However, this does not seem to be Aquinas's position, something which is clear from a consideration of how he interpreted Aristotle's own treatment of the human end. I argue that, when Aquinas read Aristotle on the question of human nature's end, and hence the source of moral normativity, of virtue and vice, for human beings, he found only an incomplete account. That is, he found that in philosophy, as distinct from revelation, there is no intrinsically complete natural end and hence, simply speaking, no true virtue available to both religious and non-religious persons

Such an analysis of Aquinas and Aristotle casts a new light on Kent's argument for the possibility of secular virtue, since it undermines the theoretical framework upon which her argument is constructed. Aquinas's view of the incompleteness of philosophy, that is, the unavailability to philosophia of a complete natural human end, renders it impossible to argue, as Kent does, directly from Thomas's theory of the end of human nature to a Thomistic conception of the possibility of secular virtue. This is not to say that Kent's fundamental thesis about the possibility of secular virtue is false, but rather that its establishment must rely on a more stable line of argumentation than is found in Kent's work.

Williams, Bekka
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 8, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
THIS IS A CO-AUTHORED PAPER.
C. Thi Nguyen is an Assistant Professor in the department of Philosophy and Humanities at Utah Valley University. He works in moral and aesthetic epistemology, particularly on issues of objectivity, expertise, disagreement, autonomy, and trust. He also works in the philosophy of games.
Bekka Williams is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Minnesota State University, Mankato. Her work includes issues regarding collective moral obligation, egalitarian political philosophy, and various issues in applied ethics. She is currently working in particular on questions surrounding sexual consent and individuals with advanced dementia.

Title: **Moral Outrage Porn**
Keywords: applied ethics, pornography, aesthetic moralism, moral discourse, grandstanding

Abstract
We begin by noting the emergence in popular culture of non-sexual uses of the word “porn”. References to “food porn”, “real estate porn”, etc. have become common. We argue that these are legitimate uses of porn as a generic category, and we offer an explanatorily useful account of porn that covers these generic uses.
We first register our agreement with Michael Rea that the definition of sexual porn relies on the more basic definition of what it is to use or treat a representation as porn, and we claim that this is also true of porn in general. We argue that using a representation as porn (roughly) is to use that representation for the purpose of generating one’s own arousal and/or enjoyment of the object of the representation freed from the typically attendant consequences of engagement with that object. Another way of putting this is that, on our view, treating a representation as Ω-porn is to use a representation of Ω for the purpose of generating one’s own Ω arousal/enjoyment, freed from the typically attendant consequences of engaging with Ω.
We then define porn, in the generic sense, in relation to our account of (generic) treating-as-porn. (Generic) porn, we argue, is any representation which is intended to or reasonably foreseeably will be used as porn.
We elaborate on applications of our account elsewhere, but in this paper we use the account to examine a previously under-theorized yet, we think, very common occurrence which we term moral outrage porn. Moral outrage porn, we claim, is the flip-side of another recently-identified phenomenon: moral grandstanding. (We would prefer the term “moral exhibitionism”).
Moral outrage porn, following our generic account, involves representations of moral outrage that are intended to or reasonably foreseeably will be used by individuals for the purpose of generating their arousal in and/or enjoyment of expressing moral outrage, freed from the typically attendant consequences of such expressions. As political outrage is a sub-type of moral outrage, we argue, the same account applies to specifically political outrage porn. For example, the commentary of Rush Limbaugh and the comedy of The Daily Show are examples of moral outrage porn.
We conclude by tentatively commenting on the moral status of moral outrage porn. On the account of generic porn we defend, we find the general moral condemnation of (generic) porn to be unsustainable. But, we suggest, both production of and enjoyment of moral outrage porn is criticizable from a Virtue Ethics perspective, in the same way that Tosi and Warmke have argued that “moral grandstanding” is morally problematic. Moral grandstanding, Tosi and Warmke claim, wrongfully turns “one’s contribution to public discourse into a vanity project.”
Similarly, we suspect, moral outrage porn itself hinges on using (putative) moral importance for one’s personal enjoyment, which devalues the significance of the relevant moral facts. Importantly, this devaluation does not hinge on a failure to treat the relevant content as true—as treating the content of moral outrage porn as true in most cases increases the relevant arousal/enjoyment.
We conclude by giving a call for future work on the moral status of moral outrage porn.

Wills, Vanessa
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 24, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
The George Washington University

Vanessa Wills is a political philosopher, ethicist, educator, and activist.

Her areas of specialization are moral, social, and political philosophy, nineteenth century German philosophy (especially Karl Marx), and the philosophy of race. Her research is importantly informed by her study of Marx's work, and focuses on the ways in which economic and social arrangements can inhibit or promote the realization of values such as freedom, equality, and human development.

Title: **Heaven is a Place on Earth: Marx's call for the abolition of morality**
Keywords: Marx, moral philosophy, historical materialism, alienation, realm of ends, Sittlichkeit

Abstract
Much of Karl Marx's writing is devoted to the critique of prominent moral systems such as Kantianism, Utilitarianism, and Christian ethics, among others. In carrying out these critiques, Marx examines how particular historical—specifically, social and economic—conditions have conditioned various manifestations of morality. But Marx argues not only that the content of particular moral theories is historical, but also that the very notion and activity of moral theory itself is a product of human activity and has arisen in the course of human social development, and that it will be abolished at a time when the gap between society as it is and society as it ought to be has been closed, and human appearance has been brought into accordance with human essence. In a society already organized so as to promote the all-sided development of the human individual, the wish, expressed in various forms of morality, for human freedom and the brotherhood of man, would be realized in human social arrangements.

For Marx, morality is "historical" in (at least) two important senses. The first is that the validity of specific moral commands and specific moral theories depends on the specific contours of human social development at any given time, and on the question of which things will promote human development, understood as the expansion and sophistication of forms of purposive intervention into the natural and social environment, at a particular point in human history.

More controversially, morality is also "historical" in the sense that morality is a social product that has arisen at a particular stage in human history and, Marx predicts, will also pass away when the gap between human existence as it is and human existence as it ought to be is closed. In a fully developed communist society, Marx argues, the social contradictions that create the basis for morality will be abolished.

It can be challenging to spell out what precisely Marx means by this. What would a "post-moral" world look like? In a fully-developed communist society, would there be any fact of the matter about moral right and wrong? Would individuals have any occasion at all to engage in moral reasoning? And is a "post-moral" world even desirable in the first place? In this talk, I will address these questions and consider their relationships to Marx's vision of what it means for human beings to adopt human flourishing and social development as their highest aim, and to recognize "man as the highest being for man." By discussing Marx's ideals of communist society in connection with Kant's "realm of ends" and the Hegelian notion of Sittlichkeit, it is possible to develop Marx's notion of a "post-moral" human condition and to appreciate its relationship to the abolition of the humans' alienation from their products, from their fellow humans, and from their species nature.

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 5, 11h45-13h30

Short Bio
I am an Assitant PRofessor at the university of istanbul sehir and i teach legal philosophy and sociology.

Title: **Corruption and Normativity of the Capital in Emerging Market States**
Keywords: Habermas, corruption, legitimacy crisis, law and democracy

Abstract
Many Emerging Market States cope with a large amount of corruption which is hard to tackle with regular political instruments. That is because corruption can be delineated as the lack of normativity which regulates the capital flow, though binding rules and procedures. However, this process of normativity cannot only be confined to a merely legislative or political process, it is a reflection of the change of value systems and normativity within society reflecting the entire legal and political system of that particular state.
In this paper, I argue that economic growth in emerging market states triggers a process of normative change due to changes of value systems that will eventual curb down the corruption. The rules have to be derived from social change which ensues from within society and finds it way through legislation in political and legislative institutions. In order to make my point I want to emphasise in particular on Jürgen Habermas book on Legitimacy crises and argue how normativity of capitalism unfolds in emerging markets states. Since the society in emerging market states lie behind in the process of modernization, the level of normativity regulating capital flow is rather insufficient, leading to unbounded corruption.
This is why I claim, referring to Habermas, that emerging market states are undergoing a normative change within society which will have its recourse in political and legal institutions. Late capitalist development in emerging market states will also lead to a late process of modernization and eventually to a rather late (legal) normative development that will be able to curtail corruption effectively. In doing so, I will concentrate on how capital flow will trigger normative change within society necessitating political and institutional change. Or in other words, how capitalism will necessitate (legal)the normativization of the capital.

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Presentation: 8th June, Session 3, 10h00-11h30

Short Bio
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Ziegler, Z. (2016). A Relational Theory of Moral Responsibility. Prolegomena : časopis za filozofiju, 15(1), 71-88. Preuzeto s http://hrcak.srce.hr/164911 -- Fulltext: english, pdf (113 KB) Philpapers: http://philpapers.org/rec/ZIEART
Ziegler, Zsolt. (2017). Two Dimensional Modal Ontological Argument for the Existence of God. European Journal of Science and Theology, 13(1), 161-171.

Title: **Closest Cases of Particularism**
Keywords: Case Pairs, Control Principle, Moral Luck, Moral Particularism, Moral Responsibility

Abstract
Moral particularism is the philosophical view which bounds morally similar cases and so ascribes moral judgment in accordance with the similarity that holds between cases (Dancy 1983, 1994, 2004, 2013). Originally, this view was developed for purposes of evaluating if the moral status of an action is determined by general moral principles.

So-called pair cases (Levy 2015, 1) have been used as an important instrument to evaluate the problem of moral luck. In one such case, luck significantly affects the agent's moral development or the result of her action. In the second case, by contrast, luck is of contrary or of no moral significance at all. Otherwise, traditional pair cases of moral luck are very much alike in that they share all other morally significant feats except the luck factor.
Michael Zimmerman, a leading figure in the contemporary moral luck debate, presents two such cases that contrast the actions of an agent called Georg with the actions of another agent called George, both of which pertain the agents killing a third agent called Henrik. As Zimmerman imagines a case in which "Georg would have freely killed Henrik but for some feature of the case over which he had no control. This being so, it seems that we must conclude here, as before, that Georg is as culpable as George [the unlucky pair murderer killing a person]" (Zimmerman 2002, 565). Hart formulates the relevant question for our moral assessment as follows: "Why should the accidental fact that an intended harmful outcome has not occurred be a ground for punishing less a criminal who may be equally dangerous and equally wicked?" (1968, 131).

Traditionally, it has been argued that the existence of moral luck contradicts the principle that "two people ought not to be morally assessed differently if the only other differences between them are due to factors beyond their control," also known as the Control Principle-Corollary (Nelkin 2013). The control principle says that the agents in both cases deserve the same moral judgment, on grounds of the assumption that, if a lucky or unlucky event had not occurred in one case, then the agent would have acted in the same way as the other agent did, or her action's result would have been the same (Richards 1986, 171; Greco 1995, 91).
I am going to show that the pair cases of moral luck cannot be satisfactorily reconstructed within a particularist framework. I argue that particularism does not readily offer a meaningful interpretation for the phrase 'the same moral judgment', which thus renders it impossible for a moral particularist to apply the control principle. Instead of the traditional pair cases of moral luck, I am going to argue, the particularist framework offers pair cases that are in a relevant sense closer pairs (than the traditional moral luck cases), as detailed below. Moreover, it is to these "better resembling" case pairs, then, that we shall ascribe only a similar, but not the same moral judgment. If this is right, then specifically the traditional pair cases of moral luck cannot be formed in accordance with particularism.

Zinsmaier, Judith
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Presentation: 8th June, Session 9, 15h00-16h30

Short Bio
I studied musical science, rhetoric and philosophy. Since April 2016 I am a research associate at the International Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (IZEW), University of Tübingen (Germany). In my dissertations thesis I want to explore Hannah Arendt's normative concept of opinion.

Title: **What makes an opinion legitimate? Hannah Arendt in comparison with Jürgen Habermas**
Keywords: normative political theory, Hannah Arendt, Jürgen Habermas, opinion, "post-factual age"

Abstract
The term “post-factual” has become widespread during the last year. Regarding our “post-factual age” journalists and other critical players call for a return to truth. This call simplifies the problem. It is not enough to stress the significance of facts. Although political action must of course be related to facts, the key concept of politics is the opinion. For Hannah Arendt, the significance of opinions is precisely what constitutes the difference between politics and sciences.

Political philosophy often reflects upon the opinion from the macro perspective of the public opinion in which the individual opinions are already dissolved. The public opinion mostly serves to theoretically solve the problem of the authorization of power. The micro perspective of the individual opinion is mostly not explored explicitly.

However, considering the current political debates the latter is very profitable. A simple incantation of truth falls short in dealing with the rise of right-wing populism. Instead, individual opinions must be examined for their legitimacy and if necessary condemned.

The question of the legitimacy of an opinion is a sensitive topic as freedom of speech is one of the cornerstones of our modern democracies. Within political philosophy particularly the tradition of liberalism struggles to justify limits on the freedom of speech.

In contrast, the political philosophies of Arendt and Habermas allow to deduce answers to the question of an opinion’s legitimacy. The reason for this is that the basis of their political thought is not the free and autonomous individual of the political liberalism. Arendt and Habermas rather chose the multitude of human beings as basis of their philosophies.

Their concepts of opinion are rooted in this fundamental pluralism. In contrast to the perspective of philosophical liberalism for Arendt and Habermas an opinion is not a personal interest that is made public at a subsequent stage. The individual and the public are instead conceptualized as related to one another.

Still, their concrete conceptions of a legitimate opinion differ. Habermas assesses the legitimacy of an opinion based on his ideal of a rational consensus. In contrast, Arendt’s normative concept of opinion gained by reinterpreting Kant’s aesthetic power of judgment is – although anything but subjectivist – not oriented toward a universal rationality.

In my presentation, I would like to reconstruct these different normative conceptions of opinion, to explore their theoretical foundations and to show their influence on an analysis of the current political debates.