Keynote Speakers
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Professor Samuel Scheffler (New York University, USA)
SAMUEL SCHEFFLER (B.A., Harvard; Ph.D., Princeton) works mainly in the areas of moral and political philosophy. His publications include six books: The Rejection of Consequentialism (1982, rev. ed. 1994), Human Morality (1992), Boundaries and Allegiances (2001), Equality and Tradition (2010), Death and the Afterlife (Ed. Niko Kolodny, 2013), and Why Worry about Future Generations? (2018), all published by Oxford University Press. He has received Guggenheim and NEH Fellowships, and has been a Visiting Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a member of the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and Letters, and a foreign member of the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters. |
Conference title:
Moral Independence Revisited: A Note on the Development of Rawls’s Thought: 1977-1980 and Beyond
Abstract:
Some commentators have expressed puzzlement about the influence a short paper of mine (“Moral Independence and the Original Position”) may have had on the development of John Rawls’s thought after the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971. The issue arises because Rawls said in the Introduction to Political Liberalism (published in 1993) that my paper had played a role in the evolution of his views, yet readers have found it difficult to understand how or why it did so, since there is no evident connection between the content of my paper and the factors Rawls identifies elsewhere in his Introduction as having been responsible for the major differences between Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. The question is of interest only insofar as it may help shed light on the complex evolution of Rawls’s thinking during the period between 1971 and 1993. That evolution is the topic of this paper. By examining some of Rawls’s published and unpublished lectures from the late 1970s and early 1980s, and drawing on correspondence I had with him during those years, I try to provide some context for his remarks about my paper and, more importantly, to refresh people’s memory of the issues that were on Rawls’s mind during that period. This may help to illuminate the position he eventually arrived at in Political Liberalism and some of the motivations for it. It may also help combat a certain tendency to anachronism: a tendency to read the finished doctrines of that book back into his earlier thought.
Moral Independence Revisited: A Note on the Development of Rawls’s Thought: 1977-1980 and Beyond
Abstract:
Some commentators have expressed puzzlement about the influence a short paper of mine (“Moral Independence and the Original Position”) may have had on the development of John Rawls’s thought after the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971. The issue arises because Rawls said in the Introduction to Political Liberalism (published in 1993) that my paper had played a role in the evolution of his views, yet readers have found it difficult to understand how or why it did so, since there is no evident connection between the content of my paper and the factors Rawls identifies elsewhere in his Introduction as having been responsible for the major differences between Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. The question is of interest only insofar as it may help shed light on the complex evolution of Rawls’s thinking during the period between 1971 and 1993. That evolution is the topic of this paper. By examining some of Rawls’s published and unpublished lectures from the late 1970s and early 1980s, and drawing on correspondence I had with him during those years, I try to provide some context for his remarks about my paper and, more importantly, to refresh people’s memory of the issues that were on Rawls’s mind during that period. This may help to illuminate the position he eventually arrived at in Political Liberalism and some of the motivations for it. It may also help combat a certain tendency to anachronism: a tendency to read the finished doctrines of that book back into his earlier thought.
Professor Serena Olsaretti (ICREA, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Spain)
Prof. Serena Olsaretti is a political philosopher based at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, where she holds a research professorship with ICREA, the Catalan Institute of Research and Advanced Studies. Before moving to Barcelona in 2010, she was a University Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, which she joined in 2001. Her work has focused primarily on theories of justice, the ethics of markets and theories of well-being. Currently she is especially interested in questions of justice involving the family, but also continues to work on libertarianism, desert and egalitarianism. At UPF she teachs in the MA in Political Philosophy. |
Conference title:
Unpaid Caring Labour and Liberal Equality
Abstract:
Feminists have long taken to task both the socio-economic institutions of liberal democracies and liberal theories of justice for failing to recognise the central role of unpaid caring labour for the maintenance of just societies. In response, liberal political philosophers now readily concede that how unpaid caring labour is distributed between men and women, and its unequal effects on their life prospects, are serious concerns of justice.
This paper does two main things. First, it argues that viewing the problem of unpaid caring labour as being only or primarily a problem about the inequalities between women and men vis-à-vis such labour is mistaken. To properly do justice to women, we need to make a case for why it is unjust for caring labour to be unpaid, regardless of whether women or men do it, and regardless of whether they choose to do it freely. The second thing the paper does is to argue that, contrary to what has been thought, liberal equality can buttress such a case.
Unpaid Caring Labour and Liberal Equality
Abstract:
Feminists have long taken to task both the socio-economic institutions of liberal democracies and liberal theories of justice for failing to recognise the central role of unpaid caring labour for the maintenance of just societies. In response, liberal political philosophers now readily concede that how unpaid caring labour is distributed between men and women, and its unequal effects on their life prospects, are serious concerns of justice.
This paper does two main things. First, it argues that viewing the problem of unpaid caring labour as being only or primarily a problem about the inequalities between women and men vis-à-vis such labour is mistaken. To properly do justice to women, we need to make a case for why it is unjust for caring labour to be unpaid, regardless of whether women or men do it, and regardless of whether they choose to do it freely. The second thing the paper does is to argue that, contrary to what has been thought, liberal equality can buttress such a case.
Professor Samuel Freeman (University of Pennsylvania, USA)
Avalon Professor in the Humanities Professor of Philosophy and of Law Ph.D. Harvard University J.D. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill A.B. (Highest Honors) University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Samuel Freeman teaches courses on social and political philosophy, ethics, philosophy of law, and philosophy and the Constitution. He has written books on Liberalism and Distributive Justice (2018), Justice and the Social Contract (2007) and on the political philosophy of John Rawls (2007). Freeman edited the Cambridge Companion to Rawls (2002), as well as John Rawls's Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (2007) and his Collected Papers (1999). He is currently working on a manuscript on liberalism. |
Conference title:
Ideal Theory and Racial Justice: On Charles Mills’ Tanner Lecture.
Abstract:
Rawls claims his theory of justice is “the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society.” Justice as fairness would be agreed to in the original position because it would be generally accepted and willingly complied with by free and equal moral persons in a well-ordered democratic society. Charles Mills argues that Rawls’s ideal theory is inapplicable to unjust societies, including the United States since it is a racist and not a democratic society. What is required instead is a non-ideal theory of reparations to rectify the history of racial injustice in the United States. I contend that any non-ideal theory of justice presupposes an ideal theory that sets forth the fundamental requirements of justice that have been violated and that are to be rectified. An ideal theory of justice constructed for a democratic society applies to a society so long as ideal theory provides appropriate standards for judging the institutions of that society. Even if the US is still racist, the fundamental principles of Rawls’s democratic conception are an appropriate conception of justice to determine its injustices and for grounding the principles of non-ideal theory that rectify them.
Ideal Theory and Racial Justice: On Charles Mills’ Tanner Lecture.
Abstract:
Rawls claims his theory of justice is “the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society.” Justice as fairness would be agreed to in the original position because it would be generally accepted and willingly complied with by free and equal moral persons in a well-ordered democratic society. Charles Mills argues that Rawls’s ideal theory is inapplicable to unjust societies, including the United States since it is a racist and not a democratic society. What is required instead is a non-ideal theory of reparations to rectify the history of racial injustice in the United States. I contend that any non-ideal theory of justice presupposes an ideal theory that sets forth the fundamental requirements of justice that have been violated and that are to be rectified. An ideal theory of justice constructed for a democratic society applies to a society so long as ideal theory provides appropriate standards for judging the institutions of that society. Even if the US is still racist, the fundamental principles of Rawls’s democratic conception are an appropriate conception of justice to determine its injustices and for grounding the principles of non-ideal theory that rectify them.